Enhancing partnership between the U.S. and RI

Enhancing partnership between the U.S. and RI

Dennis C. Blair, Chairman, Indonesia Commission Council on
Foreign Relations

David L. Phillips, Deputy Director, Council's Center for
Preventive Action, New York

Though U.S.-Indonesian relations have recently been marred by
hectoring and resentment, finger pointing over human rights
abuses or aggression in Iraq is not in the interest of either
country. Instead America and Indonesia should work together to
advance their common interests. Both countries are democracies
and partners in the fight against terrorism. The U.S. can also
promote stability in Indonesia by encouraging the resolution of
separatist violence peacefully and through negotiations.

Despite difficulties implementing a cease fire in Aceh,
Jakarta can build momentum for conflict prevention nationwide by
focusing on Papua -- a remote, resource-rich yet impoverished
province where pro-independence groups have waged a long struggle
against the central government.

Papua is home to the world's largest gold and copper mine in
Timika, a huge natural gas field in Tangguh, and forestry
resources generating about US$ 100 million annually to the
central government. Though the province is endowed with vast
natural resource wealth, the 2001 United Nations Development
Index ranked Papua as Indonesia's second poorest province.

Full and effective implementation of the Special Autonomy Law
for Papua represents a win-win situation. While preserving
Indonesia's territorial integrity, special autonomy would allow
the people of Papua to exercise full democratic rights and to
benefit from a significantly enhanced share of the province's
vast natural resource wealth.

The bill permits the province to retain up to 80 percent of
the income derived from its extractive industries. Power sharing
arrangements embodied in the Special Autonomy Law for Papua are
central to reducing tensions, promoting moderation and preserving
national unity.

However, the anticipated benefits of special autonomy have not
yet materialized. Progress has been hindered by competing
priorities in Jakarta, and a lack of training and experience in
Papua. It is also hindered by mutual distrust between ethnic
Papuans and the Indonesian government.

Though President Megawati Soekarnoputri has apologized for
policy mistakes and Army excesses in Papua, there is still much
to be done strengthening the rule of law, bringing human rights
offenders to justice, and rebuilding confidence.

Special autonomy represents a win-win situation. To accelerate
its implementation, the government should appoint a widely
respected and experienced Indonesian as "Papua Coordinator." He
would be assisted by national experts and international
specialists constituting a "secial autonomy advisory group"
drafting regulations for power sharing.

Funds from the decentralization plan should be used to support
business training, micro credit, rural cooperatives, quick impact
and employment -- generation projects for ethnic Papuans.
Consistent with the goal of improving economic opportunities for
ethnic Papuans, businesses in Papua, which are presently
dominated by international concerns and non-ethnic Papuan
migrants, would expand training and job opportunities for ethnic
Papuans.

Since the Indonesian Military (TNI) receives only about 25
percent of its budget from the national government, it fends for
itself in raising the rest through a variety of legal and illegal
enterprises. For example, TNI receives up to US$18 million
annually from an American company, Freeport-McMoran, which pays
the army to provide security for mining operations in Papua.

International businesses in Papua should gradually phase out
their security contracts with TNI and, as they do, the national
government would increase its budgetary support. Decentralization
funds could also be used to subsidize housing, health care and
social services for TNI personnel and their families.

In addition, the U.S. and other donor countries should expand
advisory and training activities to the army and police,
especially in Papua. Assistance would focus on effective security
procedures that respect the rights of citizens. To this end, the
police need better equipment and improved skills to effectively
fulfill their constitutional responsibility safeguarding domestic
law and order. Assistance would also emphasize the development of
community based policing -- a security strategy which seeks to
involve effected communities rather than intimidate them.

For TNI and the police to play a constructive role in the
future, there must be accountability for past human rights
abuses. Those responsible should be prosecuted by independent
courts and units responsible, including Army Special Force
(Kopassus), withdrawn from Papua. Acknowledgement of Papua's
violent history would be advanced through an appropriate truth,
justice and reconciliation process.

As provincial authorities assume greater responsibility under
special autonomy, assistance will be needed to build local
capacity and improve civil administration. The World Bank-led
Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI) should establish a "Papua
professional corps" assisting donor-sponsored programs, including
those of the UN Development Program bringing Papua into line with
other parts of Indonesia.

A "preventive development" strategy would enhance traditional
education, health and employment generating projects by linking
them with conflict prevention goals.

Donor affinity groups would bring together donor countries and
organizations to further coordinate assistance and focus aid on
conflict prevention. Japan would be the ideal convener of a donor
conference to launch the preventive development program. It has a
proven interest in "development for peace". Moreover, Japan is
the largest donor to Indonesia with contributions averaging $1.9
billion a year in the 1990s.

Jakarta should also postpone its plan to divide Papua into
three provinces. Instead it should accelerate full implementation
of the Special Autonomy Law.

For special autonomy to work, the people of Papua must see it
as an instrument for advancing democratization, rather than as a
mechanism to foreclose their concept of merdeka (independence);
Indonesian authorities must see that special autonomy is about
satisfying the legitimate concerns of ethnic Papuans, rather than
as an interim step to political independence.

International stakeholders -- foreign governments,
international businesses, multinational corporations and non-
governmental organizations -- can play a vital role encouraging
and supporting effective implementation of the Special Autonomy
Law.

However, their interest should not be misunderstood by either
Papuans or the government as support for separatism or a desire
to weaken the country. Expanded cooperation between the U.S. and
Indonesia with an emphasis on peace and progress in Papua would
strengthen bilateral ties, enhance Indonesia's steady democratic
progress, and advance the interests of Papuans themselves.

Dennis C. Blair is also former commander-in-chief of the U.S.
Pacific Command. David L. Phillips is also director of the
Indonesia Commission Council on Foreign Relations.