Europe's missile defense woes

LONDON: European defense ministries have approached the tactical missile defense (TMD) issue with considerable caution. The sharp decline in their post-Cold War budgets has made it difficult to undertake new programs, a problem exacerbated by the need to satisfy budget-deficit criteria for Economic and Monetary Union.

Various factors have contributed to making TMD a second- or lower-order priority in European defense planning:

* the uncertainty of the threat;

* a temptation to let the U.S. resolve the problem; and

* strong skepticism regarding the prospects for successful transatlantic armament cooperation.

European states have also questioned the battlefield effectiveness of the 'hit-to-kill' technology on which current TMD interceptor programs are based, although low-altitude systems have achieved successful test results.

Nevertheless, there is broad recognition that:

* NATO countries cannot fully prevent the development and proliferation of missile technology;

* a threat to Alliance forces deployed 'out of area' exists from weapons of mass destruction and the spread of missile technology; and

* extended air defenses (EAD) --including TMD --are among the most important capabilities required to meet the above challenges.

These points of consensus are reflected in NATO ministerial communiques, classified assessments by NATO's Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (SDGP), and in national defense reviews, such as France's 1994 Defense White Paper --its first in 22 years. European states are thus undertaking a number of EAD/TMD programs to combat these problems, although spending remains extremely limited.

Germany and the Netherlands already possess the U.S. Patriot missile system, conduct annual joint air-defense exercises with the U.S. and are purchasing Patriot PAC-3 enhancements. There is also talk of grouping Dutch, German and U.S. Patriot battalions into a brigade that would serve as an air-defense rapid deployment force.

Germany also participates in the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) program, the centerpiece of transatlantic efforts to develop TMD capabilities. MEADS is a low-altitude system designed to protect ground troops from airborne threats, including cruise and short-range ballistic missiles.

The project has led a fragile existence since its inception in 1995. In Washington, MEADS is seen as a low-priority program compared to the upgraded Patriot, Navy Area Defense (NAD) and the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems.

Consequently, the U.S. Congress attempted to eliminate funding for MEADS in both the fiscal year 1996 and 1997 defense budgets. In March 1996, France dropped out of MEADS, largely because of budgetary constraints. This left Germany and Italy to carry on as somewhat less weighty European partners for the U.S., with each country shouldering 25%, 15% and 60% of the program costs respectively.

However, MEADS is proving more resilient than many skeptics anticipated, and is now certain to continue until the end of the current project demonstration and validation (PDV) phase on Dec. 31, 1998.

MEADS will face a severe test in 1999, when the three partner countries must decide whether to continue with full-scale assembly. Whereas PDV has cost less than $200 million, complete development will cost an estimated $3 billion. Germany has major procurement commitments, while Italy is also participating in the Surface-to-Air Missile Platform/Terrain (SAMP/T) EAD program with France, raising the questions of why and how it would see both projects through to completion.

The ultimate fate of MEADS may well depend upon other countries joining the program, thereby reducing the costs to the current partners. Turkey and the Netherlands have shown the most interest in the project.

SAMP/T is the only existing program besides MEADS to involve European development of an EAD system. The Franco-Italian SAMP/T system, based on Aerospatiale's Aster 30 interceptor missile, was designed to have a very limited TMD capability, engaging tactical missiles of less than 150 kilo-meters in range. Aerospatiale has studied relatively low-cost enhancements to give the interceptor a more advanced TMD function, but Paris will not take a decision any time soon to fund the development of this improved version.

The UK remains the only major European power without current or planned EAD/TMD assets. In autumn 1994, the UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) commissioned a pre-feasibility study to identify missile-defense architectures against a range of scenarios.

The study was completed in spring 1996, and the MoD was scheduled to issue a formal policy announcement in early 1997. However, the then Conservative administration delayed the statement, and the matter is now subsumed in the new Labor government's strategic defense review (SDR).

