End the unlimited power of the MPR

Deny J.A., Executive Director Jayabaya University and Academy Foundation, Jakarta

The 2001 Annual Session of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) has revealed a paradox. During the session, all high state institutions have delivered their progress reports to the MPR. The President, the House of Representatives (DPR), the Supreme Court (MA), the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) and the Supreme Advisory Council (DPA) have reported their performance to the MPR to be appraised by the Assembly.

But who appraises the MPR's performance? Who or which institution controls the MPR if it, let's say, betrays the reform agenda for the sake of the short-term interests of the major parties that it is dominated by?

As the highest institution, the MPR wields great authority. The MPR has the authority to determine and amend the Constitution.

The Assembly has the right to elect and replace president and vice president, and to appraise the performance of other high state institutions. The Assembly is also authorized to issue stipulations that can be used as legal references.

But the Indonesian constitutional system also spoils the MPR. No institution has the authority to control the MPR, despite the fact that the Assembly could make a mistake that may have serious ramifications. For example, the MPR reelected Soeharto for a 7th consecutive term in 1998, amid the deterioration of the economic crisis and rising demands for replacement of the nation's leader.

Soeharto fell from power in the next two months and his fall was followed by a prolonged political and economic crisis that claimed many victims. It was the price the nation had to pay because of the MPR not being responsive to the public.

Unfortunately, such a condition does not make political leaders aware that it is very dangerous to have such a powerful institution like the MPR, whose authority cannot be canceled or overruled by other institutions.

The 2001 MPR session has again reminded people of the supreme body's weaknesses. The first day of the Annual Session was marred by a scuffle between Assembly members.

We saw sessions of commissions and plenary sessions, all of which looked very serious but yielded no results. The sessions were often abandoned by MPR members, with less than half of them present by their conclusion. How dangerous it is for the nation to maintain the MPR's supreme authority.

For the sake of the nation, the MPR must be reformed. In next year's annual session, reform of the MPR should result in several outcomes, as follows:

First, the MPR's status as the highest state institution should be revoked. Its status should be lowered to a high state institution at the same level of the President and the Supreme Court, allowing none to control the other. There should be no more institutions that cannot be controlled like the MPR.

Second, the MPR's actions must be subject to control. A mechanism to control these actions must be developed with the assumption that any institution is liable to make mistakes which run counter to the Constitution. Therefore, to mitigate negative effects of, or to ensure that, the MPR's actions are not contrary to the Constitution, the Constitutional Court can review a variety of stipulations drawn up by the Assembly.

Third, as the MPR is an institution representing the people, its members should be elected by the people. Thus, the present composition of its members should be altered. Since the Indonesian Military (TNI) and National Police are the apparatus of the state, their members should be removed from the institution.

In addition, democracy does not recognize the concept of utusan golongan (Interest Group). As all groups have their own representatives elected through the general election, their members should consequently also stay out of the system.

The MPR of the future should consist of two chambers only. First, the chamber for the House of Representatives (DPR) to represent the entire population of Indonesia; and second, the chamber for the Regional Representatives Council (DPD) to represent provinces.

However, representation in the DPD should be equal, irrespective of a large disparity in population density among provinces. The name of the MPR should be changed to A Joint Session Between the DPR and DPD, akin to the Congress and Senate in the United States.

Only under such a new type of institution will the MPR be able to produce innovative actions and become a locomotive for democracy. Yet, to what extent do MPR members realized the importance of such a change? Or will they wait for another wave of mass protest before they consider change for themselves?