Dialog the key to building regional trust

By Rizal Sukma

JAKARTA (JP): Last month's joint military exercises conducted by the Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA) -- comprising Britain, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia and Australia -- mean that military alliances are still crucial.

But military alliances in Southeast Asia have rarely been raised in talks on regional security since the Cold War. Political logic now tends to assume that military alliances as mechanisms for guaranteeing security are obsolete. And the spirit of multilateralism, which is based on institutionalized talks, has been around for years.

But why do FPDA members now want to revitalize the function and role of the alliance? In a press conference on the joint military exercises, the defense ministers of member countries reaffirmed the alliance's relevance.

Singapore's Defense Minister Tony Tan, for example, cited three reasons why the military alliance was still necessary: it is considered vital for regional security and stability; it is an important vehicle through which member countries can conduct regular exercises and consult in times of crisis; and it is a forum for bilateral and multilateral exercises.

But why does the FPDA now renew and reaffirm its relevance after two decades of being "low profile?" And how do FPDA and other military alliances fit into the increasing multilateral discussions to secure peace and guarantee stability in the region?

The FPDA was established in 1971 after "chaotic" order in Southeast Asia, partly caused by Indonesia's adventurous policy of konfrontasi (confrontation). Its establishment has been justified in terms of defending Malaysia and Singapore from an armed attack. Even though the potential attacker has never been clearly defined, many Indonesians know that the FPDA was established in case Indonesia reintroduced aggressive foreign policy (Mochtar Kusuma-atmadja, Contemporary Southeast Asia, December 1990, p. 169).

But for its members, the FPDA provides psychological reassurance and reflects pragmatic strategic thinking in an uncertain world. In this regard, history cannot be ignored in defense planning.

Since its establishment, the FPDA has not shown any real inclination to provide a security guarantee or umbrella for its core members such as Malaysia and Singapore. In fact, the differences between Singapore's and Malaysia's strategic perceptions on the use of a military alliance involving extra- regional powers have long been noted. Malaysia is known to have entertained the view that military involvement by extra-regional powers would only be temporary. On the other hand, Singapore has supported the view that such involvement by foreign powers, especially Western, is essential for maintaining a regional balance of power. In this context, the decline of Britain's role and security commitment in the region has made Australia's role in the defense arrangements more instrumental.

The arrangements have not been seen as actively pursuing its military function. Its first major maritime exercise, for example, did not happen until June 1981. Even so, Malaysia and Singapore viewed the smaller-than-expected exercise as inadequate. The dissatisfaction over the FPDA at that time was clearly expressed by Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister Rajaratnam. He called for a new collective arrangement and questioned the credibility of the FPDA against a Soviet threat. An Australian analyst once noted that "during the 1970s and early 1980s, the FPDA experienced periods of stagnation and rejuvenation, pointed questions as to their relevance and differing interpretations among its members as to their purpose" (Philip Methven, The Five Power Defense Arrangements and Military Cooperation Among the ASEAN States, Canberra, 1992, p.9).

Doubts over the FPDA's future increased when Paul Dibb's report to the Australian government on national defense was published in March 1986. Professor Dibb's report says the "continued existence of the FPDA is a political rather than a military consideration". To alleviate mounting criticism from Malaysia, Singapore and domestic sources, the Australian government made major revisions to the relevance of the FPDA in the Defense White Paper which drew its content primarily from Dibb's report, stressing its continued commitment to the arrangements.

Following the outcry over Dibb's report, a major air and maritime exercise, code named Lima Bersatu, was held in the South China Sea in September 1988. This was followed by joint air and naval exercises. In short, the end of the 1980s witnessed a limited rejuvenation in the activities and functions of the defense arrangements; developments which were welcomed by Malaysia and Singapore albeit in varying degrees.

In this context, the member countries' latest attempt to rejuvenate FPDA's role and relevance can be interpreted as the continuation of existing trends. But given the location and timing of the latest exercise, it is tempting to speculate on other possible reasons for it. Was the exercise prompted by growing regional concerns over China's military activities in the disputed South China Sea? Or, does it reflect the return of baseless concerns over the possibility of Indonesia becoming an aggressive regional power?

The first possibility has been denied by Malaysian Defense Minister Syed Hamid Albar (Straits Times, April 16, 1997). China, he maintained, would not use force to settle territorial disputes despite modernizing its air and naval forces. But speculation on future Indonesian aggression is even less convincing, especially in light of the Indonesia-Australia Agreement on Maintaining Security signed in December 1995. Since Jakarta has maintained good security relations with Canberra through the agreement, there is no good reason to suspect Indonesia's intentions in the region. Therefore, one does not yet have the confidence to speculate on the objectives of the FPDA military exercises.

Regardless of the reasons behind the exercise, it is likely that the joint exercise will be received with a degree of skepticism, if not cynicism, in some quarters in Indonesia. In this regard, to what extent will military alliances such as the FPDA complement the evolving principles of multilateralism as understood in the context of the post Cold War Asia-Pacific.

It is not an exaggeration to say that the establishment of a military alliance, which is usually based on the existence of strategic views of a common threat, reflects the lack, if not the absence, of trust among states in the region. Meanwhile, multilateral security talks reflect an awareness and willingness to build trust among nations. For trust to grow, the role of the ASEAN Regional Forum must be encouraged by its members. More importantly, the degree that military alliances compliment multilateralism will in the end depend on talks.

For its part, Indonesia believes that stability and security in the region will be best preserved by neighboring countries becoming more confident in the growing importance of existing multilateral forums. Most Indonesians believe that multilateral talks, no matter how slow they evolve, are still the best option for alleviating any suspicions in the region. Otherwise, what is the ARF's future if it cannot win its members' confidence?

The writer is a Ph D. graduate and a researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta. The views expressed here are the author's alone.