East Timor becomes Indonesia's Achilles' heel
East Timor becomes Indonesia's Achilles' heel
By Makmur Keliat
JAKARTA (JP): East Timor has become a conundrum for Indonesia
since the result of the Aug. 30 self-determination ballot was
announced.
Since almost 80 percent of the East Timorese voted against
autonomy within Indonesia, the question confronting the entire
nation now is should we allow the East Timorese their
independence, or should we, by hook or by crook, attempt to
maintain the province as an integral part of Indonesia?
The government has not given a clear answer to this question.
The latest statement released by the government merely indicates
that Indonesia will allow an international peacekeeping force to
enter East Timor.
This is certainly not meant to say that the Indonesian
government will soon recognize the independence of East Timor.
Before this latest statement was issued, the government stated
that the future of East Timor would be decided by the People's
Consultative Assembly, which is the only institution with the
authority to grant the territory its independence.
The only inference we can draw from such an ambiguous stance
is that the government seems to be playing for time, but by so
doing it also seems to have failed to handle the problem
decisively and assertively. In this way, one could also say that
East Timor has become a political hot potato for the government.
Why has such an ambiguous position been taken? The reason lies
primarily in the present government's habit of refusing to assume
responsibility for its failures. No matter what argument the
government puts forward, it is a bare fact that the government's
reputation, in reference to East Timor, is doomed to national
humiliation.
By allowing the international community, through the United
Nations, to undertake the task of providing order and security in
East Timor, we cannot escape the impression that Indonesian
territorial sovereignty has been compromised.
It is worth mentioning that Kashmir is still part of Indian
territory although Pakistan has claimed sovereignty over the area
for more than 50 years. Similarly, the Basque territory in the
northern part of Spain is still under the control of Spain's
central government.
It is a ridiculous argument to say that the government
continues to have a firm grip on Indonesian territorial
sovereignty. This grip has obviously weakened now that East
Timor, after more than 24 years under the jurisdiction of
Indonesia, has been put under international supervision.
Who is responsible for this turn of events? Since the
Indonesian Military (TNI), the foreign ministry and the President
have been the main actors in managing the conflict in East Timor,
they should all bear an equal share of the responsibility.
Ironically, we have witnessed these three parties all take
their own paths and attempt to muddy the waters by putting
forward differing points of view. The imposition of martial law
in East Timor is a case in point. The idea was proposed by TNI
and rejected by the Cabinet before being agreed to by the
President.
Again, TNI initially said peacekeepers were not needed in East
Timor, but now Indonesia has invited them to the territory. These
examples make it clear there are divergent views within the
government on the issue of East Timor.
To put it differently, the government appears to have failed
to determine the preferred Indonesian foreign policy, let alone
how to achieve this policy.
As a rule of thumb, a foreign policy is bound to fail if it is
designed to achieve two formidable objectives without being
equipped with sufficient resources for the task. This has become
evident in the case of East Timor.
Indeed, by putting forward the idea of a referendum, the
government intended to achieve two objectives at once: gain legal
recognition from the international community, particularly the
United Nations, while at the same time gaining credibility in the
eyes of developed countries, whose financial aid is urgently
needed by Indonesia to overcome its economic crisis.
If supported by a firm base, that is if Indonesia had recorded
an impressive record of protecting human rights in East Timor,
these two objectives could have been realized easily. However, as
the government's human rights record in East Timor is suspect at
best, the referendum inevitably resulted in an outcome much
different than what the government had hoped.
The government seems to have been overly confident that the
majority of East Timorese would vote for integration. However, as
this obviously was not the case, the government now finds itself
figuratively riding two horses at the same time.
As a consequence, the government is now forced with a
dilemmatic option: let the result of the referendum stand and
continue to receive financial aid from the international
community, or reject the results of the referendum and become
economically isolated from Western donors. Viewed from this
perspective, it is not unreasonable to opine that Indonesian
foreign policy in so far as the East Timor problem is concerned
has been irrationally shaped.
