Evolution not revolution

Evolution not revolution

By Johannes Nugroho

JAKARTA (JP): The 1998 General Session of the People's
Consultative Assembly (MPR) has satisfied the minimum
requirements of Article 2 in the 1945 Constitution, which states
that the MPR must sit at least once every five years. In fact,
the current convention is the second parliamentary session in
five year, following last year's festival of democracy in the
general election.

Under successive New Order governments, the MPR has become
notorious for a meekness toward the state executive which has
reduced the supposedly supreme state institution to performing a
string of ritual formalities. Unfortunately, some of these
formalities are not democratic, for example the absence of active
voting in the house.

Voting is the fundamental tenet of democracy as practiced by
its Greek founders, yet it is almost unheard of during the MPR
General Session. Voting is considered alien to the Indonesian
tradition of familial unanimity, but this is contradictory to
Article 2 of the Constitution, which clearly states that
resolutions must be passed by majority voting in the General
Session.

The disproportionate composition of the MPR makes it tempting
to argue that a less democratic parliament results. Of the 1,000
members, 500 come from the House of Representatives (DPR) and 500
are military and regional representatives.

The 500 DPR members are directly elected by the people.
Ironically, the other unelected members are granted identical
political status in the Assembly.

The regional representatives are selected from provincial
parliaments by the central and provincial governments, thus they
do not hold the same democratic credentials as the directly
elected members of the House of Representatives.

The Armed Forces presence in politics is an inherent tradition
of the New Order, but they are over-represented in the Assembly.
The Armed Forces answer directly to the President, but nowhere in
the 1945 Constitution does it specify a need for military
representatives in the MPR. In due course, Armed Forces interests
ought to be represented only by the President.

The Constitution was drafted hastily in our nascent years of
independence. It is natural to assume that its authors did not
have enough time to rigorously deliberate every single aspect.
Consequently the Constitution fails to adequately address
essential issues such as the composition of the MPR, the DPR and
the High Court. It is also opaque on the procedure for nominating
presidential candidates, which is currently regulated by General
Session decree II/1973.

These constitutional loopholes are injurious to democracy and
could lead to abuses of power which are justified by creative
interpretation of the Constitution. For example, a strong
executive office could easily pass a decree changing the
composition of the MPR, thereby preventing democratically
elected DPR members from exerting undue influence on the national
executive branch. Alternatively the High Court, which should act
as a judicial watchdog for the nation, could be reduced to
impotency as its role is not clearly defined in the Constitution.

In pursuit of a more democratic administration, it is of
paramount importance that the existing Constitution be amended.
The complex political scene of the late 20th century calls for a
stronger entity which ensures a strong and just nation-state.

The role of the different elements in the MPR should be
clearly defined and the institution could be reformed into a
bicameral, or two chambered, entity.

The directly elected members of the House of Representatives
could sit in a separate chamber from the government selected
regional representatives and the Armed Forces. The latter chamber
could be called the Senate.

To ensure a balanced and well run house, it is imperative that
the executive branch -- the president and the cabinet -- and the
legislative branch -- the House of Representatives -- are
independent of each other. The legislative and the executive
bodies must also be set on an equal footing, an aspect already
covered by the present Constitution.

The two chambers of parliament, the House of Representatives
and the Senate, together would constitute the supreme
constitutional authority, to which the President is accountable.

The 1945 Constitution permits the MPR to sit more than once
every five years. This aspect could be retained, allowing the MPR
to sit more regularly, allowing it to deal more effectively with
challenges of the 21st century and infrequent events, such as the
monetary crisis. An annual session would be advantageous, as the
Assembly could then accept or reject the President's annual
policy statement.

Throughout the year, the House of Representatives and the
Senate will sit separately to initiate, debate and vote on
legislation. All members of both chambers should be entitled to
initiate bills. A bill must have majority support in the directly
elected House of Representatives, before being presented to the
President. Senate-sponsored legislation will be terminated unless
first earning majority support in the House of Representatives.

The President and the cabinet can also initiate legislation
which must be debated and voted upon in the House of
Representatives. The 1945 Constitution states in Article 20 that
legislation initiated by the executive branch cannot become law
without the assent of the House of Representatives. Article 21
states that legislation initiated by the House of Representatives
must be approved by the President. These positive elements of the
Constitution should be retained.

Legislation receiving assent from both the executive and the
House of Representatives could be debated by the Senate for half
an annual parliamentary calendar in order to safeguard the
interests of the provinces and other sections of the populace.

Transparency in the administration would be improved by the
presence of opposition forces in the House of Representatives and
the Senate. Members of the cabinet should also sit in the
chambers and answer questions on behalf of the executive on their
ministerial portfolios.

The role of the High Court must be clearly articulated in any
Constitution reform. The judiciary could act as a buffer between
the executive and legislative branches of the government. It
could also act to guard against abuse of rights by the
government. The presence of such ombudsmen has worked well in
Scandinavian countries, where civil rights are held in high
regard. Alternatively, the role of ombudsman could be vested
outside the High Court in an independent human rights body, which
the present National Commission on Human Rights could evolve
into.

Whether or not amending the constitution could improve
democracy is a question yet to be debated. Nevertheless, one
thing is evident. Even a flawless political system will become
degraded when burdened by corruption and collusion, for which our
country is already renowned.

Considering the many constitutional loopholes and constant
cries for political reform, it is imperative that we accommodate
the present and future needs and aspirations of this nation in
the decision making process. The bicameral system provides a way
to adjust and improve within the existing system. It is not
subversive and does not seek to bring an end to the current
political order, rather it places an emphasis on evolution not
revolution.

Window A: These constitutional loopholes are injurious to democracy
and could lead to abuses of power which are justified by creative
interpretation of the Constitution.

Window B: Even a flawless political system will become degraded when
burdened by corruption and collusion, for which our country is
already renowned.