East Timor's troubles bound to continue

By Lela E. Madjiah

JAKARTA (JP): East Timor is mostly seen in black and white, divided into those who are prointegration and others who are proindependence.

In fact, East Timor is more complicated than what is presented on TV or in the newspaper.

The truth is that the conflicting parties which make most of the headlines are far from being a majority. The best part of the East Timorese community consists of people whose main interest is to live a normal life. They have been caught in the tug of war between prointegration and proindependence camps and are often victimized in the violent struggle for power.

Most who belong to this group are poor farmers and businesspeople who have enjoyed a relatively profitable livelihood during Indonesia's rule. They are aware that independence means starting all over again and that they may be forced to give up much of what they have achieved these past 23 years.

Prointegrationists have been blamed for much of the escalating violence that has gripped the province after President B.J. Habibie announced his second, deadly option in January this year. In the view of the international (Western) world, prointegrationists are evil through and through, while members of the proindependence camp are the chosen angels. Thanks to the slant of the Western media, the proindependence supporters are viewed as the perfect victims and the prointegrationists are the culprits.

A more objective look at the problem of East Timor shows that both camps are victims of a power play, with the U.S. the master player. Both sides lost family members in the 1974 to 1975 civil war that ended with Indonesia's presence in the territory. This is a well-known fact, but which most Westerners refuse to acknowledge or simply ignore.

"I thought only the Fretilin got killed," a UN observer confided in a recent interview following a two-week visit to East Timor in July. "I didn't know that there were people on the other side who also were killed," he added, referring to the 1975 bloody war between Fretilin and pro-Indonesian supporters.

The present militias are seen as a mere tool of the Indonesian Military which, despite its outward support for Habibie's policy, is accused of quietly helping the militias build strong armed groups to fight the Fretilin.

This is a misleading view. Even without encouragement from the military, people like Eurico Guterres, a die-hard militia leader, will raise arms to defend their right to remain citizens of Indonesia.

"People like us, and there are many of them, are poor. If something happens, like a civil war, we cannot afford to flee the country. We are the ones who have to stay. That's why we are determined to fight, not because the military pays us," a UN observer who asked to remain anonymous quoted Guteres as saying.

The military also has been blamed for renewed clashes between prointegration and proindependence supporters. The military is accused of arming and funding local militias, as well as preparing them for a guerrilla war should they lose to the proindependence group.

The military is in a very delicate position. Prointegrationists have accused the Indonesian government of betrayal, of stabbing them in the back by giving them the second option. After 23 years in East Timor, the military cannot simply walk out and bid goodbye with a neat, "That's it, this is the end of the story".

There is an emotional attachment, whether or not one chooses to believe it, between the military and local people, however small the number might be. After all, they have joined hands in fighting the Fretilin and, as brothers in combat, neither feels it can abandon the other. For this reason, the military has tried to remain neutral although it has to convince pro-Indonesian supporters that, in spirit, it remains with the East Timorese.

The matter is made more complicated by the involvement of veterans and active military officers who fought in East Timor and who are against Habibie's decision. They feel betrayed. After all, in their view, they entered East Timor in 1975 because there were East Timorese who wanted to become part of Indonesia.

Habibie's second option is threatening the existence of those East Timorese who want to remain with Indonesia, something these officers cannot tolerate after so many Indonesian troops were either killed or wounded during military operations in East Timor. These officers are supporting the prointegration camp, either openly or secretly.

Given its background, East Timor will remain a problem regardless of the outcome of the Aug. 30 ballot. Independence is seen as not viable, as Indonesia has threatened to carry out a scorched-earth policy if the proindependence camp wins the ballot.

Meanwhile, if the prointegrationists win, the opposition and their international supporters are bound to accuse Indonesia of foul play. They will demand another poll or a UN presence in the territory until a further arrangement is achieved.

The worst to come may be another civil war; the Aug. 26 clashes between proindependence and prointegration supporters show the possibility is not only there but is also an increasing reality. The hostile sides have pledged to refrain from violent acts and both have failed to keep their promise. Both camps have promised to respect the outcome of the ballot, but both are also building up arms to prepare for another guerrilla war.

Until both parties agree to respect their own oaths and to reconcile, East Timor will remain a flash point and a perfect target for outside interference, including the Indonesian government and military.

The writer is a journalist.