East Timor policy needs rethinking

By Jusuf Wanandi

JAKARTA (JP): The Habibie government proposal in mid-1998 to grant special autonomy status to East Timor was a measure too little and too late. Although it specified full home rule, with the exception of defense, foreign affairs and monetary policies, which would continue to be handled by the central government, the proposal is no longer acceptable to most East Timorese.

Had this been proposed two years earlier, it might have been accepted. After what developed in East Timor and in the whole country since Soeharto's resignation in May 1998 the plan is no longer relevant. Above all, for the proposal to be acceptable in the first place, the government should have first consulted with the local people of East Timor. Instead, the process has been driven by talks with the Portuguese at the United Nations.

The best option would have been something along the lines of the Matignon Accord between France and New Caledonia, in which a 10 year transition was stipulated, with a referendum at the end of that term to decide whether the people of New Caledonia would choose to stay within France or become independent. In the New Caledonia case, locals chose to retain links with France, because of the presence of French expatriates and because France has been generous to them in all fields.

Over the last two years or so, scholars and graduate students of East Timor abroad have held two meetings, namely in Stockholm and Washington D.C, to discuss the future of East Timor and its relationship with Indonesia. They have consulted leaders within East Timor, Indonesia and abroad.

They came to the same best-case scenario proposal in line with the Matignon Accord. Participants held the view that perhaps a transition period of five to 10 years would be feasible before a referendum could be held to decide the future status of East Timor. They said leaders from both the proindependence and prointegration factions, including Mgr. Carlos Belo, Jose Alexandre "Gusmao" Xanana and Mario Carrascalao, agreed on the outline of their proposal, because they all recognized the constraints involved in any solution.

One factor is the critical need for a transition period. Authentic efforts for reconciliation between all the factions are necessary before a referendum can be held without creating a civil war in East Timor. Preparations are also needed for training and education of the bureaucracy, politicians and others to administer the territory. If in the future East Timor opts for independence, financial sources (domestic or foreign) should be secured. Local resources can only cover 10 percent of the routine budget needs of the territory, with the rest subsidized by the central government.

Last, but not least, "normalization" and "good relations" with Indonesia are critical for East Timor's survival in the future because of its geographical location. If Indonesia is unfriendly toward East Timor, the latter will not have a peaceful and stable future. Reconciliation with Indonesia should include reconciliation with the Indonesian Military (TNI), a body that has had a traumatic and schizophrenic relationship with East Timor. This relationship with Indonesia should also include in the longer term membership of East Timor in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

While these deliberations were taking place, in January 1999 Habibie announced a reversal of his earlier policy of full autonomy status for East Timor. He shocked the world with his announcement to offer independence to East Timor by January 2000, if the East Timorese reject an offer of autonomy. Yet, this proposal appears to have been considered among his personal staff as far back as 1998, or earlier. The rationale is that East Timor costs Indonesia too much in international prestige.

Moreover, as it is a minority that is not loyal to Indonesia, they question why Indonesia should continue to subsidize the territory. They believe that this policy is not going to have an impact on other anticentripetal tendencies (such as in Aceh or Irian Jaya), because East Timor is a special case.

Habibie should be aware that his policy on East Timor may not be for the good of the East Timorese, and that his suggestion has been used as an excuse for a change in policy that, in fact, has resulted in greater uncertainties, and has created the possibility of a civil war in East Timor. The abrupt change in policy has created confusion and a feeling of despair and betrayal on the part of the prointegration faction. The military, or elements of it, even though from the outside it appears to be supporting the change in policy, is likely to sabotage the deal, because of the sacrifices they have made to take over and maintain East Timor as part of Indonesia, and because it has been completely ignored in the new deal.

If one takes into consideration that five out of 13 regencies in the West of the province are pro-Indonesia, it could be imagined that a protracted conflict is to be expected. This has begun with killings by pro-Indonesia militias that have either moved out of the control of the Indonesian forces or are indirectly encouraged by them.

Habibie's proposal for immediate independence is a proposal that is not final, because the new People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) after the elections has the sole authority to declare the separation constitutionally, since it was the MPR that established East Timor as the 27th province in 1978. Megawati Soekarnoputri, head of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan), a potential winner in the general election, has already rejected Habibie's policy reversal.

The idea of a transition period prior to a referendum may have been overrun by events and the new policy and the agreement for a plebiscite by the UN in August. But, it is not a forgone conclusion that everything will run smoothly in the next few months. A civil war, the worse case scenario, cannot be completely ruled out, despite the presence of 250 UN police officers. The general election in June could result in a coalition government that may politically reject the agreement with the Portuguese and prepare a new set of policies different than those of Habibie. After all, the Habibie government is only a transitional one and after the general election will become a lame duck government unable to implement new policies or old ones not supported by the new government.

It is also not a foregone conclusion that the People's Consultative Assembly session to elect the new president will be held in November, leaving a vacuum for too long. The new House of Representatives (DPR) may decide on a new time-table that could establish a new government within three months after the results of the elections and the installment of the new DPR sometime at the end of June or early July. In that sense the solution to the East Timor problem is as yet not final.

The writer is chairman of the Supervisory Board of the Centre for International and Strategic Studies.