East Timor: Dutch war crimes replayed

East Timor: Dutch war crimes replayed

By Aboeprijadi Santoso

This is the second of two articles on the origins of war
crimes in Indonesia.

AMSTERDAM (JP): Jakarta's rule in East Timor ended with
excessive violence, as did the Dutch war in Indonesia in the
1940s. These two cases carry lessons on the genesis of military
atrocities.

Last September, following the victory of the proindependence
camp in the August ballot in East Timor, there were reports that
hundreds of people were massacred, dozens missing, many suffering
from hunger, women raped, some 200,000 people displaced and
another 250,000 deported to East Nusa Tenggara, the western half
of Timor island.

As towns were devastated and infrastructure destroyed,
virtually the entire population suffered from insecurity and
social dislocation, and a huge amount of public and private
property was lost.

It was another Asian "Year Zero", which is what occurred in
Pol Pot's Cambodia. The carnage marked the final chapter of East
Timor's decolonization. Like the Dutch war crimes (but unlike the
Japanese war crimes, but we will put that aside), these events
were the outcome of the demise of the occupying force as its
army, itself in crisis, resisted the transition to a new state
and society. Those officers responsible for the crimes should be
tried according to international standards.

Just as the Dutch came when Indonesia proclaimed its
independence, Jakarta intervened as East Timor was about to take
advantage of its window of opportunity in the 1970s. Most
political parties in East Timor at the time, including the
Jakarta-backed Apodeti, wanted a self-determination vote, while
the left-wing Fretilin demanded independence. The 1975 invasion
by Indonesia thwarted these aspirations.

Massive violence, therefore, took place from the very
beginning. The list of massacre sites includes Dili, Tasi Tolu,
Kraras, the Matebian region, culminating in Santa Cruz, Dili,
1991, which opened Timor's Pandora's box. Globalization, with the
post-Cold War emphasis on human rights, turned the tables as the
world witnessed images of the Santa Cruz killings and the wave of
local protests.

From this point, East Timor became a lost cause for Jakarta --
just as the Dutch war was at the end of the 1940s.

As the tripartite negotiations moved forward without any
prospects of an agreement and as neither side in East Timor could
win on the battlefield, the impasse persisted for too long --
with Soeharto's Army maintaining dominance and arresting
independence leader Jose Alexandre "Xanana" Gusmao, while the
Timorese were winning the global public opinion war.

That, too, was the Dutch predicament, as its army won in 1948
in Yogyakarta and arrested Sukarno, but lost the diplomatic
struggle.

Once the economic crisis hit and Soeharto fell, it was
basically a matter of time before president B.J. Habibie
announced what was in effect a surrender -- opening the way to
the May agreement and the ballot demanded since 1974.

It was a dramatic turnaround, though, reflected by Xanana's
changing status from that of guerrilla commander to political
prisoner meeting world leaders in Jakarta; and by Jakarta's
changing response from a sort of colonial arrogance to a face-
saving pragmatism.

This was summed up by its own metaphors to describe East
Timor, from an "itching (in our) armpit" (Gen. Ali Moertopo in
1974); to "a pebble in our shoes" (Ali Alatas, 1992); "nothing
but rocks" (B.J. Habibie, 1999); and finally "an appendix we need
to get rid of" (Dewi F. Anwar, 1999).

These developments were most painful for the Army. East Timor
was too big a stake to lose. But the Army was discredited
following the collapse of Soeharto's New Order government. With
some elements of the old regime anxious to avoid another
humiliation, yet well aware the Timorese might choose
independence, armed militias were (re)activated and "security"
and "evacuation" plans prepared.

As the UN proceeded with the vote, the militia violence
continued but failed to provoke an armed response by
proindependence guerrillas, so the vote continued forward. By
August, the violence proved counterproductive and the families of
soldiers were evacuated from Dili. Jakarta officials, apparently
informed about what was coming, left Dili even before the ballot
results were announced on Sept. 4.

As new troops landed at night, danger was felt to be imminent
and the press was intimidated into leaving the country. Two days
later, the persecution, deportation and destruction began.

The mayhem was probably worse than any Dutch war crimes
committed in the 1940s. The militias were legalized, but acted
like Rambo warriors serving their masters. The extensive
destruction, widespread use of automatic weapons and the
participation of soldiers proved the militias' links, organized
rather than spontaneous, with the Army. It was not a "civil war"
nor was there anything "tribal" about the reign of terror.

It was disillusioned elements within the Army reviving the
scorched-earth tactics learned from the Dutch war, and replaying
the persecution of alleged communists in 1965 and 1966.

The action in the mid-1960s is fundamental for understanding
political violence in Indonesia. "That was the first time the
Army felt they could do anything above the law," one expert on
Indonesia, Ben Anderson, said. This "legitimate" cycle of
impunity continued in East Timor, Priok, Lampung, Irian Jaya and
Aceh.

It set the tone in defining the Army's pattern of action.
According to this pattern, military operations, particularly at
times of crisis, tend to result in human rights violations and
war crimes.

The writer is a journalist based in Amsterdam, the
Netherlands. He was in East Timor last August and September.