While in opposition, various Labor Party politicians with expertise in defense, including now Armed Forces Minister John Reid, expressed an interest in TMD to protect deployed forces. The UK appears to have a predilection for naval-based TMD, and one idea has been to deploy such a capability on the future Horizon frigate.

Nonetheless, the MoD views the missile threat as small, and the SDR is not expected to lead to any decisions on TMD program options. At most, the MoD might follow-up the pre-feasibility study with a feasibility study.

In early 1997, Spain decided to purchase the Aegis air-defense system for its four new F-100 frigates, but without the Standard Missile (SM) 2 Block IVA technology that will form the basis for U.S. low-altitude naval TMD.

The option nonetheless exists to do so at a later date. The Netherlands is also reportedly interested in the SM 2 Block IVA for deployment on the next generation air-defense Frigate 2000.

At some point in the next century, European states will have to decide whether to continue relying on the U.S. for missile early-warning intelligence, or to deploy their own satellites. In April 1996, the U.S. began sharing with its NATO allies real-time TMD early-warning information.

Paris believes very strongly that Europe should have its own capabilities, more for deterrence than for intercepting hostile ballistic missiles. A number of other European states, such as Germany, view early-warning satellites as desirable, but no country is likely to have funds available for at least another decade.

NATO's SDGP included 'layered' missile defenses, comprising both low- and high-altitude interception, in a group of desirable second-tier defense capabilities to respond to proliferation threats.

Major NATO commands have formulated a military operational requirement (MOR) for layered TMD. In 1995, the Conference of NATO Armament Directors (CNAD) established a Missile Defense Ad Hoc Group (MDAHG) to assess concepts, technical configurations and costs.

The MDAHG was to have proposed equipment solutions for meeting the Alliance's TMD requirements to the spring 1997 CNAD meeting, but instead decided that the MOR needed further refinement before it could do so. The CNAD submitted to the June 1997 meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC)'s Defense Ministers Session a report on program options for NATO to pursue a layered defense against theater ballistic missiles.

The defense ministers noted the report 'with interest'.

No European country appears ready to invest in high-altitude defense systems in the near-to-medium term. NATO is basically examining options for a layered TMD architecture out of deference to U.S. wishes.

High-altitude TMD would provide territorial defense, but West European states generally see no threat to national territory for at least another decade. They also view the financial costs as well as technological uncertainties of upper-tier TMD as extremely high. Even if a clearly perceived missile threat emerged, a large number of European countries might choose to rely on traditional deterrence rather than on deploying territorial missile defenses.

On the other hand, France and the UK have repeatedly expressed concern that the development of advanced TMD systems could erode the credibility of their nuclear-deterrent forces. Although these fears are misplaced, they are commonly cited as an obstacle to Europe's pursuit of high-altitude TMD systems.

Given the number of war-heads that both countries will continue to deploy, together with planned penetration aids, a TMD threat to their national deterrence capabilities is extremely remote for decades to come.

There are two directions NATO's EAD/TMD activities could take. One is a joint acquisition program, as is under consideration in the area of airborne ground surveillance. The second is the continuation of ad hoc national and multinational projects, with a NATO office attempting to integrate these diverse elements.

Patriot and perhaps SAMP/T and MEADS would be the initial European contributions to a NATO missile-defense capability.

The Alliance is also examining how to give its Air Command and Control System (ACCS) the ability to undertake TMD operations.

The ACCS could serve as a flexible, common command-and-control network linking the different national missile-defense systems. France is developing its own air command-and-control system (SCCOA), but it will be inter-operable with the ACCS.

The most likely prognosis is for a continued ad hoc approach to TMD. This is far simpler for countries to undertake than an all-encompassing joint acquisition program, with NATO integrating and assuring inter-operability of national assets. These ad hoc efforts seem likely to remain modest in scope given the low priority that European governments generally accord to TMD.

However, if no new European TMD capabilities emerge during the next decade, it could create a serious political and military rift with Washington, which has a considerably greater sense of urgency on this issue.