E. Timor deserves a safe exit

E. Timor deserves a safe exit

By Aboeprijadi Santoso

The Hague, Netherlands (JP): President Habibie's remarks
offering independence for East Timor by 2000 does not change the
substance at the tripartite talks, but indicates a stronger
determination, under the constraints of Indonesia's current
economic and political crises, to get rid of the issue and burden
of the former Portuguese colony.

However, major obstacles remain. On Feb. 8, a failure to reach
a consensus on a "wide ranging autonomy" package for East Timor,
in addition to the growing unrest in the territory, brought the
issue into a new and possibly dangerous phase. In New York, UN
envoy Jamsheed Marker and Indonesian and Portuguese foreign
ministers Ali Alatas and Jaime Gama, looked unhappy by the
developments.

Paradoxically the talks began with a renewed sense of hope.
The meeting was called by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in the
wake of Indonesia's reversal on East Timor last month, which took
the world by surprise. Jakarta announced it was ready "to let
East Timor go" should its people reject a proposal to give the
territory a special autonomous status.

So what went wrong? At issue were, at least, two
interconnected key points which were supposed to be part of the
UN's autonomy proposal. Namely, the method to ascertain the
Timorese's attitude toward autonomy and the need to have a
permanent UN office in East Timor.

Anyone who proposes that such a principal choice (Jakarta's
"second option" is parting ways with East Timor) will depend on
the East Timorese themselves, may be expected to have a
democratic concept of the way to assess the East Timorese's
opinion.

Indonesia's record and image in East Timor is undeniably
unfavorable. Given this context, any proposition other than a
popular vote is bound to create suspicion, confusion and
uncertainty, which could damage the very credibility which
Indonesia badly needs at this time of crisis.

As a matter of fact, the suggestion that Indonesia did not
rule out a vote was positively affirmed last Sunday. However,
this abruptly changed when it turned out that Indonesia was in
fact against a vote. It would have been logical for Indonesia to
accept the vote, and there would have been much less
international concern.

Instead, Indonesia wants a method of consultation because it
fears a referendum would result in the very outcome all parties
wish to prevent, i.e. a civil war. But this was not Jakarta's
only reason in rejecting a vote. It also has to do with the issue
of a UN office in the territory, which, according to the
Indonesian government, could only be justified if the present
status of the territory was "returned" to that of a non-self-
governing territory, as was the case under the Portuguese
administrative power until 1975, or until 1978 according to
Indonesia's People's Consultative Assembly law no. 6. This is
indeed what will happen if and when the Timorese reject the
autonomy proposal. Only then would a referendum be proper and
should, as a consequence, be held by the UN and Portugal.

Such a change of formal status for the territory, technically
speaking, has nothing to do with the danger of infighting. The
conflict, in other words, will remain there, but the burdens and
the responsibility will shift to others and leave the victims --
the East Timorese -- alone, if not in disarray. It could turn
into a replay of what Portugal did in 1975 -- abandoning its
former colony amid a civil war. However, there is one big
difference: there is no longer the specter of invasion because
Indonesia is now ready to "loose" East Timor.

The fact, though, that Indonesia will relinquish the territory
(if the new People's Consultative Assembly agrees to do so after
the autonomy proposal is rejected) means that a UN role in the
transition period cannot be rejected. As Alatas indicated, in the
case of East Timor "returning" to the status of a non-self-
governing territory, Indonesia will welcome the UN's role. Taken
by itself, this stance is a step forward. Under Soeharto such an
option was never even contemplated because the annexation
("integration") of the territory was always considered closed and
final.

Seen from a historical perspective, however, Habibie's
breakthrough may be too late to secure a more favorable course
for Indonesia and greater security for East Timor. Rapid
political developments in recent years have overtaken some key
issues at the diplomatic level. Two examples: "Xanana" Gusmao and
the issue of a referendum.

Recent studies show that public resistance and resentment in
East Timor remains stronger than generally assumed, particularly
in the central and eastern regions, where the majority of the
casualties occurred during the 1970s and 1980s. This is precisely
the fact which made Jose Alessandro "Key Rala Xanana" Gusmao, who
spent 17 years in the jungle, a legitimate national leader --
"East Timor's Soekarno" -- who should rightfully be included in
the negotiations.

It was not until the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre that the turning
point for the territory came. Like Palestinians or Rwandans, few
East Timorese can be found who have not lost their parents,
siblings or friends, as a result of a long and bloody
confrontation with a foreign army.

By 1991, a new generation of Indonesian educated Timorese
youth (known as the Matebian generation, referring to the
mountains where they were born or grew up in the 1970s) started
to organize and resist Indonesian rule, increasingly supported by
international and domestic public opinion.

Santa Cruz is as significant as President Johnson's Tonkin
bombardment in the late 1960s as a catalyst for fierce resistance
from the Vietnamese, or the Japanese capitulation in the mid-
1940s which created indispensable momentum for Indonesian freedom
fighters in their struggle against Dutch colonialists. As in
these cases, the Timorese never had the chance to express their
views through ballots or other means (except in a few areas under
Portuguese rule in 1974). But all political parties (except the
largest one, Fretilin, who proclaimed the territory's
independence) had by the mid-1970s already expressed their wish
for a referendum, including the pro-Indonesia Apodeti.

As Soeharto fell and the reform movement began, almost all
political groupings and the greater part of East Timorese society
greeted the new era by demanding a referendum; a historic term
for the East Timorese, but a humiliating one for Jakarta.

By offering a second option which would lead to independence
for East Timor before the new millennium, the government found a
face-saving device to circumvent the term while still recognizing
that the demand for a referendum and independence can no longer
be contained. It follows, theoretically, that if the East
Timorese choose autonomy and stay with Indonesia, resistance will
continue.

Conversely, but more realistically, if after some time they
choose independence, popular discontent may end.

Yet, as many have warned, a danger remains if a referendum and
independence are imposed hastily, even if it is by the East
Timorese's own choosing. Uncontrolled armed gangs acting against
an unarmed population must be prevented. Any society, having lost
hundreds of thousands of its members as a consequence of
aggression, war, internal conflicts and hunger, needs time to
heal and rebuild itself. Above all, East Timor's economic
viability cannot be taken for granted.

For these reasons, a peaceful transition from one or two years
of autonomy to independence through a referendum cannot be seen
as leaving Indonesia after "having the cake and eating it too".
Instead, it is a matter of practicing responsible political
morality for the sake of an honorable exit for Indonesia, as well
as a political necessity to secure peace and justice for the East
Timorese as a whole.

Next month, all concerned parties should agree on the method
to assess the East Timorese response to the offered autonomy. If
not overtaken by new developments on the ground, April will be
crucial. Provided that their voices are justly and fairly heard,
the East Timorese will probably choose to leave Indonesia rather
than opting for autonomy as the "final" status for their
homeland.

East Timor is at a critical juncture. Time is running out.
However, "there is no shortcut to democracy", Jamsheed Marker
warned. He said, quoting a Pakistani saying, "The trick is to
kill the snake without breaking the stick. I know where the snake
is, but I'm looking for the stick."

Indonesia can help him find "the stick" by guaranteeing, along
with the UN, peace and security in East Timor during a period of
transition, and letting the East Timorese vote and decide their
own futures.

The writer is a journalist with Radio Netherlands. He wrote a
book on Indonesia and East Timor (1995).