Don't rush into new round of political talks

Don't rush into new round of political talks

Kirsten E. Schulze, London

For the first time since the collapse of the Aceh peace
process in May 2003 the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the
Indonesian government formally talked again.

This decision came in the wake of the tsunami's devastation
of much of Aceh's coastal areas, leaving some 170,000 Acehnese
dead. This humanitarian disaster added urgency to the
informalback-channel contacts, which had been going on since
November 2004. The need to provide meaning to Aceh's immense
tragedy also pushed both the international community and many
Indonesians to urge GAM and Indonesia to leave the conflict
behind and embark upon the road of reconciliation.

While an end to three decades of conflict is, of course,
highly desirable, one should be cautious of rushing into a
renewed round of political talks.

What is often overlooked in the pressure to return to the
negotiating table is that the price of a failed peace process is
a high one indeed.

Failed peace processes diminish the hopes that a conflict can
be resolved non-violently. They polarize society, erode the
middle ground, and strengthen the hardliners. A failed peace
process delegitimises negotiations and relegimitises military
solutions. And the last thing the Acehnese need at this point is
to have their expectations raised only to be crushed.

The tsunami has not altered the positions of either the
Indonesian government or GAM. Indonesia is still not willing to
let Aceh secede and GAM is still not willing to give up its goal
of independence. Aceh's humanitarian tragedy has not bridged the
gap between them. A return to bilateral political negotiations
would thus only reproduce the zero-sum dynamics that resulted in
the breakdown of the peace process in May 2003.

That is not to say that the renewed dialog between GAM and
Indonesia has no merit, especially if it focuses on a possible
ceasefire rather than the question of sovereignty. If the new
talks can deliver a genuine, credible and lasting cessation of
hostilities that would already be a tremendous achievement and
one not without difficulties.

Every single ceasefire GAM and Indonesia agreed in the past
was violated soon after its conclusion. A renewed ceasefire will
face the same obstacles, starting with controlling troops on the
ground in the face of real and perceived provocation in an
environment of total distrust.

Indonesia will have to decide whether there will be a scaling
back in the number of Indonesian troops or a reformulation of
their mandate.

Thorny issues such as what constitutes a ceasefire violation
also have to be addressed. Apart from the obvious exchange of
gunfire GAM and Indonesia need to decide whether violations, for
instance, include the raising of GAM flags, recruitment and
training of GAM members, the import of weapons, the raising of
GAM 'taxes', and GAM political activities. These issues all
contributed to the collapse of previous ceasefires.

No less daunting is the question of whether there will be a
monitoring mechanism. Who determines when a ceasefire has been
broken and what, if any, sanctions will be imposed?

If agreement on a ceasefire could be reached, it could bring
immense benefits for Aceh. It would provide a secure environment
for humanitarian aid workers to help the Acehnese rebuild their
cities and villages and, above all, their lives. It would provide
the space for Acehnese wounds to heal - and not just those caused
by the tsunami. And if the ceasefire holds for long enough it
would help build confidence between GAM and

Indonesia and could form the basis for future political
negotiations. A long-term ceasefire would also provide the
opportunity for addressing some of the underlying causes of the
conflict: broken promises, socio-economic dislocation, political
marginalisation, and ultimately the descent into poverty of large
parts of the population while the elites enriched themselves.

A 'roadmap' is needed that focuses not just on post-tsunami
recovery but also on development across the whole province as
well as the full implementation of special autonomy. This
includes cleaner, more accountable, more effective and more
responsive governance. It also means rebuilding the education and
healthcare systems, improving the infrastructure, and addressing
rural poverty and unemployment. Focusing on the tsunami-struck
areas only could create new social jealousies and feelings of
injustice.

A long-term credible ceasefire would create the perfect
environment for the reconstruction of Aceh in a broader sense,
allowing the Acehnese to recover from both the tsunami and the
conflict and to return to some semblance of normality.

A rush into political dialog risks bringing about the
opposite. The understandable need to have something positive come
out of this horrendous natural disaster should be carefully
weighed against the costs of another failed peace process.

The writer is a senior lecturer in International History at
the London School of Economics. She is the author of The Free
Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization (East-
West Center, 2004).