Disarmament forum at impasse

By Dian Wirengjurit

GENEVA (JP): The Conference on Disarmament, termed the "single multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament related matters", is at an impasse. Since 1997, the 61-member conference has not succeeded in making any progress, whether on substantive or procedural issues. Despite having now reached the middle of the 1999 session in Geneva, the conference has yet to work out its program of work.

Meanwhile, there are only seven weeks left before this year's session of the conference ends in September. Most of the diplomats feel the 1999 session is already over.

Does it, in fact, matter? Well, not really. Given the fact that the conference is mandated for such an extraordinary task and responsibility as achieving general and complete disarmament under effective international control, the slowness is quite natural.

Furthermore, there are some precedents from the past that show the conference is facing the same unexpected circumstances. The international community must fully realize this and, perhaps, the conference only needs a break.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was finally signed in 1996 after the ups and downs of a 10-year-long negotiation process. It also happened to the Chemical Weapons Convention concluded in 1993, which was on the table since the conference was first established in 1979.

Other issues, such as Negative Security Assurance and Transparency in Armament or Radiological Weapons, seem to be completely forgotten.

What does matter? The answer to that is simply the lack of genuine flexibility and the apparent arrogance of some of its actors. Almost continually since 1997, after the momentous achievements of the previous years, the conference has been a playground for "the hard-liners" of both the nuclear weapon and nuclear-free camps.

In a forum where a decision can only be adopted by consensus, such attitudes are not only regrettable and questionable, but must be abandoned.

The way the conference has been operating in the last two years is not as a negotiating forum -- where diplomats are supposed to meet and negotiate -- but rather as a political forum, where the representatives of sovereign member states come and make statements on their policies and positions.

Or, on frequent occasions, it is like an academic forum where people come to give or listen to lectures on disarmament. Perhaps only the manner and language are diplomatic and distinguish it from, say, meetings on human rights, for example.

Forget about negotiations to bridge the gap or find compromise solutions on matters of the highest priority. The sacred jargon of "flexibility, openness and frankness", which is bandied about so freely and which is supposed to contain the key words to the success of a negotiation, appear somewhat meaningless. Or, perhaps, in the context of the conference, they now have the opposite meaning from that of the ordinary dictionary, because what prevails in the meeting is precisely the opposite.

If, theoretically, negotiation aims to reach a common formula acceptable to all, then in the conference such a formula is inconceivable. Missing are the terms "middle ground" or "middle way" from the dictionary of the conference. On the program of work, for example, which is supposed to be adopted at the beginning of each session, the discussion resembles an academic exercise.

It is purely procedural, however, and in the conference it could be analytical and politicized as well. And rather than acting realistically and pragmatically, diplomats begin to talk about the approach to the program of work. It is common nowadays to hear diplomats arguing about the need for a "comprehensive" or "linkage" or "all-or-nothing" approach versus the need for one that is "piecemeal", "partial", "step-by-step" or "stand-alone".

In other words, it is whether the program should be adopted as a whole and the conference could start its business to address all issues, or whether it could be focused on certain less controversial issues. But if some of the delegates of the nonnuclear states exclaimed quite simply that "any proposal which is not comprehensive is certainly unacceptable", then this would need no further elaboration.

On the substantive issues, particularly on the two outstanding and most controversial of nuclear disarmament (ND) and the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS), things become more complicated because the problem is no longer a matter of flexibility but a matter of attitude.

There is no room for interpretation when the delegate from the United States reiterates very plainly: "The real obstacle to nuclear disarmament negotiations here is not the willingness of the parties, but the capacity of the forum. It will not work. It will set back disarmament. We cannot and should not agree to it. That is true today. It will be equally true next year, and five years in the future".

Or, when the same delegate states, with regard to PAROS, that there will be no discussion on this issue simply because "there is no arms race in outer space".

Are there elements of flexibility or compromise in those statements?

In a forum where consensus dictates the progress of negotiation, each member has the right of veto, meaning that each has the capacity to block a near consensus.

This used to be the privilege and exclusive right of the powerful five countries, as in the UN Security Council. However, it would appear that the nonnuclear states know exactly how to make use of this exclusive rights.

Therefore, it is common practice in the conference to hear that a delegation is "waiting for instructions from or still consulting the capital". There is no need to give further explanation, but it is certainly enough to block all the proceedings.

All of those examples more often than not have a finality which makes further debate pointless.

The readiness of members to discuss and consider other members' proposals appears to be nothing more than lip-service since they themselves know that their position will not and cannot change.

It seems that most members, particularly the hard-liners, have their own agenda, which certainly does not coincide with the agenda and goals of the conference. But they appear to enjoy this game very much.

Even if the conference does finally adopt the program of work, it is questionable whether the latter can proceed smoothly, since there are lots of elements in the issues it contains which require further clarification.

If such is the case, then the conference will again face the same problem concerning the approach and other nonsubstantive issues before it comes to the real substantive issue. There is still a long, long way to go before the conference can start its mandated tasks.

Therefore, there is, or will be, no such middle way or middle ground in the conference, at least in the near future. As "an art of the possible", diplomacy seems to be paralyzed in the conference and becomes "an art of the only temporary or sometimes possible".

Even when the most experienced and respected diplomats and negotiators join the debates, the situation remains the same. The ice is too hard to be broken. The only principle that hard-liners in both camps can share seems to be "not to accept any proposal from the other side, by whatever means", even when, for most proposals, they make a point of emphasizing that one should "take into consideration all proposals".

So what can be expected from the conference in this kind of situation?

The answer lies wholly in the hands of its members, since they are well aware that the inability to overcome those problems can only undermine the credibility of the conference.

On the other hand, this will also pave the way for "other tracks" to replace it and take the lead, such as what was achieved by the ICBL and Jody Williams in the context of antipersonnel land mines through the 1997 Ottawa Convention.

If the participants in the conference wish to break the impasse and start making headway, they need to be genuinely realistic and pragmatic. Among others, they have to forget about the academic approaches which can only be confusing, and change their attitude to be more accommodating of the majority's aspirations.

Every diplomat well knows that a successful negotiation requires not only perseverance but also concessions. But in the conference what prevails is merely perseverance, and not concessions. If this does not work either, then the conference needs to comprehensively review and, perhaps, revamp itself.

Therefore, if the international community has a wish, it most likely would be: "To make progress in our deliberations, and we hope that the spirit of cooperation, goodwill and flexibility will again prevail in this august assembly".

The writer is first secretary at the Indonesian Mission to the United Nations in Geneva and a delegate to the Conference on Disarmament. This articles is a personal opinion.