East Timor's history ignored
East Timor's history ignored
Sri Pamoedjo Rahardjo
This is the second of two articles on East Timor.
JAKARTA (JP): The results associated with the rapid
development of East Timor included an increase in the local
population's health status and survival rate. The number of
children entering their teenage years increased rapidly. Despite
immense amount of funds poured into the province, the size of the
local economy was not large enough to absorb an increased labor
force.
Evidence showed that in the early 1990s, unemployment in East
Timor among East Timorese youth was quite high. Many of them
could not be absorbed by the local economy. This anomaly was due
to a population boom, particularly as a result of the generation
born before and during the invasion of those who had survived.
They demanded a better life as a result of their improved
education and had developed a better awareness of their rights.
The demographic changes had obviously worried government
officials at the central level. Social safety valve strategies
were hurriedly introduced.
One strategy was to introduce a continuing education scheme
for East Timorese. The youths were encouraged to pursue higher
education. The scheme was meant not only to improve the quality
of the local human resources, but also to delay the demographic
pressures entering the labor market. Another strategy was the
offer of jobs to qualified East Timorese from some state
enterprises. However, only a few qualified East Timorese were
absorbed in the labor market outside East Timor.
Unfortunately, the schemes were not packaged and disseminated
widely to the public. Consequently, many did not understand and
appreciate the strategy. Dissatisfaction among youths continued
to rise. These social disorders apparently affected the growth
capacity of the local economy. The mass of the local indigenous
economy remained small.
In order to maintain a conducive climate for development, the
government had warranted national stability as a political
scheme. In conjunction with these efforts, security measures were
also imposed in East Timor. In order to maintain internal
security, the Armed Forces helped the local government quell
local threats.
At that time, the government had always maintained that local
disturbances should not get out of hand because they could become
a threat to the entire nation. The antiquated assumptions against
insurgencies and disturbances developed from the experience of
low economic development levels in the 1950s and 1960s.
Similar disciplinary actions may have been implemented
throughout Indonesia by local authorities. But in East Timor, the
same disciplinary action was received by some with hatred. The
division worsened when the churches became deeply involved; they
interpreted these actions as an act of oppression toward a
minority group. Soldiers who were defending the Republic with
their own lives were seen as human rights violators. There is
less media exposure on the fate of soldiers on a military mission
than on alleged human rights abuses.
Similar responses are exacted from soldiers in other countries
when they try to defend their countries from the threat of
attack. To take a few examples, Filipino soldiers fought back
when they were attacked by Moslem insurgent groups. American
soldiers even reacted with abuse during the Vietnam war as in the
infamous My Lai massacre. An over reaction on the part of Israeli
soldiers toward Palestinian civilians was also found. Yet, these
actions were generally considered appropriate.
All of a sudden, poorly informed UN officials heard the cry
for "help" from the affected East Timorese. A series of fact-
finding visits by foreign dignitaries, U.S. senators and
congressmen and UN negotiators hurt the Indonesians more than the
help it purported to offer. The Indonesian diplomats were only
armed with their "smiles" which led to nowhere. Had the
international community put their feet in the shoes of the
Indonesians, ill-advised pressure would not have been imposed on
the Indonesian government.
The world body had been successful in denying Indonesia
recognition of East Timor as part of Indonesia. This was reversed
when an Indonesian official sent confusing signals with regards
to the East Timor issue by agreeing to put the matter to a
ballot. Tagging prointegration proponents as troublemakers did
not encourage Indonesian leaders to put up a diplomatic fight to
retain East Timor. A few months ago, the same person who
confirmed the integration of East Timor as Indonesia's 27th
province abandoned this stand. No wonder, the prointegrationists
out of control actions reflects feelings of abandonment.
Indonesians should have emulated the ASEAN commitment to
achieve harmony in East Timor. After all, Indonesia was committed
to ensuring regional security. Peace in the region had been
achieved through Indonesia's active involvement in peacekeeping
efforts in Cambodia and the Philippines. The country's
achievement of relative harmony and peace in East Timor in these
last years was wrested by outsiders from the ASEAN region.
Indonesians should learn from history how a country
disintegrates. After the Soviet Union introduced Perestroika, the
integrity of the European communist countries began to collapse.
New countries were born. The Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and
Yugoslavia disappeared from the world map. The part of Yugoslavia
that refused to comply with disintegration efforts was deemed a
Serbian ethnic cleansing scheme. Will Indonesian be next on the
disintegration and disintegrated agenda?
The presence of Rapid Deployment Forces close to the East
Timor's southern border implies a possibility of foreign
intervention in the event that Indonesia does not compromise.
Unfortunately, our politicians were busy with issues on the
distribution of election seats, and the government, trying hard
to be associated with populist moves, forgot the importance of
this threat. This is in contrast to our ASEAN friends' minimum
reaction toward the East Timor issue, which shows respect for the
sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia.
The escalated conflict in East Timor could have been avoided,
had the international community been willing to respect the
background of the Indonesian presence in East Timor. The
underlying fact is that the move was not an act of colonization.
The Indonesians were invited to help stop the bloodshed in 1975
that threatened to spill over its boundaries, a move that would
have won approval even from human rights proponents then. The
heart of the issue is the perceived inequitable development, the
unequal capacity to compete for local opportunities, and an
absence of cultural sensitivity on the part of some individuals
in the government and local settlers.
In conclusion, all Indonesians, including all our brothers and
sisters in East Timor, should wake up and resolve to solve
threats toward national disintegration. The lower rupiah value
means loss of the people's trust in the economy, but it should
not result in a loss of nationalism. With double standards around
the globe, what is justifiable for one country may not be seen as
such in another. The conflict in Northern Ireland between
Catholics and Protestants and in the Middle East between Israelis
and Palestinians is just the same wine in different bottles.
The writer is a social and economic observer.