Evidence shows unilateral sanctions a no-win crusade

Evidence shows unilateral sanctions a no-win crusade

By Arif Havas Ugroseno

JAKARTA (JP): Are sanctions becoming an increasingly important
foreign policy tool for enforcing international norms and
standards of behavior?

Yes, according to Stuart Eizenstat, U.S. Undersecretary for
International Trade, who cited U.S. sanctions against South
Africa, Iraq, Libya and Serbia (The Jakarta Post, Oct. 4).

But he is wrong on at least one count. Many U.S. sanctions are
unilateral, but the attractive ones that he quotes are
multilateral.

South Africa, for example, was sanctioned by a number of
multilateral conventions, such as the International Convention on
the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid.

But it is not likely that there will ever be an international
convention backing the unilateral American Anti-Iran Act or Anti-
Cuba Act.

U.S. unilateral sanctions are also in direct contravention
with general international law and the Charter of the United
Nations.

They run counter to the 1974 United Nations Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States which declares that no state
may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other
type of measures to coerce another state in order to take away
its sovereign powers.

They completely ignore the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Program
of Actions which "calls upon states to refrain from any
unilateral measure not in accordance with international law and
the Charter of the United Nations that creates obstacles to trade
relations among States and impedes the full realization of the
human rights set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and international human rights instruments".

These are the fundamentals that make America's call to the
international community to support its unilateral sanctions ring
hollow.

Far from following the heed of the superpower, the
international community has flatly rejected it.

Responding to a recent threat of unilateral economic
sanctions, Boris Yeltsin charged that the U.S. did not have the
right or authority to ban Russian investments and that the U.S.
move was simply incomprehensible.

The threat was set against a US$2 billion investment in
natural gas by a group of three transnational companies --
Russia's Gazprom, France's Total SA and Malaysia's Petronas --
for failing to comply with the American Anti-Iran Act.

Meanwhile, French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine challenges
that there is no responsible government that believes all
economic sanctions are effective.

In a U.S.-Iran conference held by Rutgers University and the
Middle East Institute in Washington DC in April 1997, the
European Union representative expounded that there exists a
different cultural mentality in the U.S. toward questions like
how to deal with difficult nation-states.

The European Union's rejection of the U.S. call went even
further as the EU brought the Anti-Cuba Act, known as the Helms-
Burton Act, to the World Trade Organization in May 1996.

The EU rightly claimed that the act and other legislation
enacted by the U.S. Congress regarding trade sanctions against
Cuba violate several articles in the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, and the General Agreement on Trade in Services.

After desperately arguing that the unilateral sanctions were a
matter of national security and therefore the WTO could not take
action on it, the U.S. called a truce and eventually yielded to
EU interests.

The fact that even the closest allies of the U.S. rejected
this American policy clearly demonstrates that it is the
credibility of American leadership and power that is at stake and
suffers.

In the world where interdependence is increasingly critical
and strategic alliances and collective actions are more
indispensable than ever, pursuing unilateral sanctions would
undermine goodwill needed to garner friends and allies.

Furthermore, by alienating itself from targeted countries, the
U.S. gains no leverage whatsoever to stay in touch and have an
influence in the happenings in those countries.

Even worse, realizing that America's closest allies challenge
such policy, the targeted countries would not likely change their
attitude and would only consider the policy as no more than mere
bullying, thus hardening opposition against the U.S.

U.S. international economic influence is also seriously hurt
by unilateral sanctions. Recent studies by the U.S. National
Association of Manufacturers show that from 1993 to 1996, U.S.
sanctions have created a cut in the export market worth US$790
billion.

While this number is large, the association says, it does not
convey the full extent of U.S. loses. Not only did the U.S. lose
ground in the export market but also in related export benefits,
such as service contracts and spare parts deals, as well as
confidence in the international market that America is a reliable
supplier.

As the U.S. economy is heavily dependent on exports, the loss
in the market means a loss of jobs, and thus unemployment.
Furthermore, by isolating itself from the market, the U.S. also
stands to loose the opportunity to help build a strong middle
class -- an important segment of society to support democracy --
within targeted countries.

The situation is worsened by the proliferation of local and
state sanctions in America. Currently there are 19 enacted local
and state sanctions, seven pending sanctions at local levels and
13 pending sanctions at state levels.

These include those targeted at Indonesia which are sponsored
by Massachussets and Rhode Island. Most of these sanctions
typically regulate investment and procurement.

This foreign policy exercise by local and state authorities
violates the U.S. Constitution which vests the power to conduct
foreign affairs and regulate foreign commerce in the hands of the
federal government alone.

The U.S. Supreme Court in a case referred to as "Holland vs.
Missouri" declared unconstitutional the attempt of Missouri to
create its own foreign policy regarding migratory birds from
Canada. The court established that international treaties
constituted the ultimate law of the land and that individual
states could not maintain their own foreign policies.

The reason that the U.S. federal government does not take
local and state authorities to the Supreme Court is obviously
political. The administration needs congressional support from
such states to attain fast-track legislation authority on new
regional and multilateral trade negotiations.

The administration also does not want to look soft in
hectoring and lecturing human rights the world over.

So what is the moral of the story?

Unilateral sanctions just do not work. Even when the cases of
Panama and Haiti are quoted as shining examples, one should
remember that Panama only surrendered when the U.S. sent in
combat troops in violation of international law, kidnapping
Manuel Noriega. Even poor Haiti managed to tough it out until yet
another threat of military intervention was exerted.

Thanks to the U.S., who negotiated relentlessly for the
establishment of the World Trade Organization, an international
forum is now available to American-targeted countries to bring
U.S. sanctions to court.

Even if U.S. sanctions may not be in violation of specific
international trade provisions, they nevertheless nullify or
impair expected benefits and objectives sought after from the
creation of these international norms.

As a matter of fact, due to clear violations of international
trade law, it would not be that expensive, nor difficult, to win
a case against many U.S. sanctions.

Clearly, as we learn from the "I-will-sue-you" mentality,
bringing the U.S. to the world trade court is the best possible
advice for the international community to stop unwarranted
sanctions exerted by this numero uno cop.

After all, police brutality is something that we all detest.

The writer is a graduate of Harvard Law School.