Establishing new councils smacks of scapegoating

President B.J. Habibie's fondness for setting up councils has often caused controversy, the latest being the Council for the Enforcement of Security and Law. Political analyst J. Soedjati Djiwandono, addresses this issue.

JAKARTA (JP): There is a growing tendency on the part of the Habibie government to govern this country through what the President calls "councils", in addition to his Cabinet, his "council of ministers".

Habibie established the Council for Economic Resilience, and most recently the Council for the Enforcement of Security and Law", or what can be construed as a "national security council".

His mentor and predecessor, Soeharto, wanted to establish a "reform council" shortly before his resignation. But as no one was willing to join it, he decided to resign.

Despite Habibie's good intention, not much can be expected from this latest innovation. Indeed, the riots in society have tended to create a doubtful or, more likely, a false impression of rampant religious conflict. This may explain the inclusion of religious leaders on the council.

However, it seems simplistic to conclude that the burning or destruction of places of worship of different religions by what may best be described as mobs is a reflection of religious conflict rather than primarily criminal acts.

Even if they are instigated by conflicting groups among the political elite exploiting religious sentiment or abusing religion for political ends, as some inside as well as outside government circles have insisted, they remain criminal acts with little to do with religion or relations between followers of different religions.

Quite apart from the nature of the conflicts, they are definitely security problems. And as such they are the government's problems. What can one expect from those religious leaders? What can one expect of these people, whose competence should rightly remain outside practical politics, including policy-making? And what can one expect from the council as a whole if it is supposed to be a policy-making body, and yet with no operational authority?

One may rightly wonder if the establishment of different councils is not much more than a government attempt to wash its hands, to pass the buck, and particularly in the case of failure, to put or at least to share the blame with other people or subordinate state institutions, thus shirking its responsibilities. It would not be unlike the current pattern of finding scapegoats for anything that goes amiss.

Interestingly, some members of the council, as with the previous council and the combined fact-finding team, are Cabinet ministers. Clearly their membership of such councils outside the government will only increase their already heavy burden.

Such an undertaking may have begun with the formation of the so-called "voluntary" civilian guards to assist troops in safeguarding the recent People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) Special Session and thus ensuring its "success". It may also include the idea of having "trained people" helping the police, whose function is yet to be clearly defined. It would be eerily reminiscent of the Indonesian communists' idea of a "fifth force".

One thing is clear: It will not solve the security problem and may make matters worse. It would at best mean trying to solve conflicts by creating new ones.

It is doubtful if either Article 30 of the 1945 Constitution or Law No. 20/1982, which provides for the right and obligation of all citizens to take part in the defense of the country, would be applicable in this case. The nation is not facing any external threat.

So who or what are the forces posing a challenge or a threat to the existence and integrity of the state or the nation? If not of external nature, then the "enemy" must be internal. But then the formation of such a force would only play groups of people, the nation's own citizens, off against one another. This would mean a civil war.

Worse still, one may be tempted to suspect that the formation of such additional bodies would form part of the government's effort to mobilize what may appear to be popular support, thereby strengthening its legitimacy. It may also be part of a delaying tactic in the face of what might appear to be insurmountable problems in hand.

If the government should at any point feel incapable of running or governing the country, or of solving its problems, then the logical thing to do would be to resign gracefully. After all, when Habibie was made vice president, it is doubtful if he was meant by Soeharto to assume the top position before the end of the latter's term. The fact is that Soeharto promised to give an accountability report to the MPR in 2003. Who would have thought that he would resign only two months later?

Soeharto never had a vice president for more than one term. There is little reason to believe otherwise with regard to Habibie.