Evolution not revolution

By Johannes Nugroho

JAKARTA (JP): The 1998 General Session of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) has satisfied the minimum requirements of Article 2 in the 1945 Constitution, which states that the MPR must sit at least once every five years. In fact, the current convention is the second parliamentary session in five year, following last year's festival of democracy in the general election.

Under successive New Order governments, the MPR has become notorious for a meekness toward the state executive which has reduced the supposedly supreme state institution to performing a string of ritual formalities. Unfortunately, some of these formalities are not democratic, for example the absence of active voting in the house.

Voting is the fundamental tenet of democracy as practiced by its Greek founders, yet it is almost unheard of during the MPR General Session. Voting is considered alien to the Indonesian tradition of familial unanimity, but this is contradictory to Article 2 of the Constitution, which clearly states that resolutions must be passed by majority voting in the General Session.

The disproportionate composition of the MPR makes it tempting to argue that a less democratic parliament results. Of the 1,000 members, 500 come from the House of Representatives (DPR) and 500 are military and regional representatives.

The 500 DPR members are directly elected by the people. Ironically, the other unelected members are granted identical political status in the Assembly.

The regional representatives are selected from provincial parliaments by the central and provincial governments, thus they do not hold the same democratic credentials as the directly elected members of the House of Representatives.

The Armed Forces presence in politics is an inherent tradition of the New Order, but they are over-represented in the Assembly. The Armed Forces answer directly to the President, but nowhere in the 1945 Constitution does it specify a need for military representatives in the MPR. In due course, Armed Forces interests ought to be represented only by the President.

The Constitution was drafted hastily in our nascent years of independence. It is natural to assume that its authors did not have enough time to rigorously deliberate every single aspect. Consequently the Constitution fails to adequately address essential issues such as the composition of the MPR, the DPR and the High Court. It is also opaque on the procedure for nominating presidential candidates, which is currently regulated by General Session decree II/1973.

These constitutional loopholes are injurious to democracy and could lead to abuses of power which are justified by creative interpretation of the Constitution. For example, a strong executive office could easily pass a decree changing the composition of the MPR, thereby preventing democratically elected DPR members from exerting undue influence on the national executive branch. Alternatively the High Court, which should act as a judicial watchdog for the nation, could be reduced to impotency as its role is not clearly defined in the Constitution.

In pursuit of a more democratic administration, it is of paramount importance that the existing Constitution be amended. The complex political scene of the late 20th century calls for a stronger entity which ensures a strong and just nation-state.

The role of the different elements in the MPR should be clearly defined and the institution could be reformed into a bicameral, or two chambered, entity.

The directly elected members of the House of Representatives could sit in a separate chamber from the government selected regional representatives and the Armed Forces. The latter chamber could be called the Senate.

To ensure a balanced and well run house, it is imperative that the executive branch -- the president and the cabinet -- and the legislative branch -- the House of Representatives -- are independent of each other. The legislative and the executive bodies must also be set on an equal footing, an aspect already covered by the present Constitution.

The two chambers of parliament, the House of Representatives and the Senate, together would constitute the supreme constitutional authority, to which the President is accountable.

The 1945 Constitution permits the MPR to sit more than once every five years. This aspect could be retained, allowing the MPR to sit more regularly, allowing it to deal more effectively with challenges of the 21st century and infrequent events, such as the monetary crisis. An annual session would be advantageous, as the Assembly could then accept or reject the President's annual policy statement.

Throughout the year, the House of Representatives and the Senate will sit separately to initiate, debate and vote on legislation. All members of both chambers should be entitled to initiate bills. A bill must have majority support in the directly elected House of Representatives, before being presented to the President. Senate-sponsored legislation will be terminated unless first earning majority support in the House of Representatives.

The President and the cabinet can also initiate legislation which must be debated and voted upon in the House of Representatives. The 1945 Constitution states in Article 20 that legislation initiated by the executive branch cannot become law without the assent of the House of Representatives. Article 21 states that legislation initiated by the House of Representatives must be approved by the President. These positive elements of the Constitution should be retained.

Legislation receiving assent from both the executive and the House of Representatives could be debated by the Senate for half an annual parliamentary calendar in order to safeguard the interests of the provinces and other sections of the populace.

Transparency in the administration would be improved by the presence of opposition forces in the House of Representatives and the Senate. Members of the cabinet should also sit in the chambers and answer questions on behalf of the executive on their ministerial portfolios.

The role of the High Court must be clearly articulated in any Constitution reform. The judiciary could act as a buffer between the executive and legislative branches of the government. It could also act to guard against abuse of rights by the government. The presence of such ombudsmen has worked well in Scandinavian countries, where civil rights are held in high regard. Alternatively, the role of ombudsman could be vested outside the High Court in an independent human rights body, which the present National Commission on Human Rights could evolve into.

Whether or not amending the constitution could improve democracy is a question yet to be debated. Nevertheless, one thing is evident. Even a flawless political system will become degraded when burdened by corruption and collusion, for which our country is already renowned.

Considering the many constitutional loopholes and constant cries for political reform, it is imperative that we accommodate the present and future needs and aspirations of this nation in the decision making process. The bicameral system provides a way to adjust and improve within the existing system. It is not subversive and does not seek to bring an end to the current political order, rather it places an emphasis on evolution not revolution.

Window A: These constitutional loopholes are injurious to democracy and could lead to abuses of power which are justified by creative interpretation of the Constitution.

Window B: Even a flawless political system will become degraded when burdened by corruption and collusion, for which our country is already renowned.