E. Asia Summit's birthing pains

Eric Teo Chu Cheow The Straits Times Asia News Network Singapore

At last October's meeting of ASEAN heads of government in Vientiane, Laos, it was announced that an East Asian Summit will be launched by Malaysia (as host of the next ASEAN Summit) towards the end of this year. Many political observers in the region proclaimed the birth of a "new Asia" -- breaking new ground in Asian integration and community building.

Key among the advocates of that "new Asia" were Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi and Philippine President Gloria Arroyo, who called for ASEAN to "embrace China, Japan, South Korea and India" in a larger grouping. Such an economic bloc, according to Arroyo, could then "hold its own" in future negotiations with the United States, Europe or other emerging economic entities.

Announcing the East Asian Summit while in Vientiane, Badawi said the decision was an ASEAN consensus, reached after Indonesia formally accepted the idea to transform the "ASEAN+3" framework into the EAS, with possibly additional countries like India, Australia and New Zealand invited to join the new grouping.

But recent indications point to differences of opinion and strategy among ASEAN members in fleshing out details of the EAS, notably in defining its future membership and the modalities of organization. East Asia seems inflicted with the pains of birth. Worse, it may eventually be stillborn.

Sources from North-east Asia say ASEAN could not agree on which countries should be invited to the inaugural EAS apart from the ASEAN+3 -- that is, the 10 ASEAN members, plus China, Japan and South Korea.

One ASEAN member also pressed for India to join the "new" East Asia, while another surprisingly pitched for the inclusion of Australia and New Zealand. The other countries remain non- committal and seem to advocate keeping the present ASEAN+3 formula.

Malaysia, as the next ASEAN chair and host of the summit, has yet to seek a consensus, but chances are that it will eventually tilt towards a 14-member grouping, one that includes India.

Besides the membership list, ASEAN could face problems defining the EAS' organizational framework. Japan has pressed for a system of co-chairmanship (with the chair rotating between an ASEAN and a non-ASEAN country) and a "tiered" system consisting of an inner core of ASEAN+3, a second tier of relations and cooperation with extra-regional players like India, Australia and New Zealand, and a third with the U.S.

As of now, ASEAN is more inclined towards retaining the chair for its members (on a rotational basis). It is also disinclined to introduce a tiered system, which allows non-regional powers to join the exclusive club.

In fact, Indonesian diplomats say that Jakarta has some reservations about launching the EAS formally. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono gave it the go-ahead while in Vientiane only because, one, it was his first ASEAN summit, and two, he had been given to understand that the meeting this year would be a once- off affair.

Jakarta fears that an EAS will mean ASEAN being "diluted" into a much bigger grouping. The center of gravity will shift away from ASEAN, with bigger and more powerful countries in North-east Asia holding clout and influence in the new grouping. Jakarta would prefer to consolidate ASEAN first, whilst continuing with the present ASEAN+3 framework. In any case, issues discussed at the EAS will be very similar to those tackled at ASEAN+3 forums.

Malaysia, the main advocate of the EAS, sees in it the birth of a "new" Asia and a lasting legacy for former Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad, who first promulgated the idea of an East Asian Economic Caucus back in 1990.

Underpinning Kuala Lumpur's recently renewed push is a belief in a need to balance the U.S. and the European Union -- a belief which finds receptive ears in the Chinese leadership.

Even as Kuala Lumpur is pitching to host the EAS Secretariat, China is also expected to lobby hard to host the second EAS next year on Chinese soil.

Japan, on the other hand, wants to keep the U.S. engaged in the region and in this new entity in some form, which explains its proposed "tiered" system of cooperation and relations within the new EAS framework.

Washington, commonly deemed "the most influential non-Asian East Asian participant", could prove the biggest divisive issue in any attempt to forge an East Asian grouping.

Sino-Japanese rivalry, already rampant and obvious, could heighten over the strategic future of Washington in the region.

The EAS would provide the appropriate theater for this increasing rivalry, against the backdrop of an even bigger rivalry between Beijing and Washington in Asia.

Of equal interest today is the firm intent of India to join any East Asian grouping. As one senior Indian academic told me at an India-inspired High Level Conference on Asian Integration, held in Tokyo last November, New Delhi is determined not to "miss the first train" of Asian integration.

Saddled with a troubled neighborhood (terrorism, Kashmir, a royal coup d'etat in Nepal, growing Islamic militancy in Bangladesh, among other problems), India wants to avoid at all costs becoming a "second-class member" of Asia. So India is seeking to be incorporated into the EAS' inner core -- at whatever price.

So what lies ahead for the East Asian Summit?

Given the emblematic issues of Washington's and New Delhi's future roles in the "new" Asia, ASEAN and ASEAN+3 could be split right down the middle.

ASEAN, that venerable institution of 40 years, is much too valuable for regional stability to be relegated to the dustbin of history.

But, after 40 years, perhaps a search for new or additional partners is not too surprising either. But what the new dance patterns will be remains to be seen.

The writer is the council secretary of the Singapore Institute for International Affairs.