Enough of democratizing, time for institutionalizing

Enough of democratizing, time for institutionalizing

James Van Zorge, Jakarta

Over the coming months and years, Indonesians and those who
govern should come to the realization that the office of the
presidency and the men and women who occupy it -- foremost the
President -- needs to be given greater resources in order to lead
more effectively in an era of democratization. To not recognize
so would be folly; to argue against it would be an injustice.

Since the fall of Soeharto in 1998, Indonesia's politicians
and lawmakers have successfully concocted a participatory
democracy. In the path of sweeping constitutional changes, new
electoral laws and the introduction of regional autonomy that
were engineered by the Habibie Administration, reformist measures
taken by his successors have been, with few exceptions,
consistently in tune with the public's desire to move steadfastly
away from the country's autocratic past.

With most of the democratic "hardware" now in place, the next
goal in Indonesian politics should be creating the "software" for
ensuring better governance.

For example, newcomers and old players alike inside the
national and local parliaments need more training and funding to
improve their capabilities and capacities to legislate.
Otherwise, what was once an institution that was neither given
the powers nor expected to perform will not be able to perform
now that it has been empowered.

A similar, perhaps even more compelling argument -- although
for exactly the opposite reason -- could be made about the
Indonesian presidency. Whilst the challenge for parliament is
being able to find the means to govern better and more
responsibly with its newly-found powers, the President's one is
that of adapting his office and staff to a system -- still in its
stage of infancy -- in which he is required to share power.

During the bygone years of autocracy, the President was the
Supreme Commander of Everything. Former President Soeharto's
government was his, and his alone. Soeharto's cabinet of
technocrats played the role of being presidential advisors. The
bureaucracy and parliament played the role of rubber-stamp
institutions in subservience to the President. Critics were
sidelined, or worse, and those who did not provide the rubber
stamp were stamped out.

Now enter democracy: What President Susilo's predecessors
failed to grasp, but what he must quickly understand and act
upon, is the need for him to become master of a new paradigm.

Unlike Soeharto, President Susilo must find ways to influence
legislators: No longer an instrument of the president, today's
legislators are -- for various reasons -- often at odds with the
executive. Such is the reality of any democracy.

Having to work with a coalition cabinet, the President must
also deal with ministers and secretaries of state agencies that
often hold party affiliations different from his and are --
because of inter- and intra-bureaucratic politics -- inclined to
pursue agendas that diverge with the President's. The fact that
President Susilo has coined his cabinet as Kabinet Indonesia
Bersatu should make us wonder whether he understands the fact
that, although he appointed his ministers, they are not
necessarily his own men. Expecting his ministers to understand
and act in accord with what he sees as being in the national
interest or within the better interests of his office would, at
best, be naove.

Even more daunting, the President must also contend with
decentralization, which means trying to conduct an ever-growing
chorus of governors and local legislators who see themselves as
competitors -- rather than partners -- of the national
government.

For sure, being a democratic leader is no cakewalk --
anywhere. Presidents in most democracies find it extraordinarily
challenging to meet the unreasonable expectation that, somehow,
they alone have the power to solve a nation's ills.

President Susilo should be reminded of the story where, in the
early summer of 1952, before the heat of the U.S. presidential
campaign, President Truman used to contemplate the problems of
the general-become-President should Eisenhower win the
forthcoming election. "He'll sit here, and he'll say, 'Do this!
Do that!' And nothing will happen. Poor Ike -- it won't be a bit
like the Army. He'll find it very frustrating".

Still, there are important differences between being the
President of United States and that of Indonesia. One is that the
American president has an institutional complex that supports his
office. The Indonesian president has none.

In the United States, for example, the President has an
impressive and extensive array of agencies at his disposal that
are staffed by professionals whose sole function is to serve the
President. Overall, the institution of the presidency in
Washington includes 2,500 people with policy-making
responsibilities with a yearly budget of between US$300-$350
million.

Some of the more important professional units working on
behalf of the President of the United States include the Office
of Legislative Affairs, the National Security Council, the
Council of Economic Advisors, the Office of Science and
Technology Policy, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative,
the Council on Environmental Quality, the Office of National Drug
Control Policy and, more recently, the Office of Homeland
Security.

In contrast, the Indonesian President has scant resources.
Although there is an experienced corps of administrative
personnel working at the Palace, there are no professional
agencies that serve the President. Although the incumbent
President of Indonesia is certainly better off than, say, Thomas
Jefferson, who had a staff of only one secretary and a messenger,
how can one reasonably expect a modern president in an emerging
democracy to perform without professional staff working by his
side? If one had to pity poor Ike, how should we feel for
President Susilo?

There are promising signs that perhaps help is coming. Since
President Susilo has taken office, there have been discussions
inside his so-called "Team 11" of the need for creating the
equivalent of a "West Wing" in the Palace. These Palace
confidantes have the right instincts; hopefully, President Susilo
shares the same.

Yet, there are already critics of these plans to create the
"software" that the President needs to get his job done. One
minister has argued that there are legal complications. But why
discuss the problems, not the solutions? Some argue that the help
he needs can come from within the cabinet.

This specious thinking fails to recognize the realities of
bureaucratic and coalition politics and, how they work against
the better interests of a president. Others doubt the need. At
best, we could presume that these naysayers do not understand the
complexities of managing a modern government; at worst, we might
surmise that their underlying motives are of a more sinister
nature.

The writer is a senior partner of Van Zorge, Heffernan &
Associates, a government relations consulting firm based in
Jakarta.