Facing up to the threat of maritime terror

Pavin Chachavalpongpun, The Nation, Asia News Network, Bangkok

The Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in the United States dramatically changed the landscape of global security. The threat of land and air terrorism has become every nation's concern. The frontier-less vistas that symbolized the age of globalization have almost been forgotten in the face of the mounting concerns over possible terror attacks.

In this shifting security environment, maritime terrorism poses the latest threat to world safety and the free flow of trade. In the past four years, three major operations -- the attacks on the USS Cole in 2000, the French tanker Limburg in 2002 and the Basra oil terminal -- in which terrorists attacked high-value targets with speedboats packed with explosives, demonstrated how maritime targets are now at risk.

Concerns have been raised within the maritime sectors over their vulnerability to acts of terrorism, as 80 percent of the world's trade is carried out sea. Any disruption in the flow of goods would cause massive financial losses and could freeze global trade.

The Malacca Straits is one of the world's busiest waterways, handling a third of global trade. Thousands of ships and cargo containers ply the narrow 900-km corridor between ports in East Asia, Europe and the Middle East.

It is a lifeline for Asia, whose prosperity and economic growth depend on a peaceful maritime environment. But this environment is now being challenged by rising maritime threats that are coming in various forms. Fears of ships or port facilities being attacked are palpable. Captured ships could be used to transport terrorists, explosives or even weapons of mass destruction to stage attacks on land and from the air. Terrorists could also use small boats for suicide attacks, inflicting maximum impact at sea.

Early signs of such fears can be seen in latest maritime policy of Singapore, one of the world's major ports, where all vessels registered in the country and all port facilities must be fully compliant with the new security provisions of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code. However, extreme measures to curb possible terrorist attacks become less forceful in the light of growing threats from maritime piracy. According to the International Maritime Bureau, 445 piracy cases were reported in 2003, compared to 370 in 2002. A third of the attacks took place in Asia.

The greater danger is that, firstly, pirates are adopting a new attitude that seems to suggest that sea-borne crime is a normal phenomenon in the era of terrorism. In other words, widespread terrorism legitimizes acts of piracy in the face of weak international law and the lack of strong international cooperation against such crimes.

Secondly, it is highly possible that many pirate attacks could be linked to terrorist organizations because they are conducted with increasing sophistication and precision. Terrorists, in the guise of pirates, may ransack valuable cargoes or harm crews with the intention of sabotaging other vessels, key installations, naval bases or port facilities.

Thirdly, terrorists may join hands with pirates to smuggle goods or traffic drugs. Asian states tend to underestimate the potential for cooperation between pirates and terrorists, who already work closely together through illicit business and money laundering. It is evident that terrorists understand the loopholes of sea transport and know how to exploit them to create a state of insecurity in the region. Yet, this maritime threat runs against the nature of regional trade in Asia, which remains thriving and unstoppable. James Boulitier of the Canadian Maritime Forces calls this situation: "The best of times and the worst of times."

In this context, Thailand is facing a paradoxical state of affairs. The Kingdom is eager to represent itself as a center of regional trade. The Kra Canal project will undoubtedly fulfill the country's dream by allowing it to control one third of global trade in its waters. On the other hand, such a project seriously clashes with the state's apprehensions over the worsening security situation in the South. The canal was originally proposed as Suez-style waterway running 115km through Thailand's Kra Isthmus at its narrowest point to connect the Indian and Pacific oceans. Not only would the project be beneficial from the Thai point of view, but also it would alleviate the growing congestion in the Malacca Straits.

Thailand's political fragility has once again been placed above its economic interests due to the eruption of violence in the South. The existence of Muslim extremists in the South and early indications that international terrorists may have shared with them certain types of thinking have revived the long- standing objection that the Kra Canal would cut the country into two. The break-up of the country, so the Thai state fears, would boost the desire for a resurrection of the ancient kingdom of Pattani, which would occupy the space between the lower part of the Canal and the Thai-Malaysian border.

While debate over the nexus between the Kra Canal and political unrest in the South is still going on, other aspects of the project must be highlighted too. If the Kra Canal is to materialize, the government must rethink its maritime policy and reinvigorate its naval capabilities. It needs to have a clear idea of the nature of maritime terrorism, enlarge its naval expenditures, acquire modern technology and seek international cooperation.

The most difficult part will be the institutionalization of the rule of law. Weak government agencies allow the terrorists to take advantage of the system through their lack of discipline and responsibility and through bribery.

It is thus equally essential to recruit quality personnel to oversee and enforce the nation's security.