Europe-Mideast peace process

LONDON: The visit of French President Jacques Chirac to Damascus, Jerusalem, Jericho and Cairo in October 1996 has launched a new debate on European involvement in the Middle East peace process. At a crucial time for all concerned, the debate hinges on whether Europe has anything concrete to contribute to peace besides development assistance and financial support.

The discussion goes beyond the Middle East alone. In challenging Washington's claim to exclusive political oversight in the region, Chirac touched on a broader European foreign- policy preoccupation: whether the EU's continuing inability to formulate a coherent Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) means that Europe will merely play a supporting role for U.S. global leadership.

President Chirac's visit to the Middle East came when the peace negotiations were at a low point following the outbreak of violence between Israelis and Palestinians in September 1996. It also coincided with clearer signs that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's Likud government was not only stalling over the next stage of talks, but was also seeking to renegotiate some of the terms of the 1995 agreement over the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Hebron in the West Bank.

This agreement was reached as part of the September 1995 Interim Treaty on the transfer of powers from Israel to the Palestinian Authority (PA) - known as the 'Oslo II' accord. Even though delays have occurred before in implementing the different stages of the settlement, the challenge to the substance of the Hebron agreement was interpreted by Chirac as a sign that the peace process was in danger of unraveling. His sense of urgency was reinforced by the perception that the U.S., as sole external sponsor of the political process, was too preoccupied with its November 1996 presidential elections to exert influence over either party to move the process forward.

By stressing the importance not only of Europe's interest in a lasting settlement, but also the financial and economic contributions already made by the EU, Chirac claimed to be speaking for more than France alone. Stability near the southern shores of the Mediterranean was important to Europe given its proximity to the region.

President Chirac, as well as other European leaders, were also interested in raising the morale of the Palestinians and Israel's Arab neighbors, who have had little to show for their patience with Netanyahu's policy since June 1996. Indeed, a European Union declaration in early October 1996 urged restraint by both sides following violent clashes in the West Bank, while pointedly calling on 'Israel to match its stated commitment to the peace process with concrete actions to fulfill its obligations, as well as to refrain from any action likely to create mistrust about its intentions'.

Although not actually sanctioned by the EU, Chirac's tour was swiftly followed by visits to the region by an EU ministerial troika led by Irish Foreign Minister Dick Spring representing Ireland's EU presidency, and UK Foreign Minister Malcolm Rifkind. In late November, Italian President Oscar Luigi Scalfaro also went to Cairo to reassure President Hosni Mubarak of Europe's concern both about the Hebron issue and Israeli plans to expand Jewish settlements in the West Bank.

During the Dec. 2-3, 1996 meeting in Lisbon of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), both President Chirac and Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi made clear to Netanyahu their strong opposition to the Israeli policy of pursuing more settlement activities in the occupied territories. This position is at least shared by all European governments to have so far declared themselves on the subject: further Israeli construction on the West Bank is deemed illegal, and bound to unleash new clashes and terrorism if not halted immediately.

On other aspects of the stalled peace process, neither Spring on behalf of the EU, nor other European leaders have directly criticized Chirac's presumption in speaking for Europe. However, Malcolm Rifkind's intimations while in Israel that there is room at the table for only one external mediator was interpreted by the French government and media as an implicit rebuff to Chirac's attempts to increase Europe's political influence over the peace process. The question of what Europe's political role should be, if any, in a larger regional settlement has nevertheless been posed, and only partially answered.

There has been no real consensus about the very nature of EU involvement in the Middle East and its relationship with the role of the U.S.. French as well as official European statements about this issue are very clear in making the case for a European role, but very ambiguous when it comes to its terms and the specifics of EU policy. In a speech in Abu Dhabi on Nov. 4, Malcolm Rifkind stressed that the UK was 'working through the European Union', although he said rather more about the 'benefits in establishing ... an Organization for Cooperation in the Middle East (OCME)', echoing ideas already floated by Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan. The proposal itself was vague, however, calling for an 'overall structure to encourage cooperation between all the countries of the region, with the help and participation of friends outside, such as the UK, France, the U.S. and others'.

