East Timor policy needs rethinking

East Timor policy needs rethinking

By Jusuf Wanandi

JAKARTA (JP): The Habibie government proposal in mid-1998 to
grant special autonomy status to East Timor was a measure too
little and too late. Although it specified full home rule, with
the exception of defense, foreign affairs and monetary policies,
which would continue to be handled by the central government, the
proposal is no longer acceptable to most East Timorese.

Had this been proposed two years earlier, it might have been
accepted. After what developed in East Timor and in the whole
country since Soeharto's resignation in May 1998 the plan is no
longer relevant. Above all, for the proposal to be acceptable in
the first place, the government should have first consulted with
the local people of East Timor. Instead, the process has been
driven by talks with the Portuguese at the United Nations.

The best option would have been something along the lines of
the Matignon Accord between France and New Caledonia, in which a
10 year transition was stipulated, with a referendum at the end
of that term to decide whether the people of New Caledonia would
choose to stay within France or become independent. In the New
Caledonia case, locals chose to retain links with France, because
of the presence of French expatriates and because France has been
generous to them in all fields.

Over the last two years or so, scholars and graduate students
of East Timor abroad have held two meetings, namely in Stockholm
and Washington D.C, to discuss the future of East Timor and its
relationship with Indonesia. They have consulted leaders within
East Timor, Indonesia and abroad.

They came to the same best-case scenario proposal in line with
the Matignon Accord. Participants held the view that perhaps a
transition period of five to 10 years would be feasible before a
referendum could be held to decide the future status of East
Timor. They said leaders from both the proindependence and
prointegration factions, including Mgr. Carlos Belo, Jose
Alexandre "Gusmao" Xanana and Mario Carrascalao, agreed on the
outline of their proposal, because they all recognized the
constraints involved in any solution.

One factor is the critical need for a transition period.
Authentic efforts for reconciliation between all the factions are
necessary before a referendum can be held without creating a
civil war in East Timor. Preparations are also needed for
training and education of the bureaucracy, politicians and others
to administer the territory. If in the future East Timor opts for
independence, financial sources (domestic or foreign) should be
secured. Local resources can only cover 10 percent of the routine
budget needs of the territory, with the rest subsidized by the
central government.

Last, but not least, "normalization" and "good relations" with
Indonesia are critical for East Timor's survival in the future
because of its geographical location. If Indonesia is unfriendly
toward East Timor, the latter will not have a peaceful and stable
future. Reconciliation with Indonesia should include
reconciliation with the Indonesian Military (TNI), a body that
has had a traumatic and schizophrenic relationship with East
Timor. This relationship with Indonesia should also include in
the longer term membership of East Timor in the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

While these deliberations were taking place, in January 1999
Habibie announced a reversal of his earlier policy of full
autonomy status for East Timor. He shocked the world with his
announcement to offer independence to East Timor by January 2000,
if the East Timorese reject an offer of autonomy. Yet, this
proposal appears to have been considered among his personal staff
as far back as 1998, or earlier. The rationale is that East Timor
costs Indonesia too much in international prestige.

Moreover, as it is a minority that is not loyal to Indonesia,
they question why Indonesia should continue to subsidize the
territory. They believe that this policy is not going to have an
impact on other anticentripetal tendencies (such as in Aceh or
Irian Jaya), because East Timor is a special case.

Habibie should be aware that his policy on East Timor may not
be for the good of the East Timorese, and that his suggestion has
been used as an excuse for a change in policy that, in fact, has
resulted in greater uncertainties, and has created the
possibility of a civil war in East Timor. The abrupt change in
policy has created confusion and a feeling of despair and
betrayal on the part of the prointegration faction. The military,
or elements of it, even though from the outside it appears to be
supporting the change in policy, is likely to sabotage the deal,
because of the sacrifices they have made to take over and
maintain East Timor as part of Indonesia, and because it has been
completely ignored in the new deal.

If one takes into consideration that five out of 13 regencies
in the West of the province are pro-Indonesia, it could be
imagined that a protracted conflict is to be expected. This has
begun with killings by pro-Indonesia militias that have either
moved out of the control of the Indonesian forces or are
indirectly encouraged by them.

Habibie's proposal for immediate independence is a proposal
that is not final, because the new People's Consultative Assembly
(MPR) after the elections has the sole authority to declare the
separation constitutionally, since it was the MPR that
established East Timor as the 27th province in 1978. Megawati
Soekarnoputri, head of the Indonesian Democratic Party of
Struggle (PDI Perjuangan), a potential winner in the general
election, has already rejected Habibie's policy reversal.

The idea of a transition period prior to a referendum may have
been overrun by events and the new policy and the agreement for a
plebiscite by the UN in August. But, it is not a forgone
conclusion that everything will run smoothly in the next few
months. A civil war, the worse case scenario, cannot be
completely ruled out, despite the presence of 250 UN police
officers. The general election in June could result in a
coalition government that may politically reject the agreement
with the Portuguese and prepare a new set of policies different
than those of Habibie. After all, the Habibie government is only
a transitional one and after the general election will become a
lame duck government unable to implement new policies or old ones
not supported by the new government.

It is also not a foregone conclusion that the People's
Consultative Assembly session to elect the new president will be
held in November, leaving a vacuum for too long. The new House of
Representatives (DPR) may decide on a new time-table that could
establish a new government within three months after the results
of the elections and the installment of the new DPR sometime at
the end of June or early July. In that sense the solution to the
East Timor problem is as yet not final.

The writer is chairman of the Supervisory Board of the Centre
for International and Strategic Studies.