Diplomacy can help calm troubled sea

Diplomacy can help calm troubled sea

Graham Gerard Ong, The Straits Times, Asia News Network, Singapore

The dispatch of three Indonesian warships to the Sulawesi Sea
last week, in protest against Malaysia's decision to award a
contract to an Anglo-Dutch firm to explore and mine the Ambalat
and East Ambalat oil and gas blocks, may appear to be a
straightforward case of "gunboat diplomacy".

Until a few days ago, the issue had remained largely dormant
because Malaysia appeared to be resolved to tackle it through
diplomatic rather than military means.

Now, the latest reports indicate a significant escalation in
tensions between the two countries after a confrontation between
a Malaysian and an Indonesian warship on Saturday.

The patrolling Malaysian warship seemed to have informed its
Indonesian counterpart that it had encroached into Malaysian
waters near Sebatik island in the Sulawesi Sea. In the row that
followed, the Malaysian vessel apparently decided to withdraw
when the Indonesian vessel gave pursuit.

The significance of Sebatik island, which is approximately 215
nautical miles (398km) north-east of the Ambalat blocks, was
underlined on Monday when Indonesian President Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono visited the southern part of the island. The area has
also become a temporary shelter for Indonesians fleeing a
Malaysian crackdown against illegal workers.

This confirms that the disputes over the Ambalat blocks and
Malaysia's repatriation of illegal Indonesian immigrants are
intertwined and have to be dealt with simultaneously.

However, any broader analysis of this crisis cannot avoid the
recognition that it was Indonesia which initiated it by sending a
naval presence to the area.

An explanation for its actions may be found in the works of
the famous 19th-century naval historian and strategist Alfred
Thayer Mahan. In his classic The Influence Of Sea Power Upon
History, he argued that naval power is the key to success in
international politics.

The navy's importance rests on two key pillars: Its ability to
affect events on land, and its ability to control the use of the
sea (or "command of the sea" as Mahan called it). The latter
pertains to the ability to protect one's maritime assets and to
project military power ashore while denying the opposition the
means of counteraction.

Unlike the littoral states of Singapore and Malaysia, the
Indonesian navy played a vital role in the formation of the
country's national consciousness after the end of World War II --
a consciousness not unrelated to Indonesia once being the locus
of the Sriwijaya and Majapahit maritime empires between the 7th
and 16th centuries.

Despite possessing only wooden ships, a few landing craft and
weapons left over by imperial Japan, Indonesia, soon after the
proclamation of its independence from the Dutch, created the
Agency of the People's Security Sea Service, the progenitor of
the Republic of Indonesia Navy (renamed in 1970 as the Navy of
the Indonesian Armed Forces).

Its role was then further embellished through its contribution
in the independence war against the Dutch between 1945 and 1949.

Though the Indonesian military's traditional role of dwifungsi
has been officially dismantled in the post-Soeharto era, the
dispatch of the three warships was a knee-jerk response to
President Susilo's statement about what his government believes
to be its rights in the Sulawesi Sea.

Just as the East Timor incident created a negative impression
worldwide of former president Megawati Soekarnoputri's
administration, the recent show of force in Sulawesi may come at
a high cost to President Susilo's political credibility, and may
tarnish his country's reputation.

For one thing, the Indonesian move negates the credibility it
accrued when it proposed the creation of an ASEAN Security
Community by 2020 during its 2003-2004 chairmanship of the ASEAN
Standing Committee.

Indonesia's actions go against the grain of the grouping's
fundamental principles.

ASEAN states are to settle their disagreements without
considering the use of force as an option. Preparations for the
use of force are no longer acceptable and neither must they be
factored into a country's contingency planning.

Also, the relative frailty of Indonesia's navy is an open
secret among the region's defense community. Though it is the
biggest naval force in Southeast Asia, its neglect over the 1990s
has led to an unserviceable fleet.

Even Indonesia's navy chief of staff, Admiral Bernard Sondakh,
had admitted as much. A 2002 The Jakarta Post editorial quoted
him saying, "Only a handful of our warships are operational".
Even then, since "none are equipped to engage in combat", they
were only "good for fishing expeditions", he said.

Malaysia's decision to avoid a naval response until the
Sebatik island standoff showed an accurate assessment of the
scope of Indonesia's naval capacity.

Its sensible decision to withdraw its warship from the Sebatik
island standoff also suggests that it has decided to avoid the
outbreak of unnecessary conflict.

Malaysia would do well not to engage in any sabre-rattling,
for its prudence can generate positive political capital for the
country should it submit its case on the dispute to the
International Court of Justice once again.

The news of its initial deployment of three warships, reported
in the press a day after the opening of the three-day ASEAN
Regional Forum on Regional Cooperation on Maritime Security held
in Singapore, also places added strain on the already fragile but
pressing agenda of regional maritime security cooperation.

Lastly, the Sulawesi incident raises questions about the state
of affairs within President Susilo's government.

When six Indonesian warships appeared off East Timor's coast
in 2002, security analysts interpreted it as a sign that the
Indonesian military was reasserting its power under then-
president Megawati's weak leadership.

Similarly, the warships in Sulawesi may indicate a similar bid
for power by the military, against what it perceives as President
Susilo's softness in negotiating with Malaysia on both the
illegal workers' issue as well as the oil and gas blocks dispute.

It may also indicate a struggle for power within the military,
among its various services. Significantly, just days before the
Indonesia-Malaysia summit last month, the Indonesian navy
announced a massive fleet expansion plan over the next decade.

Its plans to add at least 302 warships to its inventory may
also indicate a desire to tip the regional naval balance of power
in Indonesia's favor.

In what could be a bid for "overseas presence", the Indonesian
navy made its maiden journey across the Pacific maritime theater
in the middle of last year, sailing to Shanghai for training
exercises with the People's Liberation Army navy.

However, if the dispatch of the warships shortly after
President Susilo's meeting with Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah
Badawi was indeed done at the Indonesian leader's bidding, the
international community may need to revise its perceptions of his
diplomatic persona.

The writer is a research associate at the Institute of South-
east Asian Studies. The views expressed here are his own.
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