Dialog the key to building regional trust

Dialog the key to building regional trust

By Rizal Sukma

JAKARTA (JP): Last month's joint military exercises conducted
by the Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA) -- comprising
Britain, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia and Australia -- mean
that military alliances are still crucial.

But military alliances in Southeast Asia have rarely been
raised in talks on regional security since the Cold War.
Political logic now tends to assume that military alliances as
mechanisms for guaranteeing security are obsolete. And the spirit
of multilateralism, which is based on institutionalized talks,
has been around for years.

But why do FPDA members now want to revitalize the function
and role of the alliance? In a press conference on the joint
military exercises, the defense ministers of member countries
reaffirmed the alliance's relevance.

Singapore's Defense Minister Tony Tan, for example, cited
three reasons why the military alliance was still necessary: it
is considered vital for regional security and stability; it is an
important vehicle through which member countries can conduct
regular exercises and consult in times of crisis; and it is a
forum for bilateral and multilateral exercises.

But why does the FPDA now renew and reaffirm its relevance
after two decades of being "low profile?" And how do FPDA and
other military alliances fit into the increasing multilateral
discussions to secure peace and guarantee stability in the
region?

The FPDA was established in 1971 after "chaotic" order in
Southeast Asia, partly caused by Indonesia's adventurous policy
of konfrontasi (confrontation). Its establishment has been
justified in terms of defending Malaysia and Singapore from an
armed attack. Even though the potential attacker has never been
clearly defined, many Indonesians know that the FPDA was
established in case Indonesia reintroduced aggressive foreign
policy (Mochtar Kusuma-atmadja, Contemporary Southeast Asia,
December 1990, p. 169).

But for its members, the FPDA provides psychological
reassurance and reflects pragmatic strategic thinking in an
uncertain world. In this regard, history cannot be ignored in
defense planning.

Since its establishment, the FPDA has not shown any real
inclination to provide a security guarantee or umbrella for its
core members such as Malaysia and Singapore. In fact, the
differences between Singapore's and Malaysia's strategic
perceptions on the use of a military alliance involving extra-
regional powers have long been noted. Malaysia is known to have
entertained the view that military involvement by extra-regional
powers would only be temporary. On the other hand, Singapore has
supported the view that such involvement by foreign powers,
especially Western, is essential for maintaining a regional
balance of power. In this context, the decline of Britain's role
and security commitment in the region has made Australia's role
in the defense arrangements more instrumental.

The arrangements have not been seen as actively pursuing its
military function. Its first major maritime exercise, for
example, did not happen until June 1981. Even so, Malaysia and
Singapore viewed the smaller-than-expected exercise as
inadequate. The dissatisfaction over the FPDA at that time was
clearly expressed by Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister
Rajaratnam. He called for a new collective arrangement and
questioned the credibility of the FPDA against a Soviet threat.
An Australian analyst once noted that "during the 1970s and early
1980s, the FPDA experienced periods of stagnation and
rejuvenation, pointed questions as to their relevance and
differing interpretations among its members as to their purpose"
(Philip Methven, The Five Power Defense Arrangements and Military
Cooperation Among the ASEAN States, Canberra, 1992, p.9).

Doubts over the FPDA's future increased when Paul Dibb's
report to the Australian government on national defense was
published in March 1986. Professor Dibb's report says the
"continued existence of the FPDA is a political rather than a
military consideration". To alleviate mounting criticism from
Malaysia, Singapore and domestic sources, the Australian
government made major revisions to the relevance of the FPDA in
the Defense White Paper which drew its content primarily from
Dibb's report, stressing its continued commitment to the
arrangements.

Following the outcry over Dibb's report, a major air and
maritime exercise, code named Lima Bersatu, was held in the South
China Sea in September 1988. This was followed by joint air and
naval exercises. In short, the end of the 1980s witnessed a
limited rejuvenation in the activities and functions of the
defense arrangements; developments which were welcomed by
Malaysia and Singapore albeit in varying degrees.

In this context, the member countries' latest attempt to
rejuvenate FPDA's role and relevance can be interpreted as the
continuation of existing trends. But given the location and
timing of the latest exercise, it is tempting to speculate on
other possible reasons for it. Was the exercise prompted by
growing regional concerns over China's military activities in the
disputed South China Sea? Or, does it reflect the return of
baseless concerns over the possibility of Indonesia becoming an
aggressive regional power?

The first possibility has been denied by Malaysian Defense
Minister Syed Hamid Albar (Straits Times, April 16, 1997). China,
he maintained, would not use force to settle territorial disputes
despite modernizing its air and naval forces. But speculation on
future Indonesian aggression is even less convincing, especially
in light of the Indonesia-Australia Agreement on Maintaining
Security signed in December 1995. Since Jakarta has maintained
good security relations with Canberra through the agreement,
there is no good reason to suspect Indonesia's intentions in the
region. Therefore, one does not yet have the confidence to
speculate on the objectives of the FPDA military exercises.

Regardless of the reasons behind the exercise, it is likely
that the joint exercise will be received with a degree of
skepticism, if not cynicism, in some quarters in Indonesia. In
this regard, to what extent will military alliances such as the
FPDA complement the evolving principles of multilateralism as
understood in the context of the post Cold War Asia-Pacific.

It is not an exaggeration to say that the establishment of a
military alliance, which is usually based on the existence of
strategic views of a common threat, reflects the lack, if not the
absence, of trust among states in the region. Meanwhile,
multilateral security talks reflect an awareness and willingness
to build trust among nations. For trust to grow, the role of the
ASEAN Regional Forum must be encouraged by its members. More
importantly, the degree that military alliances compliment
multilateralism will in the end depend on talks.

For its part, Indonesia believes that stability and security
in the region will be best preserved by neighboring countries
becoming more confident in the growing importance of existing
multilateral forums. Most Indonesians believe that multilateral
talks, no matter how slow they evolve, are still the best option
for alleviating any suspicions in the region. Otherwise, what is
the ARF's future if it cannot win its members' confidence?

The writer is a Ph D. graduate and a researcher at the Centre
for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta. The views
expressed here are the author's alone.