Disclosing NU's vulnerabilities

Disclosing NU's vulnerabilities

Muhamad Rifai, Contributor, Yogyakarta

"Bodohnya NU" apa "NU Dibodohi?"

Jejak Langkah NU Era Reformasi: Menguji Khittah Meneropong

Paradigma Politik

("Folly of NU" or "Has NU been Fooled"?

Traces of NU in Reform Era: Putting Khittah to a Test -
Scrutinizing Political Paradigms)

By Bahrul Ulum

Ar-Ruzz Press & PW IPNU Central Java

September 2002

254 pp

This book is the latest of those analyzing Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)
as an opportunist movement that always loses in the political
domain. Is it true that if NU is not foolish that it will be
fooled by others?

NU was set up in 1926 by salaf ulema as a social and religious
movement to counter the modernists in terms of religious
interpretation. It was not only active in setting up pesantren
(Islamic boarding schools) but also raised social and political
awareness during the latter decades of Dutch governance. Evidence
of its holy war resolution was its decision to help set up MIAI
and Masyumi while its support for Sukarno as president was its
historical proof.

Up to that period, few intellectuals would have called NU
foolish and useless. When Indonesia became independent in 1945
and later held its first general election, NU joined Masyumi but
lost to Muhammadiyah in earning the religious affairs minister
position. It only earned a place in the advisory council without
any practical role. That's why NU set up its own party and
contested the 1955 general election.

Starting at that point, observers and intellectuals no longer
saw NU as a social and religious organization due to its
involvement in political practice.

In the New Order era under Soeharto, NU took part in the 1972
election and was second only to Golkar. When there was a fusion
of political parties in 1973, it became an element in the United
Development Party (PPP). In this period, NU was known as the
government's opposition. It rejected the government's plan to
allot 50 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives for
the military. Instead, NU suggested the allocation of 5 percent
only.

In its 27th national conference in Situbondo, East Java, in
1984, NU declared its return to its khittah (origins) as a social
and religious organization without any involvement in political
practices. As a consequence, it left PPP and accepted Pancasila
as the sole principle. It also allowed its members to vote for
any party.

From this time up to the fall of Soeharto, NU, led by K.H.
Sahal Mahfuds and Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid, began to develop a
healthy intellectual discourse on democracy and the reinforcement
of civil society. It sought to empower the people to eradicate
illiteracy and also help them realize their rights as citizens.

In this period, NU was involved in cultural areas. The young
generation of NU emerged. They not only had orthodox religious
knowledge from their pesantren education but are also familiar
with modernist, neo-modernist and post-modernist ideas.

After the reform era kicked off, following the onset of the
multi-dimensional crisis and the fall of Soeharto, B.J. Habibie
became president. In a flash, political euphoria hit the entire
country: Freedom to express opinions and criticisms. Here, NU,
which from the beginning of its history had its own political
culture, was also dragged into this euphoria and set up the
National Awakening Party (PKB) on July 23, 1998.

In his book, Ulum observes that during the reform era, NU's
vision shifted to more of an involvement in politics. Critically,
Ulum tested how well the flexibility or consistency of NU's
khittah was maintained by its leaders. Or, perhaps, it was used
for power or personal interest purposes through changeable
situations.

In his evaluation, NU in the reform era has violated its own
khittah when the central executive board of NU instructed that
all NU members should vote for PKB.

Ulum criticizes NU for spending so much energy only on
political matters and neglecting other things. Further, he
bitterly lashes out and says their flexibility in the
interpretation of khittah, relative to the situation and the
condition, backfired on them and the NU always loses or looks
foolish.

It is regrettable, though, that a supposed intellectual such
as Ulum is unable to process data broadly and comprehensively. It
seems he is still burdened with the hypothesis and concepts
prevailing among some NU figures, intellectuals, bureaucrats,
politicians or those which can be found in mass media opinions.

Ulum should have involved himself in the processing of his own
research. Is it true, as he claims, that for NU grassroots were
only politically active when Gus Dur became president? At least,
Ulum can study the activities set up by the NU's young generation
in this period. This would have been helpful in his political
conclusions. Otherwise, he is assessing everything using the
election yardstick of losing or winning.

In fact, using a parallel historical approach, Ulum could have
observed the flexibility of the interpretation of khittah to find
out what sociological and political conditions have served as the
background so that there is always a shift from politics to
khittah and then to politics again in a circle.

NU joined GAPI and Masyumi in the context of resisting the
Dutch leadership. When it was politically impossible to wage
resistance, NU moved to the cultural line. Why is it that when
Gus Dur was forced to step down it was considered a loss and he
himself was considered too foolish for political matters and gave
rise to a disgusting image?

Don't we see that in its "craziness", despite the labeling of
opportunism, traditionalism, conservatism, foolishness and
resistance, NU has consistently fought against injustice for the
sake of humanity. It is completely wrongheaded to consider a
social struggle in terms of short-term winning and losing of
elections or from the labeling of stupidity. Here Ulum must learn
to be a truly independent intellectual and must now allow himself
to be carried away by the major currents of opinions to avoid
amateurism.