Fri, 07 Jul 1995

Expanding the meaning of national vigilance

By Mochtar Buchori

JAKARTA (JP): The term "national security" has been used in this society primarily in the military and political sense. It is very seldom that one uses this expression to discuss the security of the country in terms of economic conditions. Still more seldom is this term used to discuss or analyze the security of the country in terms of its social or cultural condition.

The emergence of this particular usage can be well understood if one takes into account that the issue of national security was first publicly launched in 1966, after the abortive coup d'etat by the Indonesian Communist Party. At that time it was the problems of political and military security that were most tangible. But our national situation has changed tremendously since then, and now, in 1995, it is very realistic, I think, to look at our national security issue in terms of our economic, social, and cultural conditions.

It is well to note in this regard that two political concepts have been devised to enhance society's awareness regarding national security. These two concepts are "national resilience" and "national vigilance". These two concepts have, since then, been routinely used as political instruments, to make the public appreciative towards and proactive in efforts launched by the Government to promote national security.

The term "national resilience" was conceived in the early 1970's, if I am not mistaken. I still remember how, in those years, the late Gen. Ali Murtopo asked us intellectuals to find the right translation for the concept ketahanan nasional, while explaining to us what he meant by this term. If I remember correctly he told us that this term means the ability of the nation to avert dangers and to overcome crises. Any kind of danger and crisis: military, political, economic and others.

The term "national vigilance" was conceived about a decade later, if I am not mistaken, in the early 1980s. In those days national campaigns were organized to make the entire society alert to existing political dangers. Special short courses were organized for government officials, from first echelon bureaucrats in the upper level of the hierarchy, down to the fourth echelon people at the district, or kabupaten, government level.

The essence of these short courses on national vigilance was that we must always be on guard towards two kinds of political danger, i.e. danger from the "extreme left" and danger from the "extreme right". Danger from the "extreme left" meant danger from communist ideology. But instructors were always evasive or confused when asked about the exact meaning of "danger from the extreme right". We just had to draw our own conclusions. Some of us thought that it meant political danger imposed by "Islamic fundamentalists", while some others concluded that this term was actually meant to denote political danger dormant within "Islamists and right-wing socialists".

I have never been able to accept this particular model of national vigilance. And I am quite sure that I have never been alone in this respect. The whole model looks too simplistic to me. Somehow, I cannot put away the idea that threats to our national security can come from other sources outside politics and military aggression. I think that we should be equally on guard towards other, more subtle threats or dangers, that could emanate from sources other than the two political extremes. Especially after the big event in 1989, which put an end to the cold war situation, it becomes very clear to me that this model of national vigilance needs some rethinking and updating.

Therefore, it came as a very pleasant surprise and a real treat for me when some time ago I was invited, together with other names familiar to me, to participate in a panel discussion about national vigilance. It turned out that the discussion was attended, I guess, by more than one hundred persons, each one of them looking very official. I learned later on that this audience consisted of officials with at least middle level managerial positions, from government offices, state-owned enterprises, and the private sector. A very important audience in my opinion.

The three panelists were asked first to give their introductory remarks, followed by a question and answer discussion with the audience. The introductory part was opened with comments from an economist, a friend of mine, who was explicitly asked by the host to address the problem of national vigilance in terms of the present economic situation.

He presented his view, in which he pointed out that, viewed within the long term perspective, three present conditions should be considered "unhealthy", "risky" or "potentially explosive, or dangerous". They are foreign debt, inflation, and conglomeration. And, he explained in very a succinct way, why.

The second panelist, a general, spoke briefly about national vigilance in terms of standard substance, i.e. political danger from the extreme right and from the extreme left. While the second panelist gave his presentation, my friend the economist whispered to me that I should talk as elaborately as possible, because we still had about three-and-a-half hours to go. He was afraid that the two of us would become repetitive during the remaining portion of the discussion, realizing that the second panelist tends to be brief and very concise throughout the entire panel discussion.

I received no special request from the host, concerning the specific subject that I should be contributing during this discussion. Taking a clue from the presentation of my friend, the economist, I concluded that the best thing for me to do was to try to expand the concept of national vigilance. To try to explain to the audience that in this era of economic and information globalization, it is not right to restrict our vigilance, regarding national security, to political threats only. We should be equally alert towards threats that come from global economic and cultural interactions.

I purposely talked about "the hidden aspects" of national vigilance and national resilience. By this term, I meant conditions which, at present, look harmless but which, if examined carefully, may reveal seeds for national weakness in the future.

As an example, I gave the danger of what may happen if we are negligent about the type of education currently offered to the young.

It is quite probable that, due to defects in the design and implementation of current educational programs, we will have, one day, a generation whose national resilience is very weak. This can very well happen with a generation which is not properly equipped with the right intellectual tools, necessary for dealing effectively with problems of modern times.

I cited some statistics to show the fragile condition of our labor force at the moment. I also showed how far we are lagging, at the moment, behind Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines with regard to our higher education. These are conditions about which we should always be on the alert.

It seemed that we succeeded in persuading the audience to think about national vigilance along new lines. All questions that were subsequently asked were related to current economic, political, and cultural problems. No one asked any question about either "extreme left" or "extreme right".

While having tea during the half hour break, a number of the audience came to me and talked about the need of updating our perception of dangers, that may threaten our national security. They seem to think in terms of the present situation, and seem quite informed about regional and international situations in their respective fields. On the basis of these formal and informal discussions I have the very strong impression that these people are really different from the bureaucrats I met in the early and middle 1980s, at the same king of event. These are not the same doctrinaire people I used to meet and talk with in those years before the concepts of globalization and cyberspace were even known in this country.

I went home wondering if that much change has really happened since the early 1970s and early 1980s. If this is really true, is it wise to ask this new breed of Indonesians to think of current problems in terms of paradigms and axioms of the 1970s and 1980s?

The writer is an observer of socio-cultural affairs.