Israeli opposition to an active EU role is one more factor that keeps the U.S. in a leading position among external players involved in the search for a settlement in the Middle East. The Irish EU presidency has restated the Europe's official position of support for U.S. mediation, without demanding greater European involvement. However, the appointment of an official EU envoy to the peace process - Spanish Ambassador to Israel, Miguel Angel Moratinos - has opened speculation about the exact nature of the envoy's tasks, as well as the circumstances under which he might act on the EU's behalf.

Since the end of the 1991 Gulf War, Europe has played a supporting, if indirect, role in the Middle East peace process. The first breakthrough in a tortured history of attempts to bring Israeli and Palestinian negotiators to the same table occurred in the aftermath of Saddam Hussein's defeat. Under U.S. pressure, both Israelis and Palestinians realized their vulnerabilities: the Israelis, because of the fragility of security when under fire from Scud missiles; and the Palestinians from the isolation of having supported Saddam Hussein early on in the war.

The first meeting of the peace process was brokered by the U.S. with the initial involvement of the former Soviet Union. It took place in Madrid, Spain, in October 1991, but with only a nominal European Community (EC) presence. The EC, in fact, became more engaged in the five working groups of the multilateral regional peace process set up in Moscow in January 1992. The most important of these has been the Regional Economic and Development Working Group (REDWG), which has met at regular intervals since.

The break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 effectively removed the Russians from the negotiations. However, the glare of publicity and the subsidiary position of the Palestinian delegation proved the downfall of the Madrid process. It was eventually replaced by secret talks under the auspices of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry which culminated in the Declaration of Principles (or Oslo track) signed by the former Israeli prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, and Palestine Liberation Organization chairman Yasser Arafat on Sept. 13, 1993.

By mutual agreement of both parties, the siting of the signing ceremony on the White House lawn in Washington DC confirmed the U.S. role in overseeing the implementation of the 'Oslo' timetable and its subsequent modifications under 'Oslo II'. The Europeans pledged regional development funding amounting to European Currency Units (ECUs) of $375 million and additional private investment of $125 million over the five-year period 1993-1998. In terms of direct financial support to the fledgling Palestinian Authority, the EU has contributed 85 percent of its running costs to date, almost as a symbolic counterbalance to Washington's annual $3-4 billion support package to the Israeli government.

Until Chirac's open support for establishing a Palestinian state in October 1996, neither Europeans nor the U.S. sought to draw attention to this division of labor. The potential bias in the U.S. position as facilitator for the peace process has nevertheless begun to be commented on, if not in public, certainly in the corridors of Paris and Rome. Chirac's well- publicized speech, as the first foreign head of state to address the Palestinian Legislative Council, was widely perceived in the Arab world as a counter to the U.S.-Israeli alliance, especially since he refrained from making a similar appearance in the Israeli Knesset.

There are also differences of a more technical nature regarding the appropriate vehicle for regional economic integration. The U.S. has strongly supported the idea of creating a development bank for the Middle East and North Africa. Most EU members, while accepting the need for an institutional framework to support integration, are opposed to the idea and point to the fact that there are already sufficient banks to serve the Middle East, including the World Bank and the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development.

A period of delay in new U.S. initiatives is to be expected in the transition to President Clinton's second-term administration, following the announcement that Madeleine Albright will replace Warren Christopher as U.S. Secretary of State. However, if no new initiatives are forthcoming, the EU debate is unlikely to remain the storm in a tea cup it has largely been presented as until now.

One of the challenges to renewed European activism in the Middle East remains the division of interests, both commercial and political, they share in the region. Malcolm Rifkind's visit to the region encompassed the Gulf, and it is here that France and the UK have faced most competition over arms sales since the 1991 Gulf War.

Chirac's earlier visit to the Middle East was also perceived by some as a cynical exercise to increase French trade, particularly of arms to the Arab states. This would complement greater French commercial activism in Iran, another fly in the ointment to U.S. regional policy. For Israel as well, however, the EU has become an increasingly important trading partner, accounting for over 50 percent of its exports and up to 70 percent of its imports.

With the signing of a new set of association agreements with the EU in 1995, including a cooperation agreement over research and development, Israel is moving slowly into the European sphere. It might be here that Europe has more room to influence Israel over peace, rather than in simply supporting U.S. mediation.