Establishing new councils smacks of scapegoating

Establishing new councils smacks of scapegoating

President B.J. Habibie's fondness for setting up councils has
often caused controversy, the latest being the Council for the
Enforcement of Security and Law. Political analyst J. Soedjati
Djiwandono, addresses this issue.

JAKARTA (JP): There is a growing tendency on the part of the
Habibie government to govern this country through what the
President calls "councils", in addition to his Cabinet, his
"council of ministers".

Habibie established the Council for Economic Resilience, and
most recently the Council for the Enforcement of Security and
Law", or what can be construed as a "national security council".

His mentor and predecessor, Soeharto, wanted to establish a
"reform council" shortly before his resignation. But as no one
was willing to join it, he decided to resign.

Despite Habibie's good intention, not much can be expected
from this latest innovation. Indeed, the riots in society have
tended to create a doubtful or, more likely, a false impression
of rampant religious conflict. This may explain the inclusion of
religious leaders on the council.

However, it seems simplistic to conclude that the burning or
destruction of places of worship of different religions by what
may best be described as mobs is a reflection of religious
conflict rather than primarily criminal acts.

Even if they are instigated by conflicting groups among the
political elite exploiting religious sentiment or abusing
religion for political ends, as some inside as well as outside
government circles have insisted, they remain criminal acts with
little to do with religion or relations between followers of
different religions.

Quite apart from the nature of the conflicts, they are
definitely security problems. And as such they are the
government's problems. What can one expect from those religious
leaders? What can one expect of these people, whose competence
should rightly remain outside practical politics, including
policy-making? And what can one expect from the council as a
whole if it is supposed to be a policy-making body, and yet with
no operational authority?

One may rightly wonder if the establishment of different
councils is not much more than a government attempt to wash its
hands, to pass the buck, and particularly in the case of failure,
to put or at least to share the blame with other people or
subordinate state institutions, thus shirking its
responsibilities. It would not be unlike the current pattern of
finding scapegoats for anything that goes amiss.

Interestingly, some members of the council, as with the
previous council and the combined fact-finding team, are Cabinet
ministers. Clearly their membership of such councils outside the
government will only increase their already heavy burden.

Such an undertaking may have begun with the formation of the
so-called "voluntary" civilian guards to assist troops in
safeguarding the recent People's Consultative Assembly (MPR)
Special Session and thus ensuring its "success". It may also
include the idea of having "trained people" helping the police,
whose function is yet to be clearly defined. It would be eerily
reminiscent of the Indonesian communists' idea of a "fifth
force".

One thing is clear: It will not solve the security problem and
may make matters worse. It would at best mean trying to solve
conflicts by creating new ones.

It is doubtful if either Article 30 of the 1945 Constitution
or Law No. 20/1982, which provides for the right and obligation
of all citizens to take part in the defense of the country, would
be applicable in this case. The nation is not facing any external
threat.

So who or what are the forces posing a challenge or a threat
to the existence and integrity of the state or the nation? If not
of external nature, then the "enemy" must be internal. But then
the formation of such a force would only play groups of people,
the nation's own citizens, off against one another. This would
mean a civil war.

Worse still, one may be tempted to suspect that the formation
of such additional bodies would form part of the government's
effort to mobilize what may appear to be popular support, thereby
strengthening its legitimacy. It may also be part of a delaying
tactic in the face of what might appear to be insurmountable
problems in hand.

If the government should at any point feel incapable of
running or governing the country, or of solving its problems,
then the logical thing to do would be to resign gracefully. After
all, when Habibie was made vice president, it is doubtful if he
was meant by Soeharto to assume the top position before the end
of the latter's term. The fact is that Soeharto promised to give
an accountability report to the MPR in 2003. Who would have
thought that he would resign only two months later?

Soeharto never had a vice president for more than one term.
There is little reason to believe otherwise with regard to
Habibie.