Downturn in Indonesian-U.S. relations?

Downturn in Indonesian-U.S. relations?

The following is the first of two articles based on a
presentation given at a discussion on ties between Indonesia and
the U.S., by Prof. Dr. Hasjim Djalal, M.A.. He has been
Ambassador-at-Large for the Law of the Sea/Maritime Affairs since
1994 and teaches international law and relations at Padjadjaran
University, Bandung. The discussion was organized by the Golkar
party on Nov. 1 in Jakarta.

JAKARTA: Many Indonesians perceive that Indonesian-U.S.
relations are experiencing a downturn -- notwithstanding the fact
that both countries would surely still like to have good or even
better relations.

Geostrategically speaking, especially in maritime issues,
Indonesia is important to the U.S. Indonesia lies between two
major continents, Asia and Australia, and between two major
oceans, the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. It also controls some
of the major shipping routes essential for the U.S., especially
in terms of commercial and naval requirements.

Together with Malaysia and Singapore, Indonesia controls the
closest routes between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean through
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, and together with other
littoral countries, Indonesia plays a significant role in
maintaining the stability and safety of navigation and
communications through the South China Sea.

Moreover, Indonesia also controls the strategic waterways
between the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean through the
Straits of Karimata and Sunda. With the Philippines, Indonesia
also maintains a significant role in the Celebes Sea, an
important waterway for submarine access from the Pacific to the
Indian Ocean.

Perhaps most importantly for the U.S. is the deep water seas
in Indonesia's eastern waters, particularly the Maluku sea, the
Banda sea, the Ceram sea, the Straits of Ombai and Wetar, the
Sawu sea, and many other important routes in the area.

Deep water navigational communication through the archipelago
has been extremely important for the U.S. mainly given its
interests in protecting oil and energy resources in the Gulf
states.

The U.S. has also several major military and naval bases in
the Pacific Ocean, such as in Honolulu, Guam, Okinawa, and
Yokosuka in Japan, and in the Indian Ocean, particularly on Diego
Garcia. The routes through Indonesian waters have become more
significant for the U.S. especially since it abandoned its Clark
air base and Subic naval base in the Philippines.

Lately, China has emerged as one of the potential threats to
U.S. naval supremacy in the Pacific.

Since modernization began with the Deng Xiaoping regime some
20 years ago, China has developed fishing capacity not only in
the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, but all the way to the North
Atlantic. It has also developed missile capabilities that could
reach significant and distant places in the Pacific Ocean.

In this geostrategic set-up, Japan seems to be able to little.
It is constrained by a Constitution that allows only defensive
forces and prohibits the Japanese Defense Force from operating
more than 1000 miles from Tokyo Bay.

Japan cannot operate in the South China Sea or in the waters
of Southeast Asia, which are very important for its political,
economic and strategic security. Three main reasons: More than 80
percent of Japan's energy sources come through the South China
Sea and the waters of Southeast Asia; a large part of its
investments lie in Southeast Asia; and its significant economic
and trade ties with Southeast Asia and the South China Sea.

While political and strategic relations in Northeast Asia have
lately being showing improvement, the long-term perspective in
the equation of powers in the region is still a big question
mark. This is especially so in view of the uncertainties
concerning the future of Russia and the role that it could play
in the region.

The importance of Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia,
should thus become augmented, not only because of this
geomaritime strategy but also because it is the world's fourth
most populous country, the largest and most strategically located
archipelagic country, with the largest population of Muslims and
very rich in natural resources.

The U.S. must ensure that Southeast Asia remains friendly and
stable so that its strategic interests in the area and in the
Pacific and the Indian Oceans can be protected.

The Straits Times on Oct. 6 reported that the U.S. is
considering the relocation of some of its forces in Northeast
Asia to Northern Australia. Australia has always been one of the
closest allies of the U.S. in Asia, particularly in the Southern
hemisphere.

If and when the U.S. does move some of its strategic forces to
Australia, the significance of Southeast Asia, mainly Indonesia,
to the U.S., will increase. Relations between the U.S. and
Australia on the one hand and the Southeast Asian countries on
the other could become even more sensitive.

Indonesia would become much more intertwined with the
strategic interests of the U.S., because the safety of its lines
of air and sea communications would be protected not only from
its bases in the Western and Northern Pacific but also from
Australia. Indonesia would then be "sandwiched" on all sides by
the U.S. forces and its allies.

Herein lies the significance of recent developments in the
eastern parts of Indonesia. Given the fact that Indonesia could
not prevent East Timor's separation, the latter could become
closer to Australia than to Indonesia in many respects.

While East Timor may have become "independent" from Indonesia,
it may yet become "dependent" on Australia, also given that the
political elite in East Timor think that Australia is their
"savior". Economically, East Timor may become more closely linked
to Northern Australia than to West Timor.

The Far Eastern Economic Review reported in its Aug. 21
edition that Darwin and Northern Australia have taken great
economic and trade benefits from East Timor.

The United Nations Transitional Authority for East Timor
(UNTAET) is even planning to make Northern Australia,
particularly Darwin, a new gateway from Australia to Asia.

Northern Australia, the magazine reported, gained $235 million
from UNTAET expenditure in East Timor. Northern Australia is
constructing a 1,400-kilometer long railway link between Darwin
and Alice Springs. Estimated at $700 million, it is to be
completed before 2003.

East Timor may simply become a beachhead for Australian
strategic interests in the vast archipelago and, in particular,
the waters of the eastern parts; especially since Australia over
the last five years has conducted its long-term relocation of
military bases to Northern Australia, closer to the eastern parts
of Indonesia.

The twin strategic interests of Australia with regard to
Indonesia are (1) to ensure the seas and airspace between
Indonesia and Australia remain open and safe for Australia and
that (2) that the sea and air approaches to Australia through the
archipelago remain open and accessible to Australia.

Australia, perhaps with the U.S. in tow, will pay more
attention to the eastern parts of Indonesia, which may have an
unpredictable effect on Indonesian unity, given the current
situation in Irian Jaya and the Maluku islands.

Indonesia could benefit from this potentially increased
attention from the U.S. and Australia towards the eastern parts
of the country -- lack of attention to these areas could lead to
severe problems with regard to Indonesia's future national
integration.

The policy of resettling refugees, therefore, poses a
potential problem, with planned relocation sites being in Wetar
and perhaps also the Buru Islands. Wetar Island is north of the
Wetar Strait, one of the most strategic deep water routes for
submarines, with the Ombai Strait to the west, the Letti Strait
to the east, while to the north is the Banda Sea, all the way to
Buru Island.

All these waters have been the "playground" and routes of
foreign submarines. The Wetarese could easily become a minority
on their own island -- which could be a "time bomb" for
Indonesia.

The U.S. lies thousands of miles across the biggest ocean in
the world. Even the small Indonesian navy and air force will
still be highly dependent upon the U.S., especially in terms of
equipment, technology and even spare-parts. The strategic
relations between the two countries are grossly imbalanced in
favor of the U.S.

Trying to compete with the US in a military build-up would be
useless; so would notions of building up coalitions with
potential adversaries or its enemies. This would also counter the
traditional Indonesian philosophy of not supporting military
alliances.

The best way to protect Indonesia's interests in such an
unstable environment would be to make it a policy to develop and
create an atmosphere of peace, stability and cooperation in
Indonesia and in Southeast Asia.

This would ensure that there was no need for the U.S. to
interfere in national and regional affairs so as to protect its
interests.