East Timor becomes Indonesia's Achilles' heel

By Makmur Keliat

JAKARTA (JP): East Timor has become a conundrum for Indonesia since the result of the Aug. 30 self-determination ballot was announced.

Since almost 80 percent of the East Timorese voted against autonomy within Indonesia, the question confronting the entire nation now is should we allow the East Timorese their independence, or should we, by hook or by crook, attempt to maintain the province as an integral part of Indonesia?

The government has not given a clear answer to this question. The latest statement released by the government merely indicates that Indonesia will allow an international peacekeeping force to enter East Timor.

This is certainly not meant to say that the Indonesian government will soon recognize the independence of East Timor. Before this latest statement was issued, the government stated that the future of East Timor would be decided by the People's Consultative Assembly, which is the only institution with the authority to grant the territory its independence.

The only inference we can draw from such an ambiguous stance is that the government seems to be playing for time, but by so doing it also seems to have failed to handle the problem decisively and assertively. In this way, one could also say that East Timor has become a political hot potato for the government.

Why has such an ambiguous position been taken? The reason lies primarily in the present government's habit of refusing to assume responsibility for its failures. No matter what argument the government puts forward, it is a bare fact that the government's reputation, in reference to East Timor, is doomed to national humiliation.

By allowing the international community, through the United Nations, to undertake the task of providing order and security in East Timor, we cannot escape the impression that Indonesian territorial sovereignty has been compromised.

It is worth mentioning that Kashmir is still part of Indian territory although Pakistan has claimed sovereignty over the area for more than 50 years. Similarly, the Basque territory in the northern part of Spain is still under the control of Spain's central government.

It is a ridiculous argument to say that the government continues to have a firm grip on Indonesian territorial sovereignty. This grip has obviously weakened now that East Timor, after more than 24 years under the jurisdiction of Indonesia, has been put under international supervision.

Who is responsible for this turn of events? Since the Indonesian Military (TNI), the foreign ministry and the President have been the main actors in managing the conflict in East Timor, they should all bear an equal share of the responsibility.

Ironically, we have witnessed these three parties all take their own paths and attempt to muddy the waters by putting forward differing points of view. The imposition of martial law in East Timor is a case in point. The idea was proposed by TNI and rejected by the Cabinet before being agreed to by the President.

Again, TNI initially said peacekeepers were not needed in East Timor, but now Indonesia has invited them to the territory. These examples make it clear there are divergent views within the government on the issue of East Timor.

To put it differently, the government appears to have failed to determine the preferred Indonesian foreign policy, let alone how to achieve this policy.

As a rule of thumb, a foreign policy is bound to fail if it is designed to achieve two formidable objectives without being equipped with sufficient resources for the task. This has become evident in the case of East Timor.

Indeed, by putting forward the idea of a referendum, the government intended to achieve two objectives at once: gain legal recognition from the international community, particularly the United Nations, while at the same time gaining credibility in the eyes of developed countries, whose financial aid is urgently needed by Indonesia to overcome its economic crisis.

If supported by a firm base, that is if Indonesia had recorded an impressive record of protecting human rights in East Timor, these two objectives could have been realized easily. However, as the government's human rights record in East Timor is suspect at best, the referendum inevitably resulted in an outcome much different than what the government had hoped.

The government seems to have been overly confident that the majority of East Timorese would vote for integration. However, as this obviously was not the case, the government now finds itself figuratively riding two horses at the same time.

As a consequence, the government is now forced with a dilemmatic option: let the result of the referendum stand and continue to receive financial aid from the international community, or reject the results of the referendum and become economically isolated from Western donors. Viewed from this perspective, it is not unreasonable to opine that Indonesian foreign policy in so far as the East Timor problem is concerned has been irrationally shaped.

Also requiring discussion are the irrational thoughts most of us have toward East Timor. According to a widely known old adage, "winning the battle is different from winning the war".

In this context, the government, TNI in particular, seems to have won the battle but not the war. In a way, one could also say that the results of the referendum were a clear victory for the ballot over the bullet.

In other words, the government failed to win the hearts of the East Timorese. To avoid the same consequences, TNI must learn how to behave in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, the new era of globalization has given birth to a new kind of deterrence to human rights violations by any party, including the military establishment. In this context, TNI should not pretend to be unaware of these new international developments.

Another irrationality in the whole East Timor matter was the idea of the referendum. The government, particularly the foreign ministry, seems to have failed to fully grasp the hidden dangers behind this idea. No one doubts that we must respect the concept of a referendum, which is based on the principle that the territory of a state should be established with the consent of the governed. This is merely a different name for the right to self-determination.

However, as stated by R.Y. Jennings in 1963, the right of self-determination is essentially a political principle, although it has legalistic overtones. As a consequence, the idea is imbibed with the concept of power plays.

In a country like Indonesia, where nation building is a seemingly endless process, diplomacy supporting the idea of self- determination could easily become self-defeating diplomacy. There is not a country in the world whose diplomacy is aimed at reducing the size of its territory.

One could also find irrationality in Habibie's recent statements before a gathering of ulema. By saying that Indonesia remained a big country minus the 700,000 East Timorese residing in the tiny province (The Jakarta Post, Sept. 11, 1999), Habibie committed two mistakes.

First, such a statement implied his permissiveness on the issue of separatism. This is perilous to the preservation of territorial integrity. The reason for this lies in the fact that Indonesia is home to hundreds of ethnic groups, but only a few of them -- such as the Javanese, Bugis, Sundanese and Balinese -- form a substantial portion of the country's total population.

If Habibie's faulty logic was employed, there would be the possibility for small ethnic groups to separate from Indonesia. It is a pity that such a statement came from the mouth of the person who is tasked with playing the role of the architect of Indonesia's foreign policy. Such a statement can be considered extraordinarily irrational, particularly at this point in the country's history when the spirit of separatism and communalism is creeping into the minds of many people, as seen in Aceh and Ambon.

Second, such a statement also implies Habibie's naivete about territorial sovereignty. Territorial sovereignty is not a question of number and size; it is basically a matter of national pride. This is why China still claims sovereignty over the Spratly Islands, although they are merely a string of tiny islands located in the South China Sea, far from the Chinese mainland.

That is also one of the reasons why many people are of the opinion that territorial sovereignty is not a divisible commodity. As such, it is one of the very foundations for the establishment of the state, and it is the state that entitles us, including Habibie, to have citizenship. Without territorial sovereignty, there is no reason at all to have a government, including a president. Hopefully, Habibie will not reach this conclusion.

In view of all of these irrationalities, it is no wonder we have failed to maintain East Timor as an integral part of Indonesia. In other words, we deserve what we got. It is clear that we are now forced to swallow a biter pill, because we cannot reject the idea of a peacekeeping force as proposed by the United Nations Security Council.

This is lamentable, of course. Moreover, "peacekeeping force" is merely a diplomatic term. Basically, the more correct term is "peacemaking force". The reason is that peacekeeping forces are always launched before a consensus on peace is reached. This was shown in the cases of the Gulf War and Kosovo. It is the peacemakers who always define what peace is. We may cry out angrily, "whose peace it is anyway", but we have no options left.

Economically and militarily, Indonesia is not in the position to resist the international community. So let them come and make peace according to their conditions. What we need to do is avoid repeating the same mistake in the future. Otherwise, sooner or later, Indonesia will be a mere historical footnote; the country that broke up into several nation-states.

The writer is a lecturer in the International Relations Department of the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Indonesia, Jakarta.