Enough of democratizing, time for institutionalizing

James Van Zorge, Jakarta

Over the coming months and years, Indonesians and those who govern should come to the realization that the office of the presidency and the men and women who occupy it -- foremost the President -- needs to be given greater resources in order to lead more effectively in an era of democratization. To not recognize so would be folly; to argue against it would be an injustice.

Since the fall of Soeharto in 1998, Indonesia's politicians and lawmakers have successfully concocted a participatory democracy. In the path of sweeping constitutional changes, new electoral laws and the introduction of regional autonomy that were engineered by the Habibie Administration, reformist measures taken by his successors have been, with few exceptions, consistently in tune with the public's desire to move steadfastly away from the country's autocratic past.

With most of the democratic "hardware" now in place, the next goal in Indonesian politics should be creating the "software" for ensuring better governance.

For example, newcomers and old players alike inside the national and local parliaments need more training and funding to improve their capabilities and capacities to legislate. Otherwise, what was once an institution that was neither given the powers nor expected to perform will not be able to perform now that it has been empowered.

A similar, perhaps even more compelling argument -- although for exactly the opposite reason -- could be made about the Indonesian presidency. Whilst the challenge for parliament is being able to find the means to govern better and more responsibly with its newly-found powers, the President's one is that of adapting his office and staff to a system -- still in its stage of infancy -- in which he is required to share power.

During the bygone years of autocracy, the President was the Supreme Commander of Everything. Former President Soeharto's government was his, and his alone. Soeharto's cabinet of technocrats played the role of being presidential advisors. The bureaucracy and parliament played the role of rubber-stamp institutions in subservience to the President. Critics were sidelined, or worse, and those who did not provide the rubber stamp were stamped out.

Now enter democracy: What President Susilo's predecessors failed to grasp, but what he must quickly understand and act upon, is the need for him to become master of a new paradigm.

Unlike Soeharto, President Susilo must find ways to influence legislators: No longer an instrument of the president, today's legislators are -- for various reasons -- often at odds with the executive. Such is the reality of any democracy.

Having to work with a coalition cabinet, the President must also deal with ministers and secretaries of state agencies that often hold party affiliations different from his and are -- because of inter- and intra-bureaucratic politics -- inclined to pursue agendas that diverge with the President's. The fact that President Susilo has coined his cabinet as Kabinet Indonesia Bersatu should make us wonder whether he understands the fact that, although he appointed his ministers, they are not necessarily his own men. Expecting his ministers to understand and act in accord with what he sees as being in the national interest or within the better interests of his office would, at best, be naove.

Even more daunting, the President must also contend with decentralization, which means trying to conduct an ever-growing chorus of governors and local legislators who see themselves as competitors -- rather than partners -- of the national government.

For sure, being a democratic leader is no cakewalk -- anywhere. Presidents in most democracies find it extraordinarily challenging to meet the unreasonable expectation that, somehow, they alone have the power to solve a nation's ills.

President Susilo should be reminded of the story where, in the early summer of 1952, before the heat of the U.S. presidential campaign, President Truman used to contemplate the problems of the general-become-President should Eisenhower win the forthcoming election. "He'll sit here, and he'll say, 'Do this! Do that!' And nothing will happen. Poor Ike -- it won't be a bit like the Army. He'll find it very frustrating".

Still, there are important differences between being the President of United States and that of Indonesia. One is that the American president has an institutional complex that supports his office. The Indonesian president has none.

In the United States, for example, the President has an impressive and extensive array of agencies at his disposal that are staffed by professionals whose sole function is to serve the President. Overall, the institution of the presidency in Washington includes 2,500 people with policy-making responsibilities with a yearly budget of between US$300-$350 million.

Some of the more important professional units working on behalf of the President of the United States include the Office of Legislative Affairs, the National Security Council, the Council of Economic Advisors, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, the Council on Environmental Quality, the Office of National Drug Control Policy and, more recently, the Office of Homeland Security.

In contrast, the Indonesian President has scant resources. Although there is an experienced corps of administrative personnel working at the Palace, there are no professional agencies that serve the President. Although the incumbent President of Indonesia is certainly better off than, say, Thomas Jefferson, who had a staff of only one secretary and a messenger, how can one reasonably expect a modern president in an emerging democracy to perform without professional staff working by his side? If one had to pity poor Ike, how should we feel for President Susilo?

There are promising signs that perhaps help is coming. Since President Susilo has taken office, there have been discussions inside his so-called "Team 11" of the need for creating the equivalent of a "West Wing" in the Palace. These Palace confidantes have the right instincts; hopefully, President Susilo shares the same.

Yet, there are already critics of these plans to create the "software" that the President needs to get his job done. One minister has argued that there are legal complications. But why discuss the problems, not the solutions? Some argue that the help he needs can come from within the cabinet.

This specious thinking fails to recognize the realities of bureaucratic and coalition politics and, how they work against the better interests of a president. Others doubt the need. At best, we could presume that these naysayers do not understand the complexities of managing a modern government; at worst, we might surmise that their underlying motives are of a more sinister nature.

The writer is a senior partner of Van Zorge, Heffernan & Associates, a government relations consulting firm based in Jakarta.