Deterrence note effective in fighting terrorism

Awan Wibowo Laksono Poesoro, Jakarta

As Bali started picking up speed in the healing of its economy from the 2002 bombings that killed 202 people, another battery of bomb attacks were launched on the island. The recent attacks took 23 lives, and reminds us that terrorism is a grave problem in Indonesia.

Once renowned for the hospitality of its peoples, Indonesia has experienced an upswing in terrorism these past years. Records show that since the 1970s there have been about 100 terrorist incidents (including bombings and aircraft hijackings), 80 of which occurred during the reform era (post May 1998).

To cope with the problem, the government has implemented a deterrence policy. Does it work? Referring to the data above, it is safe to conclude that it does not. So, what needs to be done to address the matter?

For starters, cost-benefit analyses commonly practiced by economists might come in handy. Applying such analysis to explain terrorism, the number and magnitude of terrorist attacks could be predicted by equalizing the incremental, or marginal, costs of undertaking terrorism to the incremental benefits of executing it.

The incremental costs are the increasing costs of carrying out additional terrorist attacks, encompassing the costs of raising funds, collecting equipment (weapons and explosives), recruiting and training terrorist operatives, building networks (including preparing escape plans), and gathering intelligence (like choosing targets).

Further, the marginal costs of terrorism should also include the costs of operatives being killed or apprehended (leading to incarceration, torture, and interrogation that may compromise the terrorist network). Considering all the costs as constraints, it would be harder for any one terrorist group to execute additional terrorist strikes.

The incremental costs are highly influenced by impetuses propelling the operatives. The operatives could be spurred by external impetuses like redress given to their families (frequently promised to terrorists running lethal attacks like suicide bombings and skyjackings); future political positions and the concomitant economic concessions; and notoriety stemming from media attention.

There are also internal impetuses such as religions, clique mentalities, and political ideologies. In this case, they will undertake terrorist activities steadfastly regardless of any external impetuses being offered -- even if there is none. With a rise in impetuses, at the same level of marginal costs, more terrorist incidents will occur.

So far, the government's deterrence policy has intended to increase the marginal costs of terrorism so that the amount of terrorism can be reduced. The policy has been carried out by setting grim castigations (like long prison sentences and the death penalty) for the perpetrators, and creating conditions (like strict security measures) that make it difficult for terrorists to accomplish their missions.

Though prevention efforts such as heightening security measures in public places like offices, malls, and airports surely increase the marginal costs of terrorism, the efforts may drive terrorists to seek other targets and types of terror, making prevention more costly than planned.

Moreover, in Indonesia, the internal impetuses are more dominant than the external ones, so a deterrence policy that raises the risk and provides harsh chastisement to culprits does not have a significant impact in cutting back terrorism.

In fact, in the case of terrorism by fanatic religious groups, where internal impetuses are the only impetuses impelling their actions, deterrence could be futile as the impetuses overwhelm the marginal costs. This could explain suicide bombing cases in this country.

Hence, rewards offered for information leading to the terrorists' capture (like the US$10 million prize offered by the U.S. government for the capture of Dulmatin, the mastermind of the 2002 Bali bombings) would just make them more feel that their struggle is highly regarded by their opponents and worth fighting for, attracting acknowledgement from their peers and supporters and inducing more terrorism in the future.

Deterrence policies (like the enforcement of Law 11/1963 on Anti-Subversion during the Old and New Order days, and Law 15/2003 on Anti-Terrorism in the reform era), with its repressive character, have a tendency to centralize political and economic decisions, enfeebling democratic life, sapping local governments' authority, and limiting economic activities to certain areas.

Taking the shortcomings of deterrence into account, we should adopt another policy to complement it. What we need is some sort of policy that will lessen the marginal benefits of terrorism, which are the decreasing benefits of launching additional terrorist acts -- as the targeted society will adapt to terrorist acts, so the incremental effects of them tend to subside.

The more centralized political and economic systems, with a limited number of key actors, are easy prey for terrorism because when they can paralyze the actors, there will be not enough parties to substitute for them. So, though deterrence policy is supposed to reduce the marginal costs of terrorism, it will in turn make the country more susceptible to terrorism, increasing the marginal benefits of terrorism.

Ergo, the government should concentrate on policies that can reduce the marginal benefits of terrorism. What we need then are policies that really decentralize political and economic powers, which can be done by truly embracing democracy and improving the workings of market economy.

In more decentralized systems, when terrorism strikes, there will be many parties to substitute for the crippled actors and resume activities, decreasing terrorism's marginal benefits and thus making it less appealing, as it will have minimal effect on political and economic stability.

Decentralizing and deterrence policies should be invoked concurrently. Relying only on deterrence will not stop terrorism; it merely delays it for a while.

The writer is a researcher at the Indonesian Institute and a USC Trojan.