Disclosing NU's vulnerabilities

Muhamad Rifai, Contributor, Yogyakarta

"Bodohnya NU" apa "NU Dibodohi?"
Jejak Langkah NU Era Reformasi: Menguji Khittah Meneropong
Paradigma Politik
("Folly of NU" or "Has NU been Fooled"?
Traces of NU in Reform Era: Putting Khittah to a Test - Scrutinizing Political Paradigms)
By Bahrul Ulum
Ar-Ruzz Press & PW IPNU Central Java
September 2002
254 pp

This book is the latest of those analyzing Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) as an opportunist movement that always loses in the political domain. Is it true that if NU is not foolish that it will be fooled by others?

NU was set up in 1926 by salaf ulema as a social and religious movement to counter the modernists in terms of religious interpretation. It was not only active in setting up pesantren (Islamic boarding schools) but also raised social and political awareness during the latter decades of Dutch governance. Evidence of its holy war resolution was its decision to help set up MIAI and Masyumi while its support for Sukarno as president was its historical proof.

Up to that period, few intellectuals would have called NU foolish and useless. When Indonesia became independent in 1945 and later held its first general election, NU joined Masyumi but lost to Muhammadiyah in earning the religious affairs minister position. It only earned a place in the advisory council without any practical role. That's why NU set up its own party and contested the 1955 general election.

Starting at that point, observers and intellectuals no longer saw NU as a social and religious organization due to its involvement in political practice.

In the New Order era under Soeharto, NU took part in the 1972 election and was second only to Golkar. When there was a fusion of political parties in 1973, it became an element in the United Development Party (PPP). In this period, NU was known as the government's opposition. It rejected the government's plan to allot 50 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives for the military. Instead, NU suggested the allocation of 5 percent only.

In its 27th national conference in Situbondo, East Java, in 1984, NU declared its return to its khittah (origins) as a social and religious organization without any involvement in political practices. As a consequence, it left PPP and accepted Pancasila as the sole principle. It also allowed its members to vote for any party.

From this time up to the fall of Soeharto, NU, led by K.H. Sahal Mahfuds and Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid, began to develop a healthy intellectual discourse on democracy and the reinforcement of civil society. It sought to empower the people to eradicate illiteracy and also help them realize their rights as citizens.

In this period, NU was involved in cultural areas. The young generation of NU emerged. They not only had orthodox religious knowledge from their pesantren education but are also familiar with modernist, neo-modernist and post-modernist ideas.

After the reform era kicked off, following the onset of the multi-dimensional crisis and the fall of Soeharto, B.J. Habibie became president. In a flash, political euphoria hit the entire country: Freedom to express opinions and criticisms. Here, NU, which from the beginning of its history had its own political culture, was also dragged into this euphoria and set up the National Awakening Party (PKB) on July 23, 1998.

In his book, Ulum observes that during the reform era, NU's vision shifted to more of an involvement in politics. Critically, Ulum tested how well the flexibility or consistency of NU's khittah was maintained by its leaders. Or, perhaps, it was used for power or personal interest purposes through changeable situations.

In his evaluation, NU in the reform era has violated its own khittah when the central executive board of NU instructed that all NU members should vote for PKB.

Ulum criticizes NU for spending so much energy only on political matters and neglecting other things. Further, he bitterly lashes out and says their flexibility in the interpretation of khittah, relative to the situation and the condition, backfired on them and the NU always loses or looks foolish.

It is regrettable, though, that a supposed intellectual such as Ulum is unable to process data broadly and comprehensively. It seems he is still burdened with the hypothesis and concepts prevailing among some NU figures, intellectuals, bureaucrats, politicians or those which can be found in mass media opinions.

Ulum should have involved himself in the processing of his own research. Is it true, as he claims, that for NU grassroots were only politically active when Gus Dur became president? At least, Ulum can study the activities set up by the NU's young generation in this period. This would have been helpful in his political conclusions. Otherwise, he is assessing everything using the election yardstick of losing or winning.

In fact, using a parallel historical approach, Ulum could have observed the flexibility of the interpretation of khittah to find out what sociological and political conditions have served as the background so that there is always a shift from politics to khittah and then to politics again in a circle.

NU joined GAPI and Masyumi in the context of resisting the Dutch leadership. When it was politically impossible to wage resistance, NU moved to the cultural line. Why is it that when Gus Dur was forced to step down it was considered a loss and he himself was considered too foolish for political matters and gave rise to a disgusting image?

Don't we see that in its "craziness", despite the labeling of opportunism, traditionalism, conservatism, foolishness and resistance, NU has consistently fought against injustice for the sake of humanity. It is completely wrongheaded to consider a social struggle in terms of short-term winning and losing of elections or from the labeling of stupidity. Here Ulum must learn to be a truly independent intellectual and must now allow himself to be carried away by the major currents of opinions to avoid amateurism.