Devolution a must to fight poverty

Devolution a must to fight poverty

By S. Abdurrahman

CANBERRA (JP): Various development programs, from the
"vindicative" perspective of the Indonesian government, have been
able to significantly ease out rural poverty for the past two
decades.

The development programs introduced by the government include
presidential assistance programs, a presidential instruction
program for the least developed villages, a savings scheme and a
credit scheme.

However, are these poverty alleviation programs sincerely
devolved at the village level in a wide-range scope and to a far-
reaching extent to ensure their effectiveness and efficiency? And
more importantly, do they include the participation of the poor?
How do the determinants of implementing devolution at the village
level interplay for the goal of poverty alleviation?

Devolution, in its fullest local sense, is a precursor to
alleviating poverty at the village level. By common definition,
it is the transfer of administrative and political power from the
upper echelon of the government to lower levels. Many
commentators have claimed that it is the strongest form of
decentralization with multidimensional and propoor objectives. As
usually assumed and professed, one of the objectives of
devolution is the alleviation of poverty on the basis of a
"participatory and emancipatory approach".

What is devolution in Indonesia? Policy statements on rural
development during the New Order government era devote
considerable attention to engaging the participation of the poor,
rural population.

The policy stipulated in the Broad Outlines of State Policies
states that the greatest attention must be given to furthering
rural development by increasing participation, preparedness and
self-reliance of village society. It has been proclaimed by the
Ministry of Home Affairs that villages, the smallest autonomous
territorial communities, are the "pillars of public participation
in all facets of government, development and society".

In addition, Law No. 5/1974 recognizes the right of villages
to manage their own internal affairs. A village is headed by an
official elected periodically, who is responsible to a district
head. The other village functionaries are nominated or appointed
directly by the village head. Administrative structures of the
village are determined by the Village Government Law of 1979,
stipulating the need for increasing public participation in
development and the effectiveness of village administration.

But the principle of wider representation of the public in
village administration has been treated with lip service. The
1979 village law actually formalizes the centralization of
authority in the hands of the village head and supravillage head
officials from the district and upper levels. The village
function is limited to the administration of centrally-planned
policies of the national government and upper-level regional
administrations.

To support the finances of the village, the government
authorizes it to use part of the locally collected tax on land
and buildings. On the other hand, over time, villages lose their
sources of income when their control and rights over many
resources cease.

Likewise, the administration deconcentration does not extent
to the political sphere. Political responsibilities are expressed
and shouldered by second-level local administrations (regencies
and mayoralties) as stipulated in Government Regulation No.
45/1992. Under this ruling, governmental matters other than
security and defense, judiciary, foreign affairs, currency,
monetary and other functions not affecting national interests are
within the scope of accountability of second-level local
administration.

Notably, the three Indonesian political parties, the dominant
Golkar, United Development Party and Indonesian Democratic Party,
are not rooted in villages and districts. As such, they do not
have strong representation and clout at local levels. People at
village and district levels are collectively a "floating mass"
and they are not directly involved in political activities.

The strongest rationale for this is the claim by the
government that people at these levels have no interest in
democratic processes and they have limited capacities to deal
with modern political and social changes. The rural populace's
immature understanding in political affairs and limited
organizational skills are suspected of being responsible for this
problem. It is assumed that their involvement in political
parties will do more "harm" than "good" for their own lives and
for the unity of the country. But this is an exquisite example of
political "window dressing" to cover up the vested interest of
the government.

The hidden agenda of separating rural people from the
political parties is to maintain the status quo of the present
government under Golkar. A greater bulk of the 200 million
population in Indonesian, most of whom live in rural areas,
constitute the biggest and strongest partisan groups for Golkar.

Unlike the two other political parties, Golkar has official
channels at the village and district levels through functionaries
at those levels. Such official functionaries have no choice other
than supporting the ruling party and influencing the whole
society to support Golkar in order to win the general election,
held once every five years.

Of course, there is a win-win condition offered by Golkar to
the village and district officials -- if Golkar stays as the
ruling faction, they will also stay in their positions or might
be promoted to more desirable positions.

Another striking fact is that most of the government-sponsored
development schemes for alleviating poverty at village levels are
not uncommonly named as Golkar's social development programs,
such as rural banking, presidential assistance, a presidential
instruction program for the least developed villages, family
planning, savings scheme, credit scheme and other forms of
poverty-alleviation programs. People at the village levels are
required to make a vow as partisans of Golkar in order to have
access to these development-assistance packages.

The rhetoric of participation is obviously shown by the
widening discrepancy between what should be and what is in the
delivery of the development programs. It is also explained by the
ingrained assumptions regarding the limited capacities of a
traditionally oriented rural populace to deal with modern social
change. And by the higher priority given to insuring perpetuation
of the central government hegemony in all aspects of the
political process. These centrally planned priorities and
paternalistic tendencies are reflected in central government
policies reinforcing the bureaucratic rigidity of village-level
administrations throughout Indonesia.

So, is devolution a successful strategy for helping the poor
in Indonesian villages out of their plight? No. Are the poverty
alleviation programs, which are masqueraded as "propoor", really
devolved down to the village levels? No. What is wrong with the
determinants of implementing devolution at the village level in
Indonesia?

Primarily, there is inadequacy of financial support for the
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of "supposedly"
devolved poverty-alleviation programs. Because of this, the
mobility of rural poverty workers in villages can hardly gain
impetus and are definitely not sustained. The financial
constraint in providing incentives and rewards explains the lack
of proper orientation and training for them. This breeds
"halfhearted" commitment and incompetence of field motivators and
poverty technicians in actual village propoor development works.

There is an obvious lack of community organization and
participation of the poor in decision-making and implementation
of programs and projects for alleviating their poverty. This is
partly explained by the highly elitist structure in the
inegalitarian local societies.

The present community structure is executive-centered.
Decisions emanate from the so-called "executives", and poor
people are only consulted, if ever informed, or not at all. The
personality and orientation of the leaders strongly influence the
process of decision-making. This constraint on structure affects
the various inputs to the system, which has also subsequent
influence on the benefits or outputs of programs and projects as
well as their impact in the long run. This strengthens the
people's dependency attitude, which kills their initiative for
participation and develops low self-esteem.

The incidence of "politicizing" of poverty-alleviation
programs is highly notable. This is in light of the culture of
graft and corruption by officials who define their involvement
with the handling of resources within the stream of aggrandizing
parochial interests. Out of the practice of political
manipulations, "small empires" are established on the turf of
local leaders in some villages that are controlled by political
dynasties.

In other words, there is a replication of the top-heavy and
rather "blurred" or "shady" social structure of the central
government at the village levels. This could be an aftermath of
the faulty selection of formal community leaders. What is crucial
in this scenario is that the people do not necessarily share the
thinking of village leaders, which render attempts of devolution
as exercises in futility.

Given these realities, how then should devolution be
implemented relevantly, responsively and proactively to the goal
of poverty alleviation, particularly at the village level?

The writer is a non-governmental organization activist now
pursuing postgraduate studies in development administration at
the Australian National University, Australia.

Window: The hidden agenda of separating rural people from the
political parties is to maintain the status quo of the present
government under Golkar.