Dr. Sundhaussen has an affection for ABRI

Dr. Sundhaussen has an affection for ABRI

By Dewi Anggraeni

MELBOURNE, Australia (JP): Dr. Ulf Sundhaussen, the author of
The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics 1945-1967, is
genial and oozes compassion. Not only does he have an intimate
knowledge of the Indonesian Armed Forces, he also has an obvious
affection for the institution.

Currently Associate Professor in Comparative Government at the
University of Queensland in Australia, Dr. Sundhaussen stumbled
into studying the Indonesian military by accident.

Born in Frankfurt and brought up in Berlin, Germany, he went
to the only university in what was then West Berlin, The Free
University.

"It was an improvised university, because the only Berlin
university was in East Berlin. By 1948, students and professors
from the university walked out and set up The Free University in
West Berlin," he explained.

Young Sundhaussen had been forced out of school by poverty
brought about by the war, and was a bricklayer and coal miner for
eight years before resuming his studies.

He majored in International Relations and Comparative
Government.

His first contact with Indonesia was when his comparative
government professor spoke about different styles of government
and mentioned Indonesia. Sundhaussen found the method of
musyawarah (deliberation) very interesting.

"Before then I had no knowledge of Indonesia, apart from where
it was geographically."

He then began to seek out articles about Indonesia in
newspapers. It was towards the end of the Guided Democracy in the
early 1960s that he became increasingly captivated, despite the
lack of encouragement from fellow students and professors.
Academic attention to Southeast Asia then stretched only as far
as what is now Myanmar.

After his First-class Honors thesis on Konfrontasi, he decided
to do his Ph.D on Indonesia also. Unable to obtain any
supervision in Germany, he went to Monash University in
Melbourne, Australia, in 1965.

While he intended to look into parliamentary systems, everyone
suggested that he study the Indonesian army. Sundhaussen thought
that every second American scholar would have been working on the
army, but discovered it was regarded as too hot a topic and
decided to have a try. He sent in his visa applications to the
immigration, and waited. No answer was forthcoming.

Sundhaussen laughed at the suggestion that back then visa
applications took a long time to process.

"If you were an immigration officer, would you be brave enough
to give a research visa to someone who wanted to study the role
of the army in politics?" he asked.

He was about to give up when the late General Suwarto (check
name), then Commandant of Seskoad (Army Staff and Command College
in Bandung), visited Melbourne. The two men met, and the general
asked Sundhaussen about his current project. Sundhaussen told the
general his plans.

Luckily the two men became friends and a short time later
Sundhaussen arrived in Bandung for a two-year stay. He traveled
to other cities in Indonesia, meeting and talking to those in the
military. They provided him with unusual insight into the
military psyche.

"It was a very good learning experience," commented
Sundhaussen.

Apart from The Road to Power, Sundhaussen has also written
monographs, numerous articles, and collaborated with another
writer on the biography of General Nasution. He has published
numerous academic papers on systems of governments in other
countries. He avoids confining himself to one country and tries
to view each country in the global context.

"I feel that my interest in other countries has taught me more
about Indonesia," he said.

Currently he is writing a book on the collapse of military
regimes.

Q: In your opinion, when did ABRI gain power in Indonesia?

A: In Indonesia, the military moved gradually into a position
of power. In many countries you have a military coup, crushing
through the gate of the presidential palace, so to speak. In
1950, the military in Indonesia made a decision they were not
going to do just that, because it would have started a string of
violence brought about by a coup, a counter coup, a counter
counter coup and so on.

Simatupang and others wanted to develop a professional army,
support parliamentary democracy and stay away from politics.
However, the politicians began to harass them, so by 1955, they
fought back. They demanded that the politicians behave
professionally as well.

In 1957, after several attempts at forming coalitions, the
politicians fell out without forming another.

Q: That was the end of parliamentary democracy.

A: Yes. The army did not want to do much at all. But Sukarno
was saying then that parliamentary democracy did not work at all,
so they had to do something. So he selected another cabinet under
Djuanda, who was not connected to any party, and the army would
provide the backbone. Martial law was introduced where Sukarno
made decisions in the center and the army implemented them. No
toppling of government. There was a vacuum, and they stepped in
to help out. By 1959, the 1945 Constitution was reintroduced. It
was Nasution who proposed it at the end of 1957. Sukarno should
have liked to come up with something himself, but neither he nor
his friends from Murba came up with anything.

Q: So the 1945 Constitution was reintroduced by default?

A: Yes, because they couldn't think of anything else.

The army was then filling a vacuum, and afterwards became a
junior partner in the Guided Democracy set up. There was the
president, then the army, then the PKI. The other parties did not
do much at all.

Q: By your definition, the army also filled a vacuum in 1965.

A: Yes. Here was a president who had ruined the country, not
listening to the people, wanting to go on with konfrontasi, a war
he could not win, using up all the resources. He also refused to
accept the policies of the MPRS. So he had to go. There was no
coup. Probably a creeping coup, if anything.

Q: There was, nonetheless, a bloodbath.

