Enhancing partnership between the U.S. and RI

Dennis C. Blair, Chairman, Indonesia Commission Council on Foreign Relations

David L. Phillips, Deputy Director, Council's Center for Preventive Action, New York

Though U.S.-Indonesian relations have recently been marred by hectoring and resentment, finger pointing over human rights abuses or aggression in Iraq is not in the interest of either country. Instead America and Indonesia should work together to advance their common interests. Both countries are democracies and partners in the fight against terrorism. The U.S. can also promote stability in Indonesia by encouraging the resolution of separatist violence peacefully and through negotiations.

Despite difficulties implementing a cease fire in Aceh, Jakarta can build momentum for conflict prevention nationwide by focusing on Papua -- a remote, resource-rich yet impoverished province where pro-independence groups have waged a long struggle against the central government.

Papua is home to the world's largest gold and copper mine in Timika, a huge natural gas field in Tangguh, and forestry resources generating about US$ 100 million annually to the central government. Though the province is endowed with vast natural resource wealth, the 2001 United Nations Development Index ranked Papua as Indonesia's second poorest province.

Full and effective implementation of the Special Autonomy Law for Papua represents a win-win situation. While preserving Indonesia's territorial integrity, special autonomy would allow the people of Papua to exercise full democratic rights and to benefit from a significantly enhanced share of the province's vast natural resource wealth.

The bill permits the province to retain up to 80 percent of the income derived from its extractive industries. Power sharing arrangements embodied in the Special Autonomy Law for Papua are central to reducing tensions, promoting moderation and preserving national unity.

However, the anticipated benefits of special autonomy have not yet materialized. Progress has been hindered by competing priorities in Jakarta, and a lack of training and experience in Papua. It is also hindered by mutual distrust between ethnic Papuans and the Indonesian government.

Though President Megawati Soekarnoputri has apologized for policy mistakes and Army excesses in Papua, there is still much to be done strengthening the rule of law, bringing human rights offenders to justice, and rebuilding confidence.

Special autonomy represents a win-win situation. To accelerate its implementation, the government should appoint a widely respected and experienced Indonesian as "Papua Coordinator." He would be assisted by national experts and international specialists constituting a "secial autonomy advisory group" drafting regulations for power sharing.

Funds from the decentralization plan should be used to support business training, micro credit, rural cooperatives, quick impact and employment -- generation projects for ethnic Papuans. Consistent with the goal of improving economic opportunities for ethnic Papuans, businesses in Papua, which are presently dominated by international concerns and non-ethnic Papuan migrants, would expand training and job opportunities for ethnic Papuans.

Since the Indonesian Military (TNI) receives only about 25 percent of its budget from the national government, it fends for itself in raising the rest through a variety of legal and illegal enterprises. For example, TNI receives up to US$18 million annually from an American company, Freeport-McMoran, which pays the army to provide security for mining operations in Papua.

International businesses in Papua should gradually phase out their security contracts with TNI and, as they do, the national government would increase its budgetary support. Decentralization funds could also be used to subsidize housing, health care and social services for TNI personnel and their families.

In addition, the U.S. and other donor countries should expand advisory and training activities to the army and police, especially in Papua. Assistance would focus on effective security procedures that respect the rights of citizens. To this end, the police need better equipment and improved skills to effectively fulfill their constitutional responsibility safeguarding domestic law and order. Assistance would also emphasize the development of community based policing -- a security strategy which seeks to involve effected communities rather than intimidate them.

For TNI and the police to play a constructive role in the future, there must be accountability for past human rights abuses. Those responsible should be prosecuted by independent courts and units responsible, including Army Special Force (Kopassus), withdrawn from Papua. Acknowledgement of Papua's violent history would be advanced through an appropriate truth, justice and reconciliation process.

As provincial authorities assume greater responsibility under special autonomy, assistance will be needed to build local capacity and improve civil administration. The World Bank-led Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI) should establish a "Papua professional corps" assisting donor-sponsored programs, including those of the UN Development Program bringing Papua into line with other parts of Indonesia.

A "preventive development" strategy would enhance traditional education, health and employment generating projects by linking them with conflict prevention goals.

Donor affinity groups would bring together donor countries and organizations to further coordinate assistance and focus aid on conflict prevention. Japan would be the ideal convener of a donor conference to launch the preventive development program. It has a proven interest in "development for peace". Moreover, Japan is the largest donor to Indonesia with contributions averaging $1.9 billion a year in the 1990s.

Jakarta should also postpone its plan to divide Papua into three provinces. Instead it should accelerate full implementation of the Special Autonomy Law.

For special autonomy to work, the people of Papua must see it as an instrument for advancing democratization, rather than as a mechanism to foreclose their concept of merdeka (independence); Indonesian authorities must see that special autonomy is about satisfying the legitimate concerns of ethnic Papuans, rather than as an interim step to political independence.

International stakeholders -- foreign governments, international businesses, multinational corporations and non- governmental organizations -- can play a vital role encouraging and supporting effective implementation of the Special Autonomy Law.

However, their interest should not be misunderstood by either Papuans or the government as support for separatism or a desire to weaken the country. Expanded cooperation between the U.S. and Indonesia with an emphasis on peace and progress in Papua would strengthen bilateral ties, enhance Indonesia's steady democratic progress, and advance the interests of Papuans themselves.

Dennis C. Blair is also former commander-in-chief of the U.S. Pacific Command. David L. Phillips is also director of the Indonesia Commission Council on Foreign Relations.