End of a chapter

By disbanding the Coordinating Agency to Support the Strengthening of National Stability (Bakorstanas) and all its units in the regions, President Abdurrahman Wahid has closed another chapter in the military's domination of the government in this country. Bakorstanas, and even more so its precursor, the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Kopkamtib), were the tools through which the military exercised its combined role of defense and politics. These were the omnipotent agencies through which the military flexed its muscles so effectively in controlling the country for more than three decades.

Although it was supposed to have played the role of coordinator, Bakorstanas was headed at the national level by the commander-in-chief of the military, and at the regional levels by the chiefs of the regional military commands. Except at the national level, where the military chief reported to the president, the heads of the regional agencies (Bakorstanasda) became the de facto local rulers, with the power to override the civilian administrations "in the interests of the nation". In practice, the agency and its regional units became tools for then president Soeharto and his military commanders to ensure full control over the country.

The history of Bakorstanas and its predecessor Kopkamtib is filled with much blood, all spilled in the name of maintaining national security. Kopkamtib was established in late 1965 to bring the nation back from the brink of chaos in the wake of an abortive coup blamed by the Army on the communists. Soeharto, then a young Army general, headed the agency and his power was boosted on March 11, 1966, when then president Sukarno signed away all his powers, virtually at gunpoint, giving the agency carte blanche to do whatever was necessary to restore order and peace.

Things were never the same from that point on. Soeharto used that power not only to crush the communists, but also to assume power a year later. Soeharto retained Kopkamtib, which Sukarno established in a time of emergency, to help him secure his grip over the country and sustain his power. Kopkamtib became a ruthless agency which rounded up Soeharto's political opponents, including student activists in the 1970s and 1980s. The agency's public notoriety reached such a point that in 1988 Soeharto replaced Kopkamtib with a new agency, called Bakorstanas.

With a new name and a supposedly more humane face, the new agency essentially played the same role as Kopkamtib. Like its predecessor, Bakorstanas and its regional units possessed immense power that should have raised questions about its legitimacy.

It is only appropriate that President Abdurrahman now has decided to abolish Bakorstanas, since his democratically elected government no longer has any use for such an agency. And with the separation of the National Police from the Indonesian Military (TNI) last April, internal security should now fall fully under the authority of the police. There can be no more questions about who is in charge of internal security during times of noncrisis. The military's involvement in internal security should be restricted to when the country, or particular regions, is in a state of emergency.

By abolishing Bakorstanas, the President has effectively clipped the power of the military, which many people in the past meekly accepted. Abdurrahman has done this with little fanfare and even less prior warning. But this is the same President who has also single-handedly maneuvered to replace a number of military top brass whose democratic credentials were dubious, restoring civil supremacy over the military in the process. This is the President who has made good on his promise to fight for a civil society, in a style that often confuses his supporters and detractors.

If the President is consistent, his next target will be the complex network of the Army's territorial arms, from the regional to the district commands. They too overlap with the duties of the police, and they too have had their share of power abuses.

The President's detractors within the TNI have tried to portray his maneuverings to bring the military under control as meddling in their internal affairs. Others have suggested that the endless criticism of TNI is aimed at destroying the military. But even the harshest criticism of the military pales in comparison to the atrocities TNI has committed in the past against its own people. The military has been guilty of some of the most heinous crimes, and has literally gotten away with murder.

It seems far too preposterous to conclude that the President's maneuvers and the public criticism are part of a systematic campaign to destroy TNI. No sane citizen, not even those who have suffered the worst of the military's atrocities, could envisage a nation without a military. These criticisms reflect the increasing public demand for greater public accountability from the military, which is essential in any democracy. They are intended to pressure TNI to mend its ways. The sooner TNI adapts to the changing times, the quicker the criticism will dissipate, and the faster TNI will regain the public's respect.