E. Timor deserves a safe exit

By Aboeprijadi Santoso

The Hague, Netherlands (JP): President Habibie's remarks offering independence for East Timor by 2000 does not change the substance at the tripartite talks, but indicates a stronger determination, under the constraints of Indonesia's current economic and political crises, to get rid of the issue and burden of the former Portuguese colony.

However, major obstacles remain. On Feb. 8, a failure to reach a consensus on a "wide ranging autonomy" package for East Timor, in addition to the growing unrest in the territory, brought the issue into a new and possibly dangerous phase. In New York, UN envoy Jamsheed Marker and Indonesian and Portuguese foreign ministers Ali Alatas and Jaime Gama, looked unhappy by the developments.

Paradoxically the talks began with a renewed sense of hope. The meeting was called by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in the wake of Indonesia's reversal on East Timor last month, which took the world by surprise. Jakarta announced it was ready "to let East Timor go" should its people reject a proposal to give the territory a special autonomous status.

So what went wrong? At issue were, at least, two interconnected key points which were supposed to be part of the UN's autonomy proposal. Namely, the method to ascertain the Timorese's attitude toward autonomy and the need to have a permanent UN office in East Timor.

Anyone who proposes that such a principal choice (Jakarta's "second option" is parting ways with East Timor) will depend on the East Timorese themselves, may be expected to have a democratic concept of the way to assess the East Timorese's opinion.

Indonesia's record and image in East Timor is undeniably unfavorable. Given this context, any proposition other than a popular vote is bound to create suspicion, confusion and uncertainty, which could damage the very credibility which Indonesia badly needs at this time of crisis.

As a matter of fact, the suggestion that Indonesia did not rule out a vote was positively affirmed last Sunday. However, this abruptly changed when it turned out that Indonesia was in fact against a vote. It would have been logical for Indonesia to accept the vote, and there would have been much less international concern.

Instead, Indonesia wants a method of consultation because it fears a referendum would result in the very outcome all parties wish to prevent, i.e. a civil war. But this was not Jakarta's only reason in rejecting a vote. It also has to do with the issue of a UN office in the territory, which, according to the Indonesian government, could only be justified if the present status of the territory was "returned" to that of a non-self- governing territory, as was the case under the Portuguese administrative power until 1975, or until 1978 according to Indonesia's People's Consultative Assembly law no. 6. This is indeed what will happen if and when the Timorese reject the autonomy proposal. Only then would a referendum be proper and should, as a consequence, be held by the UN and Portugal.

Such a change of formal status for the territory, technically speaking, has nothing to do with the danger of infighting. The conflict, in other words, will remain there, but the burdens and the responsibility will shift to others and leave the victims -- the East Timorese -- alone, if not in disarray. It could turn into a replay of what Portugal did in 1975 -- abandoning its former colony amid a civil war. However, there is one big difference: there is no longer the specter of invasion because Indonesia is now ready to "loose" East Timor.

The fact, though, that Indonesia will relinquish the territory (if the new People's Consultative Assembly agrees to do so after the autonomy proposal is rejected) means that a UN role in the transition period cannot be rejected. As Alatas indicated, in the case of East Timor "returning" to the status of a non-self- governing territory, Indonesia will welcome the UN's role. Taken by itself, this stance is a step forward. Under Soeharto such an option was never even contemplated because the annexation ("integration") of the territory was always considered closed and final.

Seen from a historical perspective, however, Habibie's breakthrough may be too late to secure a more favorable course for Indonesia and greater security for East Timor. Rapid political developments in recent years have overtaken some key issues at the diplomatic level. Two examples: "Xanana" Gusmao and the issue of a referendum.

Recent studies show that public resistance and resentment in East Timor remains stronger than generally assumed, particularly in the central and eastern regions, where the majority of the casualties occurred during the 1970s and 1980s. This is precisely the fact which made Jose Alessandro "Key Rala Xanana" Gusmao, who spent 17 years in the jungle, a legitimate national leader -- "East Timor's Soekarno" -- who should rightfully be included in the negotiations.

It was not until the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre that the turning point for the territory came. Like Palestinians or Rwandans, few East Timorese can be found who have not lost their parents, siblings or friends, as a result of a long and bloody confrontation with a foreign army.

By 1991, a new generation of Indonesian educated Timorese youth (known as the Matebian generation, referring to the mountains where they were born or grew up in the 1970s) started to organize and resist Indonesian rule, increasingly supported by international and domestic public opinion.

Santa Cruz is as significant as President Johnson's Tonkin bombardment in the late 1960s as a catalyst for fierce resistance from the Vietnamese, or the Japanese capitulation in the mid- 1940s which created indispensable momentum for Indonesian freedom fighters in their struggle against Dutch colonialists. As in these cases, the Timorese never had the chance to express their views through ballots or other means (except in a few areas under Portuguese rule in 1974). But all political parties (except the largest one, Fretilin, who proclaimed the territory's independence) had by the mid-1970s already expressed their wish for a referendum, including the pro-Indonesia Apodeti.

As Soeharto fell and the reform movement began, almost all political groupings and the greater part of East Timorese society greeted the new era by demanding a referendum; a historic term for the East Timorese, but a humiliating one for Jakarta.

By offering a second option which would lead to independence for East Timor before the new millennium, the government found a face-saving device to circumvent the term while still recognizing that the demand for a referendum and independence can no longer be contained. It follows, theoretically, that if the East Timorese choose autonomy and stay with Indonesia, resistance will continue.

Conversely, but more realistically, if after some time they choose independence, popular discontent may end.

Yet, as many have warned, a danger remains if a referendum and independence are imposed hastily, even if it is by the East Timorese's own choosing. Uncontrolled armed gangs acting against an unarmed population must be prevented. Any society, having lost hundreds of thousands of its members as a consequence of aggression, war, internal conflicts and hunger, needs time to heal and rebuild itself. Above all, East Timor's economic viability cannot be taken for granted.

For these reasons, a peaceful transition from one or two years of autonomy to independence through a referendum cannot be seen as leaving Indonesia after "having the cake and eating it too". Instead, it is a matter of practicing responsible political morality for the sake of an honorable exit for Indonesia, as well as a political necessity to secure peace and justice for the East Timorese as a whole.

Next month, all concerned parties should agree on the method to assess the East Timorese response to the offered autonomy. If not overtaken by new developments on the ground, April will be crucial. Provided that their voices are justly and fairly heard, the East Timorese will probably choose to leave Indonesia rather than opting for autonomy as the "final" status for their homeland.

East Timor is at a critical juncture. Time is running out. However, "there is no shortcut to democracy", Jamsheed Marker warned. He said, quoting a Pakistani saying, "The trick is to kill the snake without breaking the stick. I know where the snake is, but I'm looking for the stick."

Indonesia can help him find "the stick" by guaranteeing, along with the UN, peace and security in East Timor during a period of transition, and letting the East Timorese vote and decide their own futures.

The writer is a journalist with Radio Netherlands. He wrote a book on Indonesia and East Timor (1995).