A: Yes, but the bloodbath had nothing to do with the power
change. The bloodbath occurred because the PKI was seen to have
masterminded the alleged coup of 1st October. So Soeharto and
Nasution wanted to bring the culpable ones to justice. Then
Sukarno said, "The deaths of the generals were just ripples in
the sea of revolution. We will not have any trials." So the army
and many other people as well, took the law into their own hands.
Hence the bloodbath, as the situation got out of hand. A great
number of innocent people were killed at that time.

Q: So during Sukarno's rule, the military role was not as
prominent as it became under Soeharto?

A: No, it was not. The relationship between Sukarno and the
army was not an easy one, when the army was created back in 1945.

Q: What happens now under Soeharto?

A: Soeharto has done what many military leaders who became
heads of governments did. He wanted the military to obey him yet
have no way to interfere in politics. Officers were given
positions in the public and diplomatic services, yet they were
not allowed input in the process of decision making.

Q: Is that what is meant by professionalizing the military?

A: Yes. They were trained to be obedient to the hierarchy and
their seniors.

Nevertheless there is inconsistency. He tells the military to
be a professional military, yet he gives the officers jobs that
are not military in character.

When you were trained to give orders and obey orders, yet had
to socialize in an environment where negotiations and gentle
persuasions are practiced, wouldn't you find yourself in a
difficult situation?

Q: What is lost in the process of professionalizing the army?

A: During Nasution era, he emphasized that those in the
rebellions such as DI-TII, Permesta and others were fellow
citizens. They were not to be eliminated, but won back. In the
professionalized military, that has been unlearned.

Q: The dwifungsi has been an uncomfortable dual function then?

A: Yes. There is an inner contradiction that is very difficult
to overcome. The architect of the New Order or Pancasila
Democracy can hold the system together because he himself is an
enormously prestigious man. But when he goes, this system is
unlikely to survive in its present form.

Q: What will happen then?

A: I can't say exactly, not being a prophet, but I can
speculate a little. We have to accept that the military is not
fully in control. A coup is impossible unless the incumbent
government has already lost legitimacy. A government who seems to
be doing its job will have the support of the people. In order to
make a coup you need the cooperation of civilians.

On the other hand, the military is not the master of its
decision when it comes to the question of what to do next. Should
we pack up and return to the barracks, stay on and coopt people
into our ranks, what should we do? It's not only up to the
military men.

Q: We don't have any civilians ready to take over government?

A: Exactly. What we need is a civilian counter elite ready and
willing to take over. People who have ideas and policies, and who
are acceptable to the military.

Q: The criterion of acceptability to the military is crucial?

A: Certainly. We have seen in many parts of the world, where
the military elite is ready to go, and the civilian counter elite
is ready to take over. But then the military elite finds out that
as soon as the civilian elite takes over, military officers will
be arrested and charged with human rights violations and so
forth. Naturally they refuse to hand over. These people have a
sense of survival.

The way I see it, even if the military in Indonesia is ready
to return to the barracks and they want to strike a deal with a
civilian elite, who is there to negotiate with them?

Q: Haven't the military elements in Golkar been eroding?

A: Yes they have, but to what extent? Twenty-five years ago
there were all sorts of people saying they were going to take
over Golkar. It hasn't happened.

Q: Who is a likely candidate?

A: I would say neither Golkar nor PPP are capable of devising
a stable government. The one interesting phenomenon is the
seemingly good relationship between PDI and NU. If that holds,
that could be the nucleus of a civilian counter elite to form a
government. There are all sorts of organizations, forums and so
on, who are doing good things. But they are essentially a group
of intellectuals with very little mass support. We have seen what
happened to PSI.

While many groups are doing good and valuable things, they are
still not beyond personal animosity. If you want to work towards
a democratic government as a common goal, you must put that
behind you and work towards that common goal.

Note:

Murba: A socialist party founded in Yogyakarta on Nov. 7,
1948. In January 1965, it was disbanded, but the New Order
government rehabilitated the party in October 1966.

PKI: Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party). It
was banned following the abortive coup on Sept. 30, 1965.

Konfrontasi: confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia in
1963 as Indonesia accused Malaysia of being a British neo-
colonialism project.

MPRS: The Provisional People's Consultative Assembly,
established by President Sukarno in 1959. In 1971 the first
general elections under the New Order Government took place to
elect members of the House of Representatives (DPR) and the
People's Consultative Assembly (MPR).

DI-TII: Darul Islam-Tentara Islam Indonesia or Islamic Troops.
This hard-line group was formed in 1948 and had continuously
tried to topple the government until it was totally wiped out in
1965.

PRRI/Permesta: Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia
(the Indonesian Revolutionary Government of Republic Indonesia),
proclaimed on Feb. 15, 1958 by Achmad Husein, who was not
satisfied with the existing government. The rebels were
outstripped in the same year but it was not until 1961 that the
group was totally eliminated.

Dwi fungsi: or Dual Function, a concept on the dual role of
the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) which allows its members to
hold seats in the government and take part in administering the
country.

Golkar: Golongan Karya, literally meaning the workers' group.
It is the ruling faction.

PPP: Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party),
one of the three political groups in the country.

PDI: Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party),
the smallest political group in the country.

NU: Nahdlatul Ulama, Indonesia's largest Moslem organization
with about 30 million members.

PSI: Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist Party), a
political party founded in 1948 by Sutan Sjahrir, the first prime
minister. It was disbanded in 1960.