Ethnic conflict or policy failure?

By Sidhesh Kaul

JAKARTA (JP): The recent spate of violence in parts of Indonesia, be it secessionist or ethnic in nature, are the result of relentlessly pursuing years of lop sided developmental strategies. To dismiss these flare ups as isolated bursts of local temper gone overboard is to over simplify the situation.

To demonize these conflicts as secessionist stirrings or movements that challenge Indonesia's integrity is an empty political exercise that solemnly blesses state sponsored brutality.

The government of President Abdurrahman Wahid is today torn between the confusion of playing up to democratic expectations and at the same time pandering to the nationalistic centripetal forces that advocate the use of state sponsored repression as a means of preserving territorial and national integrity at any cost.

The continued use of force by the state is not a solution -- it is part of the problem. The time is ripe for dissecting the issues within a framework that is acceptable within democratic norms without abandoning pragmatism, whilst at the same time respecting the aspirations of the struggling peoples for a distinct identity.

During the course of the past several decades, the blood that has been shed is a result of the power struggle in which ethnicity has become merely an excuse in the absence of a more compelling ideology .

Societies all over the globe have ethnic diversity but some nations seem to manage the diversity better than others. Since 1945 history reveals there have been 415 major episodes of political violence in different parts of the globe and of which 411 have erupted in countries that had recently shaken off the colonial yoke and could be further classified as either developing or economically backward countries.

A closer examination of the 411 conflicts reveals that almost 25 percent of the violence is ethnic in nature and has inevitably happened in the post-independence period. Although statistics can be misleading, these numbers yield a pattern that cannot be ignored.

Most of the ethnic violence has happened in areas where there is a diverse mix of ethnicity (with a single pre-dominant ethnic group); where democratic institutions are in the early stages of formation or altogether absent, there is a high incidence of economic backwardness and where the level of development is low.

Ethnicity merely becomes an excuse for the use of state force to quell violence and historically the Indonesian government (and the politicians) has been quick to seek refuge behind the veil of "ethnic conflict" without addressing the real issues.

To use ethnicity as a means for political polarization is a dangerous game for an ethnically diverse nation such as Indonesia. A traditional Java-centric and myopic view to the ethnic problems could have repercussions that could spell mayhem in the years to come.

Any resistance, whether political or otherwise, to a more humanist approach that is devoid of centric connotations would succeed in creating irreversible damage and fuel secessionist ambitions.

The recent episode of "ethnic violence" in Kalimantan is a case in point. There has been a long history of conflict between the Dayaks, the indigenous people of Kalimantan, and the Madurese. The first Madurese arrived in Kalimantan in the 1930s (the transmigration program was initially started by the Dutch colonizers) but these numbers increased dramatically in the 1970s as a direct consequence of the Indonesian government's transmigration plan.

Under the transmigration program the government hoped to ease the pressures of the growing population in Java and populate those areas of Indonesia that were less densely populated.

Indonesia's transmigration program has gone down in world history as one of the largest movements of peoples in this century. Independent reports have put the number of transmigrated families at about 2 million since the program started.

The main target areas for the Indonesian government were Kalimantan, Irian Jaya and Lampung in southern Sumatra. Kalimantan was targeted for two reasons; its low population density and the abundance of natural resources.

The government's experiment to brutally mix diverse cultures without the support of adequate developmental policies or delivery mechanisms, institutions and infrastructure that guaranteed equitable distribution and protected and respected the indigenous peoples' sensitivities and the sheer lack of sincerity in promoting real growth, was a recipe for disaster.

This was a powder keg waiting to be ignited.

This was colonization happening a second time around and was met with indigenous resistance that has grown over the years. The transmigration exercise has obviously backfired and has left, in its wake, a host of other problems including the recent spate of gory ethnic clashes.

The transmigration program in Kalimantan resulted in the rainforests being replaced by palm oil and coconut plantations. The Dayaks soon found themselves at the bottom of the economic pile and unable to pursue their traditional means of existence. Traditionally the Dayaks are wedded, in more ways than one, to their forests, which are an inextricable part of the Dayak way of life.

The government appropriated Dayak lands whilst no efforts were made to give them a chance to share in the exploitation of their traditional resources, nor were adequate efforts made to provide opportunity for upward mobility.

The transmigrated Madurese have become the soft targets for the Dayak's in their expression of anger and dissatisfaction. The deployment of skewed policies, with active help from the World Bank, is the biggest contributor to the unrest in Kalimantan.

This pattern of misery has been replicated in other parts of Indonesia. The recent picture of the thousands of Madurese fleeing Kalimantan is enough evidence of the failure of this policy.

The government, and the World Bank, would have to be accountable to the angry Dayaks, the re-displaced Madurese and the Indonesians at large for this disaster.

There are no universal policy prescriptions available to counter ethnic conflicts and every nation state has its own share of ethnic diversity.

The size, geographic distribution and degree of mobilization of the diverse segments, number; the relationship of ethnic diversity to other forms of social differentiation and hierarchy; the cultural definition of the state -- all these are pointers for formulation of policies that would lessen ethnic tensions.

Ethnicity by itself is not dangerous -- it is the destructive manifestations and the propensity of ethnicity to be exploited in the repressive political context that needs to be addressed.

The last time Indonesia collectively put aside ethnicity was during its fight for independence. The post-independence period has witnessed succeeding governments that have consciously followed a path, stemming from political considerations, of building a centripetal structure. The almost fanatical obsession with Javanization has led to a permanent mindset within the minorities of maltreatment.

Instead of choosing to preserve and respect ethnic diversity outside the realms of governance, succeeding governments have unwittingly laid the foundations of a sharply divided country.

Today we see the combatants in the several ethnic conflicts around Indonesia, whether they are in the majority or not within their respective communities, using and highlighting their ethnic diversity as a justification for mobilizing support.

The solution lies in adopting policy based initiatives whilst shunning the colonial "police-the-minorities" approach.

The Indonesian government would actively have to pursue and practice the concept of "state neutrality" as a means for promoting ethnic accommodation and preventing ethnic conflict -- but this is easier said than done.

Reversing decades of policies that promoted internal colonization, as a means of promoting trust and respect for the unity of Indonesia is a gargantuan task. Perhaps some of the problems would be resolved with the recent moves by the government to decentralize governance and to give a degree of autonomy to regions.

The autonomy efforts would have to go hand in hand with electoral reforms so that minorities can rely on the system for fair representation. The danger of disintegration will once again loom large if these autonomy efforts are badly or insincerely executed.

The writer is a regional commentator on political and economic affairs based in Jakarta.