Dutch knew of Westerling coup

By Ronald Frisart

HAARLEMS, the Netherlands (JP): Late in 1949, the very top brass of the Dutch army in Indonesia knew that former Royal Netherlands-Indies Army captain Raymond Westerling wanted to launch a coup in Indonesia. But the Dutch intelligence services were prohibited from going into the case. And the Indonesians were put off with fair words.

This comes from Dutch documents in the recently published 20th (and last) volume of Officiele Bescheiden betreffende de Nederlands-Indonesische Betrekkingen 1945-1950 (Official Documents concerning Dutch-Indonesian Relations 1945-1950).

By the end of 1949, Westerling was no longer a member of the Royal Netherlands-Indies Army (KNIL). In January, he was discharged from the military and became director of the transportation firm Koh Hien in West Java.

His military reputation was well known. Many Dutch thought of him as a celebrity. To the Indonesians, he was notorious because of his actions at the end of 1946, beginning of 1947. In barely three months he had smashed the Indonesian resistance in South Sulawesi by using counter-terrorism. The estimated number of victims of Westerling and his elite Korps Speciale Troepen varies from several thousand to tens of thousands.

Shortly before the Netherlands were to hand over sovereignty to the Federal Republik Indonesia Serikat, of which Sukarno's Republic of Indonesia was a subdivision, rumors about Westerling began to circulate. With the transfer of sovereignty on Dec. 27, 1949 drawing near, tensions rose.

Many Dutch were not easy about the future. They thought the Indonesians were not mature enough to run their own country. Historian Gerretson even mentioned "Her Majesty's Indian Apes". In the ranks of the KNIL thoughts were in a ferment. The servicemen would either be dismissed or transferred to Dutch or Indonesian military service.

Indonesian KNIL members in particular did not feel like going to serve the former enemy.

In West Java the situation was chaotic. Apart from the KNIL and Indonesian army (TNI), detached armed groups operated, mainly belonging to the radical Darul Islam. The TNI was not monolithic either. In its ranks, some supported Sukarno, while others were in favor of Pasundan, the West Javanese federal state created by the Dutch.

In early November, 1949, Sukarno's deputy, Hatta, asked the Dutch what Westerling was up to. In December, he was given reassurances. "There were no indications of subversive activities", Dutch historian Hans Meijer summed up the answer in his thesis.

But on Jan. 5, Westerling demanded that the Pasundan recognize his troops as its army because, according to Westerling, the TNI was not able maintain order. He did not get his way though, and on Jan. 23, 1950, his followers attacked Bandung. The attack failed, as did Westerling's planned coup against the new Indonesian government.

With Dutch help, he was smuggled out of the country, while Sukarno and his political friends were not slow to liquidate the federal states so cherished by the former colonial power.

"Dutch authorities apparently had underestimated the situation", historian Meijer wrote in 1994. But recently- published documents show that the reality was different. The Dutch had ignored Westerling's schemes intentionally.

What the Dutch commander of West Java, Engles, reported on Dec. 27, 1949, to his chief of staff, Van Langen, is significant. On the authority of the military police Engles stated that on Dec. 25, Westerling asked army commander Buurman van Vreeden how he would react "if after the transfer of sovereignty a coup would be launched". Buurman van Vreeden answered that he, nor his troops, would take part in it. But he did nothing to stop Westerling's scheming.

Engles also recalled a meeting between Westerling and chief of staff Van Langen, arranged by Engles himself. Van Langen pointed out to Westerling once more that the Dutch would be in trouble "if he would accomplish something before the Transfer of Sovereignty". Was a coup after the transfer of sovereignty no real problem then?

Engles considered his report highly sensitive. He did not put a copy in his own archives, and, according to him "it seems advisable to destroy this writing after reading". Apparently only army commander Buurman van Vreeden's copy is preserved. The compilers of Official Documents dug the copy up from his archives.

Also very interesting is the discrepancy between a document of Dec. 7, 1949, and a report written one day later. On Dec. 7, the Dutch governor Lovink meets with other high officials in Batavia (Jakarta). Among other things, they discussed what Westerling's Angkatan Perang Ratu Adil (APRA) was planning. The stories that circulated "in general seem exaggerated", Lovink said.

But the next day the attorney-general of the Supreme Court of Indonesia, Kartodirdjo, received an ominous report from Verbrugh, police inspector. The inspector explained that APRA consisted of a hotchpotch of (partly armed) disgruntled men -- as well as former KNIL-servicemen and former civil servants of the Dutch Binnenlands Bestuur -- and that the movement had branches all over West Java. Moreover, Verbrugh reported that APRA behaved in a conspiratorial way: "Every instruction given by the Commander should be kept secret".

The mention also catches one's eye in that the APRA battalion commander, Toto Suherman, reportedly said "that if he were in urgent need of weapons, he would always get full support from the green beret and red beret troops". Those green and red berets were the tough Korps Speciale Troepen in which Westerling once served.

Strongly striking the imagination is what Verbrugh writes about Dutch intelligence experts. In early November, they received "the first concise and vague information" about APRA. Their reaction was "lukewarm", which, according to Verbrugh applied especially to the Central Military Intelligence Service.

What is more: "The staff was even prohibited from being interested in this case", whereupon "one preferred to avoid any reporting whatsoever".

That is amazing because the Dutch intelligence services went to great pains to put on record the activities of Indonesians they considered extremists. And the archives of the Dutch ministry of defense in The Hague prove that Dutch defector Poncke Princen was also kept track of closely.

Westerling, to the Dutch authorities, was a different case. Still there is no need for surprise. After his coup attempt had failed, it appeared that quite a few of the Dutch military had had questionable contacts with him.

Early in 1949, Westerling was even provided with weapons, with the knowledge of the then-highest Dutch authorities: Governor Beel and Army Commander Spoor. Dutch involvement in the Westerling affair has been known for years. These newly-published documents make it even worse.

The writer is a member of the editorial staff of the daily newspaper Haarlems Dagblad, the Netherlands.