E. Asia Summit's birthing pains

E. Asia Summit's birthing pains

Eric Teo Chu Cheow
The Straits Times
Asia News Network
Singapore

At last October's meeting of ASEAN heads of government in
Vientiane, Laos, it was announced that an East Asian Summit will
be launched by Malaysia (as host of the next ASEAN Summit)
towards the end of this year. Many political observers in the
region proclaimed the birth of a "new Asia" -- breaking new
ground in Asian integration and community building.

Key among the advocates of that "new Asia" were Malaysian
Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi and Philippine President
Gloria Arroyo, who called for ASEAN to "embrace China, Japan,
South Korea and India" in a larger grouping. Such an economic
bloc, according to Arroyo, could then "hold its own" in future
negotiations with the United States, Europe or other emerging
economic entities.

Announcing the East Asian Summit while in Vientiane, Badawi
said the decision was an ASEAN consensus, reached after Indonesia
formally accepted the idea to transform the "ASEAN+3" framework
into the EAS, with possibly additional countries like India,
Australia and New Zealand invited to join the new grouping.

But recent indications point to differences of opinion and
strategy among ASEAN members in fleshing out details of the EAS,
notably in defining its future membership and the modalities of
organization. East Asia seems inflicted with the pains of birth.
Worse, it may eventually be stillborn.

Sources from North-east Asia say ASEAN could not agree on
which countries should be invited to the inaugural EAS apart from
the ASEAN+3 -- that is, the 10 ASEAN members, plus China, Japan
and South Korea.

One ASEAN member also pressed for India to join the "new" East
Asia, while another surprisingly pitched for the inclusion of
Australia and New Zealand. The other countries remain non-
committal and seem to advocate keeping the present ASEAN+3
formula.

Malaysia, as the next ASEAN chair and host of the summit, has
yet to seek a consensus, but chances are that it will eventually
tilt towards a 14-member grouping, one that includes India.

Besides the membership list, ASEAN could face problems
defining the EAS' organizational framework. Japan has pressed for
a system of co-chairmanship (with the chair rotating between an
ASEAN and a non-ASEAN country) and a "tiered" system consisting
of an inner core of ASEAN+3, a second tier of relations and
cooperation with extra-regional players like India, Australia and
New Zealand, and a third with the U.S.

As of now, ASEAN is more inclined towards retaining the chair
for its members (on a rotational basis). It is also disinclined
to introduce a tiered system, which allows non-regional powers to
join the exclusive club.

In fact, Indonesian diplomats say that Jakarta has some
reservations about launching the EAS formally. President Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono gave it the go-ahead while in Vientiane only
because, one, it was his first ASEAN summit, and two, he had been
given to understand that the meeting this year would be a once-
off affair.

Jakarta fears that an EAS will mean ASEAN being "diluted" into
a much bigger grouping. The center of gravity will shift away
from ASEAN, with bigger and more powerful countries in North-east
Asia holding clout and influence in the new grouping. Jakarta
would prefer to consolidate ASEAN first, whilst continuing with
the present ASEAN+3 framework. In any case, issues discussed at
the EAS will be very similar to those tackled at ASEAN+3 forums.

Malaysia, the main advocate of the EAS, sees in it the birth
of a "new" Asia and a lasting legacy for former Malaysian prime
minister Mahathir Mohamad, who first promulgated the idea of an
East Asian Economic Caucus back in 1990.

Underpinning Kuala Lumpur's recently renewed push is a belief
in a need to balance the U.S. and the European Union -- a belief
which finds receptive ears in the Chinese leadership.

Even as Kuala Lumpur is pitching to host the EAS Secretariat,
China is also expected to lobby hard to host the second EAS next
year on Chinese soil.

Japan, on the other hand, wants to keep the U.S. engaged in
the region and in this new entity in some form, which explains
its proposed "tiered" system of cooperation and relations within
the new EAS framework.

Washington, commonly deemed "the most influential non-Asian
East Asian participant", could prove the biggest divisive issue
in any attempt to forge an East Asian grouping.

Sino-Japanese rivalry, already rampant and obvious, could
heighten over the strategic future of Washington in the region.

The EAS would provide the appropriate theater for this
increasing rivalry, against the backdrop of an even bigger
rivalry between Beijing and Washington in Asia.

Of equal interest today is the firm intent of India to join
any East Asian grouping. As one senior Indian academic told me at
an India-inspired High Level Conference on Asian Integration,
held in Tokyo last November, New Delhi is determined not to "miss
the first train" of Asian integration.

Saddled with a troubled neighborhood (terrorism, Kashmir, a
royal coup d'etat in Nepal, growing Islamic militancy in
Bangladesh, among other problems), India wants to avoid at all
costs becoming a "second-class member" of Asia. So India is
seeking to be incorporated into the EAS' inner core -- at
whatever price.

So what lies ahead for the East Asian Summit?

Given the emblematic issues of Washington's and New Delhi's
future roles in the "new" Asia, ASEAN and ASEAN+3 could be split
right down the middle.

ASEAN, that venerable institution of 40 years, is much too
valuable for regional stability to be relegated to the dustbin of
history.

But, after 40 years, perhaps a search for new or additional
partners is not too surprising either. But what the new dance
patterns will be remains to be seen.

The writer is the council secretary of the Singapore Institute
for International Affairs.