East Timor's troubles bound to continue

East Timor's troubles bound to continue

By Lela E. Madjiah

JAKARTA (JP): East Timor is mostly seen in black and white,
divided into those who are prointegration and others who are
proindependence.

In fact, East Timor is more complicated than what is presented
on TV or in the newspaper.

The truth is that the conflicting parties which make most of
the headlines are far from being a majority. The best part of the
East Timorese community consists of people whose main interest is
to live a normal life. They have been caught in the tug of war
between prointegration and proindependence camps and are often
victimized in the violent struggle for power.

Most who belong to this group are poor farmers and
businesspeople who have enjoyed a relatively profitable
livelihood during Indonesia's rule. They are aware that
independence means starting all over again and that they may be
forced to give up much of what they have achieved these past 23
years.

Prointegrationists have been blamed for much of the escalating
violence that has gripped the province after President B.J.
Habibie announced his second, deadly option in January this year.
In the view of the international (Western) world,
prointegrationists are evil through and through, while members of
the proindependence camp are the chosen angels. Thanks to the
slant of the Western media, the proindependence supporters are
viewed as the perfect victims and the prointegrationists are the
culprits.

A more objective look at the problem of East Timor shows that
both camps are victims of a power play, with the U.S. the master
player. Both sides lost family members in the 1974 to 1975 civil
war that ended with Indonesia's presence in the territory. This
is a well-known fact, but which most Westerners refuse to
acknowledge or simply ignore.

"I thought only the Fretilin got killed," a UN observer
confided in a recent interview following a two-week visit to East
Timor in July. "I didn't know that there were people on the other
side who also were killed," he added, referring to the 1975
bloody war between Fretilin and pro-Indonesian supporters.

The present militias are seen as a mere tool of the Indonesian
Military which, despite its outward support for Habibie's policy,
is accused of quietly helping the militias build strong armed
groups to fight the Fretilin.

This is a misleading view. Even without encouragement from the
military, people like Eurico Guterres, a die-hard militia leader,
will raise arms to defend their right to remain citizens of
Indonesia.

"People like us, and there are many of them, are poor. If
something happens, like a civil war, we cannot afford to flee the
country. We are the ones who have to stay. That's why we are
determined to fight, not because the military pays us," a UN
observer who asked to remain anonymous quoted Guteres as saying.

The military also has been blamed for renewed clashes between
prointegration and proindependence supporters. The military is
accused of arming and funding local militias, as well as
preparing them for a guerrilla war should they lose to the
proindependence group.

The military is in a very delicate position.
Prointegrationists have accused the Indonesian government of
betrayal, of stabbing them in the back by giving them the second
option. After 23 years in East Timor, the military cannot simply
walk out and bid goodbye with a neat, "That's it, this is the end
of the story".

There is an emotional attachment, whether or not one chooses
to believe it, between the military and local people, however
small the number might be. After all, they have joined hands in
fighting the Fretilin and, as brothers in combat, neither feels
it can abandon the other. For this reason, the military has tried
to remain neutral although it has to convince pro-Indonesian
supporters that, in spirit, it remains with the East Timorese.

The matter is made more complicated by the involvement of
veterans and active military officers who fought in East Timor
and who are against Habibie's decision. They feel betrayed. After
all, in their view, they entered East Timor in 1975 because there
were East Timorese who wanted to become part of Indonesia.

Habibie's second option is threatening the existence of those
East Timorese who want to remain with Indonesia, something these
officers cannot tolerate after so many Indonesian troops were
either killed or wounded during military operations in East
Timor. These officers are supporting the prointegration camp,
either openly or secretly.

Given its background, East Timor will remain a problem
regardless of the outcome of the Aug. 30 ballot. Independence is
seen as not viable, as Indonesia has threatened to carry out a
scorched-earth policy if the proindependence camp wins the
ballot.

Meanwhile, if the prointegrationists win, the opposition and
their international supporters are bound to accuse Indonesia of
foul play. They will demand another poll or a UN presence in the
territory until a further arrangement is achieved.

The worst to come may be another civil war; the Aug. 26
clashes between proindependence and prointegration supporters
show the possibility is not only there but is also an increasing
reality. The hostile sides have pledged to refrain from violent
acts and both have failed to keep their promise. Both camps have
promised to respect the outcome of the ballot, but both are also
building up arms to prepare for another guerrilla war.

Until both parties agree to respect their own oaths and to
reconcile, East Timor will remain a flash point and a perfect
target for outside interference, including the Indonesian
government and military.

The writer is a journalist.