Elections: 'Civilian' vs 'military' nationalism

Otto Syamsuddin Ishak, Civil Society Alliance for Democracy (Yappika), Jakarta

The political dynamics in 2004 are accelerating as the general election nears. Political observers link this phenomenon to the fact that the process of the 2004 general election is of much greater complexity than that of the 1999 elections. This great complexity, unfortunately, is yet to be coupled with well thought out preparation.

There may be a significant relationship between the increasingly heated atmosphere and the amendment to the elections law. However, in this article, I will try to describe this situation from the perspective of nationalism that Jack Snyder introduced. (Snyder is Professor of International Relations in the political science department and Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University). This means that the 2004 general election is viewed as an arena where civilian nationalists and military nationalists will compete.

Civilian nationalism is usually found in countries where the development of democracy has become fully fledged. In these countries, representative institutions are stronger than government institutions. Meanwhile, since Soeharto stepped down in 1998, Indonesia has reached only a transitional point expected to lead the country to a more democratic state.

Unfortunately, the 1999 general election only produced people's representatives of a poor quality, better known as crooked or rotten politicians. As a result, this transitional period has become a time in which government institutions have been re-entrenched, particularly in regard to the political position of the military.

The re-entrenchment of the political position of the military began when the generals displayed their disobedience to the political policies of the supreme commander of the military, president Abdurrahman Wahid, a phenomenon that brought down Wahid and put Megawati in his place. In this context, obedience to the supreme commander was pitted against the interests of national sovereignty.

Since the early years of Indonesia's independence, national foes have continued to be produced in order to maintain the existence of military nationalism. During the Sukarno years, foreign countries were named the nation's enemies. During Soeharto's era, the communists were used. Today, the enemies are separatists, and they are linked with terrorism so that the country can enjoy foreign support.

In this transitional period -- to quote Snyder -- the efforts that the military nationalists make will be consist of dominating the definition of a situation, introducing social segregation and controlling the press.

On the one hand, the act of dominating the definition of a situation is represented by a statement about the threat of national disintegration posed by the separatist movements in Aceh and Papua. The military nationalists demand that the civilian government provide "a political umbrella" and a military operation budget.

On the other hand, civilians must stop pushing for human rights trials linked with military leaders. Continuing with the human rights trial, they argue, will only demoralize the soldiers now fighting to save national sovereignty.

The main agents that the military nationalists employ for social segregation are hoodlums. They are aroused to claim that human rights and prodemocracy activists betray nationalism and have become the lackeys of separatists and foreign powers. In fact, as Jack Snyder put it, military nationalists are hostile to upholding human rights and democracy, which simultaneously means upholding people's sovereignty.

To control information, military nationalists have developed their project of "embedded journalism". Journalists are trained to assume their stance and take action in defending national unity. Journalists are controlled so that there is only one information source for their reporting. Unfortunately, the journalists themselves have been brought face-to-face with hoodlumism, which is backed by military nationalists.

When the military nationalists have begun to gain strength, they will endeavor to impress upon the people that they are better saviors of national sovereignty than the civilian political leaders. At the national level, they will begin to label a civil society movement as an enemy. The military has defined the judicial review of Law No. 12/2003 on elections as an attempt to foil the elections, coupled with conflicts involving political party followers and money politics.

Then the Army chief of staff has said that if the general election is marred with bloodshed resulting from conflicts involving followers of political parties contesting the elections, the Army will intervene.

Then the chief of the National Intelligence Agency (BIN) announced five threats to the elections, namely terrorism, separatism, neoimperialism and colonialism, ultra-liberalism and communism. Finally, the National Resilience Institute (Lemhanas) has made public its findings of 28 spots of potential trouble during the elections.

Efforts by civil society organizations to proceed with democratization in a systemic way are instead defined as sabotage against democracy. Worse still, this definition of situation has earned a nod from members of the military elite in the Cabinet of the present civilian government and also from politicians in the political parties and in the House of Representatives.

Besides, the military has continued to entrench itself by establishing raiders troops, purchasing more military equipment, providing training to people and mobilizing support from veteran organizations.

Meanwhile, the political elite has responded with statements warm to the military. Amien Rais has said that he will have a vice presidential running mate from the military, while Nurcholis Madjid has warned care must be taken to ensure that the military will not feel they have been set aside. Meanwhile, a number of retired generals and civilian figures have set up an organization called the Front for the Revival of Greater Indonesia.

Indeed, a fundamental difference between the general elections in 1999 and in 2004 lies in the spirit of nationalism. The 1999 general election was wrapped n an atmosphere dominated by the spirit of civilian nationalism, more popularly known as a reform atmosphere. The 2004 elections are so far marked with a revival of military nationalism.

We can draw a conclusion that the spirit of military nationalism will be dominant throughout 2004. As a result, there will be a clash between the civilian nationalists and their military counterparts. The question is whether this political tension, clash and turmoil will lead to the establishment of stronger civilian representative institutions or their subordination by military-controlled bureaucratic institutions.