Does Golkar need to be dissolved?
By Joe Fernandez
JAKARTA (JP): Demands to have Golkar dissolved reached their peak when Golkar offices were set on fire in a number of towns in East Java. Last Thursday this newspaper reported the "support" stated by faction leaders at the legislature; they said in effect that Golkar should be maintained for the sake of solidarity.
To understand this polemic a number of factors should be taken into consideration, including the legal basis of dissolving parties and fairness regarding the privileges enjoyed by Golkar under the rule of the New Order.
The 1999 law no. 2 on political parties states that the dissolution of a political party must fulfil a number of conditions.
The dissolution of a party, which is in the authority of the Attorney General, is only one kind of punishment for a party violating the law, as mentioned in clause 17.
The Attorney General can also punish parties by freezing their executive board, withdrawing their rights to join elections or apply only administrative penalties such as terminating aid from the state budget, as stated in clause 18.
In practice the dissolution and freezing of political parties under this law is very difficult because of its utopian prerequisites. "Severe violations of the law" only occur when a party is found to have aims which run counter to the Pancasila state ideology or the 1945 Constitution, or if it is found to have spread communism, Marxism or Leninism, or have accepted contributions from foreign parties.
Other violations such as receiving individual contributions of more than Rp 15 million a year, or corporate contributions of more than Rp 150 million a year, are rarely considered a serious breach of the law -- as almost all major parties joining the last election are suspected of having violated the above clause.
What is of greater concern is the suspicion that almost all political parties which gained seats in the last election have violated clause 18, item 4 regarding the obligation of parties to have all income and contributions audited by a public accountant.
Only one party -- unfortunately not Golkar -- has conformed with clause 15 regarding the obligation to report the contributions it received at the end of each year, or 15 days before elections, or 30 days after elections, to the Attorney General and have the contributions audited by a public accountant.
Clause 15 must be considered part of a party's accountability to the Indonesian public, because it has enjoyed taxpayers' money. Public accountability must be the utmost priority compared with formal or administrative accountability submitted to the Attorney General.
It is highly unfortunate that until now the Attorney General has never revealed the results of audits by public accountants of all registered parties; therefore the public has yet to know of the parties' financial condition.
Not surprisingly, this has led to suspicions of "money politics" and the rise of new scandals. Defense minister Mahfud MD alleged that Golkar had received Rp 90 billion from the State Logistics Agency in the last election.
This is where the Attorney General must be transparent to avoid more mud slinging among the political elite, regarding allegations of illicitly gained funds used by political parties.
Suspicions towards legislators from the Akbar Tandjung-led Golkar are still high because of the privileges they are still enjoying, in the form of accumulated assets and capital.
Therefore if Golkar, which has renamed itself the "New Golkar" party feels it has changed its character since the New Order days, it should take the initiative to announce the individual wealth of its members who sit in the legislature, as is the practice in many countries.
This should start with Golkar's high-ranking executives.
The Golkar image which Akbar wishes to promote involves a small change in the party's structure. However this only touches the surface. When introducing the Golkar Party ahead of the last election, Akbar was very proud of the removal of the Board of Patrons (Dewan Pembina) at the central level, the Board of Advisors (Dewan Pertimbangan) at the provincial level and the Board of Councilors at the regency or township level.
But this is far from enough.
One must question the ownership of assets, or the transfer of ownership of assets under Golkar. Assets of the government and provincial administrations which under the New Order were taken over by Golkar, because of its proximity with those in power, now remain under its control -- such as the land and premises of both the Central Board office and of a number of provincial offices.
One should further question Golkar's many benefits in the form of "personal" support from government offices, which was earlier so easy to acquire.
The basic relevant question here is: Has the Golkar Party really cut off all its "perks" in the form of facilities, government support and that millions of civil servants?
Other parties would surely be jealous of the vast facilities that Golkar has enjoyed so far. Is it fair for the Golkar Party to continue to exist while it has and is still enjoying the above facilities, and spending what it has gained from its special financial sources?
Golkar's exclusive access to assets and capital was possible because of its earlier structure. A secretariat chief on its Board of Patrons, for example, was ex-officio the secretary of the liaison office of state bodies at the State Secretariat -- which meant easy access to state facilities.
The Chairman of the Board of Patrons, then president Soeharto himself, was entitled to reap the harvest from the "money tree"; this comprised the foundations (yayasan) under his control -- the Yayasan Dana Karya Abadi (DAKAB), Yayasan Amal Bakti Muslimin Pancasila (ABMP), and others.
Of course huge sums of money have been gathered from DAKAB and ABMP alone through the decades-long "contribution" from civil servants' salaries throughout the country or "requests" of funds from state corporations, in particular the fuel company Pertamina and the State Logistics Agency.
Those were only two of so many "money machines" made available to Golkar at that time.
Then there was the position of Golkar treasurers, held by some of the country's renowned business people. They all gained facilities when serving under Golkar chairmen. They all have businesses and close linkages with conglomerates which grew under the Soeharto regime.
It is now up to Golkar to take a close look at itself. Has it really made a clean break with its past? Or is it still discreetly enjoying privileges through established networks?
Depending on the party's moral accountability and credibility, can it elegantly erase its stigma and rise with a truly new name and paradigm, to become a modern party with integrity?
The end of East Europe's communist parties should be a valuable object lesson for Golkar.
The problem is that Golkar is still using its old paradigm. The only difference is that it used to be the ruler; now it is the loser, and no longer has the support of the military or the bureaucracy.
The writer is a senior researcher at the Jakarta-based Institute for Policy and Community Development Studies.