East Timor's Indictment : A Chance To Save Indonesia's Reform

East Timor's Indictment : A Chance To Save Indonesia's Reform

Aboeprijadi Santoso
Journalist
Amsterdam

Instead of expressing regret over Dili's indictment of
Indonesian generals (as East Timor President Xanana Gusmao did)
or flatly rejecting it (as Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan
Wirayuda and President Megawati Soekarnoputri hastily did),
Jakarta and Dili would do well to review their policies and
consider the long-term implications of the issue.

A new myth has emerged since East Timor's independence in May
last year. In order to foster a good relationship with Jakarta,
it is believed, Dili should avoid sensitive issues, including
efforts to bring those responsible for killings, deportation and
destruction in East Timor in 1999 to justice. For Jakarta, having
been humiliated when it lost East Timor's independence vote,
would only be too happy to welcome a new neighbor that puts the
importance of a good relationship before everything else.

This myth ignores four intertwined factors, ranging from
international support for East Timor and for the indictments, to
the need in Indonesia for real reform.

First, a tiny half-island amidst a great archipelagic
neighbor, East Timor's geo-political predicament is unfortunate
since it virtually dictates much of the country's foreign policy
outlook. Metaphorically, East Timor has, in fact, opted to become
a Finland, an independent country living in the shadow of or
dependent upon its powerful neighbor, the Soviet Union, rather
than a Baltic state, which evolved from domination to occupation
by the same giant.

But, unlike Finland or the Baltics in the past, post-Cold War,
independent East Timor has obtained the good will and commitment
of the international community, which has, in the past, ignored
its sufferings, to help the country if its security is at stake.

A recent proposal by UN Chief Kofi Annan to postpone the
withdrawal of UN troops from East Timor and its endorsement by
the UN Security Council, expresses that awareness acutely. Annan
has explicitly spoken of a real threat by former pro-Jakarta
militias both inside the country and from Indonesian West Timor.

While the war on terrorism and the crisis on Iraq have pushed
the case of crimes against humanity committed by the Indonesian
officers and the militias in East Timor in 1999 from the front
pages, the issue has certainly not been, and will not be
forgotten.

Second, the elections in East Timor in 2001 and 2002 have
proved beyond doubt that Xanana Gusmao and Fretilin are the
country's most legitimate leader and ruling political party.
Whatever the differences between the president and the party on
the issue of Dili's indictment of the Indonesian generals, the
fact that matters most, is that the judicial authorities in Dili
will continue the proceedings. The ruling party and the local
populace have strongly supported the process. Reports have
indicated that the Dili indictment, if it continues to be ignored
by Jakarta, may in the long run damage the popular support for
the president, who is sincerely concerned to preserve a good
relationship between his country and Indonesia.

Local human rights organizations have expressed concerns on
the issue. Perkumpulan Hak's director Jose-Luis de Oliveira has
pointed out that victims of the 1999 mayhem have begun to ask,
"whose president is Xanana Gusmao really?" For a small population
whose majority suffered under the Indonesian Army and had been
victimized by the rampage, that's a pregnant question -
potentially critical even for a charismatic leader who liberated
his country from the colonial joke.

It is too early to conclude on this double institutional
leadership, but with a potential threat to the leadership of
Xanana Gusmao whose presidency, modeled on the Portuguese, is not
as strong as the U.S.'s or Indonesia's -- Jakarta cannot simply
rely on President Xanana's good will. On the contrary, if Jakarta
wishes to help strengthen Xanana's position, it should seriously
consider Dili's indictment.

Third, East Timor's civil society is not alone in demanding
justice on the violence in 1999. There has always been and still
is relatively broad international public opinion supporting these
demands, including human rights organizations in Indonesia, which
call for breaking the chain of impunity.

For a number of generals with leading positions at the
ministry of defense and the military headquarter in 1999, were
neither investigated (including former coordinating minister
Gen. (ret) Feisal Tanjung) nor tried (former military chief Gen.
(ret) Wiranto). Seven independent researchers in a document
titled, Masters of Terror: Indonesia's Military and Violence in
East Timor in 1999, Canberra, 2002 have listed 11 major events,
124 officers and militia members as (possible) suspects and
several institutions and military and police units as possibly
involved in the violence and its planning.

Yet of those, only 5 cases were selected for Jakarta's trial,
one was dropped, and of the 18 suspects tried, most have been
acquitted and a few got light verdicts despite a minimum sentence
of ten years defined for crimes against humanity.

Not surprisingly, the Dili indictments, issued by the UN-
sponsored Serious Crimes Investigation Unit within the East Timor
justice system, has been welcomed and seen as implicit criticism
of Jakarta's "fake" trials.

Fourth, for the Megawati government to cooperate with the
justice authorities in Dili would not only be a unique political
and moral investment, both internationally and domestically, but
it would also be an important contribution, on the part of
Jakarta, to foster a good relationship between Indonesia and East
Timor, and, ultimately, real reform in Indonesian politics and
reconciliation with East Timor.

The political leaders' indignant responses, first, to
President Megawati attending East Timor independence day, and,
second, to the loss of Sipadan and Ligitan islands at the World
Court last year, revealed the depth of the humiliation Jakarta
felt, more than it has publicly admitted, since it lost East
Timor.

With the shame so deeply felt about East Timor, a creative and
imaginative policy change in Jakarta by responding positively to
the indictment on 1999 violence could restore the country's
dignity and may have a liberating effect. But Megawati is not the
type of leader who would initiate a policy break and, with her
close links to the military's top-brass, it is hard to envisage
such a change.

Yet that's precisely the point. With the military leaders'
growing impatient with Aceh and Papua, some have envisioned the
possibility of a military strike without presidential consent,
ignoring that civil supremacy that rests with the president, who
is also the commander-in-chief.

President Megawati could justifiably strike back and restrain
her generals. With the Timor atrocities in 1999 now recognized as
the Army's achilles heel, she could acquire the leverage and
seize the momentum to liberate the Army from its post-colonial
trauma in order to definitely close Indonesia's Timor chapter.

For now, the least Jakarta can do, if it is to prevent an
international tribunal and to restore Indonesia's dignity after
the shameful events of 1999, is to encourage the generals to
fully cooperate with the justice authorities and human rights
institutions in Indonesia and East Timor.