Also requiring discussion are the irrational thoughts most of
us have toward East Timor. According to a widely known old adage,
"winning the battle is different from winning the war".
In this context, the government, TNI in particular, seems to
have won the battle but not the war. In a way, one could also say
that the results of the referendum were a clear victory for the
ballot over the bullet.
In other words, the government failed to win the hearts of the
East Timorese. To avoid the same consequences, TNI must learn how
to behave in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, the new era of
globalization has given birth to a new kind of deterrence to
human rights violations by any party, including the military
establishment. In this context, TNI should not pretend to be
unaware of these new international developments.
Another irrationality in the whole East Timor matter was the
idea of the referendum. The government, particularly the foreign
ministry, seems to have failed to fully grasp the hidden dangers
behind this idea. No one doubts that we must respect the concept
of a referendum, which is based on the principle that the
territory of a state should be established with the consent of
the governed. This is merely a different name for the right to
self-determination.
However, as stated by R.Y. Jennings in 1963, the right of
self-determination is essentially a political principle, although
it has legalistic overtones. As a consequence, the idea is
imbibed with the concept of power plays.
In a country like Indonesia, where nation building is a
seemingly endless process, diplomacy supporting the idea of self-
determination could easily become self-defeating diplomacy. There
is not a country in the world whose diplomacy is aimed at
reducing the size of its territory.
One could also find irrationality in Habibie's recent
statements before a gathering of ulema. By saying that Indonesia
remained a big country minus the 700,000 East Timorese residing
in the tiny province (The Jakarta Post, Sept. 11, 1999), Habibie
committed two mistakes.
First, such a statement implied his permissiveness on the
issue of separatism. This is perilous to the preservation of
territorial integrity. The reason for this lies in the fact that
Indonesia is home to hundreds of ethnic groups, but only a few
of them -- such as the Javanese, Bugis, Sundanese and Balinese --
form a substantial portion of the country's total population.
If Habibie's faulty logic was employed, there would be the
possibility for small ethnic groups to separate from Indonesia.
It is a pity that such a statement came from the mouth of the
person who is tasked with playing the role of the architect of
Indonesia's foreign policy. Such a statement can be considered
extraordinarily irrational, particularly at this point in the
country's history when the spirit of separatism and communalism
is creeping into the minds of many people, as seen in Aceh and
Ambon.
Second, such a statement also implies Habibie's naivete about
territorial sovereignty. Territorial sovereignty is not a
question of number and size; it is basically a matter of national
pride. This is why China still claims sovereignty over the
Spratly Islands, although they are merely a string of tiny
islands located in the South China Sea, far from the Chinese
mainland.
That is also one of the reasons why many people are of the
opinion that territorial sovereignty is not a divisible
commodity. As such, it is one of the very foundations for the
establishment of the state, and it is the state that entitles us,
including Habibie, to have citizenship. Without territorial
sovereignty, there is no reason at all to have a government,
including a president. Hopefully, Habibie will not reach this
conclusion.
In view of all of these irrationalities, it is no wonder we
have failed to maintain East Timor as an integral part of
Indonesia. In other words, we deserve what we got. It is clear
that we are now forced to swallow a biter pill, because we cannot
reject the idea of a peacekeeping force as proposed by the United
Nations Security Council.
This is lamentable, of course. Moreover, "peacekeeping force"
is merely a diplomatic term. Basically, the more correct term is
"peacemaking force". The reason is that peacekeeping forces are
always launched before a consensus on peace is reached. This was
shown in the cases of the Gulf War and Kosovo. It is the
peacemakers who always define what peace is. We may cry out
angrily, "whose peace it is anyway", but we have no options left.
Economically and militarily, Indonesia is not in the position
to resist the international community. So let them come and make
peace according to their conditions. What we need to do is avoid
repeating the same mistake in the future. Otherwise, sooner or
later, Indonesia will be a mere historical footnote; the country
that broke up into several nation-states.
The writer is a lecturer in the International Relations
Department of the School of Social and Political Sciences at the
University of Indonesia, Jakarta.