Deterrence note effective in fighting terrorism

Deterrence note effective in fighting terrorism

Awan Wibowo Laksono Poesoro, Jakarta

As Bali started picking up speed in the healing of its economy
from the 2002 bombings that killed 202 people, another battery of
bomb attacks were launched on the island. The recent attacks took
23 lives, and reminds us that terrorism is a grave problem in
Indonesia.

Once renowned for the hospitality of its peoples, Indonesia
has experienced an upswing in terrorism these past years. Records
show that since the 1970s there have been about 100 terrorist
incidents (including bombings and aircraft hijackings), 80 of
which occurred during the reform era (post May 1998).

To cope with the problem, the government has implemented a
deterrence policy. Does it work? Referring to the data above, it
is safe to conclude that it does not. So, what needs to be done
to address the matter?

For starters, cost-benefit analyses commonly practiced by
economists might come in handy. Applying such analysis to explain
terrorism, the number and magnitude of terrorist attacks could be
predicted by equalizing the incremental, or marginal, costs of
undertaking terrorism to the incremental benefits of executing
it.

The incremental costs are the increasing costs of carrying out
additional terrorist attacks, encompassing the costs of raising
funds, collecting equipment (weapons and explosives), recruiting
and training terrorist operatives, building networks (including
preparing escape plans), and gathering intelligence (like
choosing targets).

Further, the marginal costs of terrorism should also include
the costs of operatives being killed or apprehended (leading to
incarceration, torture, and interrogation that may compromise the
terrorist network). Considering all the costs as constraints, it
would be harder for any one terrorist group to execute additional
terrorist strikes.

The incremental costs are highly influenced by impetuses
propelling the operatives. The operatives could be spurred by
external impetuses like redress given to their families
(frequently promised to terrorists running lethal attacks like
suicide bombings and skyjackings); future political positions and
the concomitant economic concessions; and notoriety stemming from
media attention.

There are also internal impetuses such as religions, clique
mentalities, and political ideologies. In this case, they will
undertake terrorist activities steadfastly regardless of any
external impetuses being offered -- even if there is none. With a
rise in impetuses, at the same level of marginal costs, more
terrorist incidents will occur.

So far, the government's deterrence policy has intended to
increase the marginal costs of terrorism so that the amount of
terrorism can be reduced. The policy has been carried out by
setting grim castigations (like long prison sentences and the
death penalty) for the perpetrators, and creating conditions
(like strict security measures) that make it difficult for
terrorists to accomplish their missions.

Though prevention efforts such as heightening security
measures in public places like offices, malls, and airports
surely increase the marginal costs of terrorism, the efforts may
drive terrorists to seek other targets and types of terror,
making prevention more costly than planned.

Moreover, in Indonesia, the internal impetuses are more
dominant than the external ones, so a deterrence policy that
raises the risk and provides harsh chastisement to culprits does
not have a significant impact in cutting back terrorism.

In fact, in the case of terrorism by fanatic religious groups,
where internal impetuses are the only impetuses impelling their
actions, deterrence could be futile as the impetuses overwhelm
the marginal costs. This could explain suicide bombing cases in
this country.

Hence, rewards offered for information leading to the
terrorists' capture (like the US$10 million prize offered by the
U.S. government for the capture of Dulmatin, the mastermind of
the 2002 Bali bombings) would just make them more feel that their
struggle is highly regarded by their opponents and worth fighting
for, attracting acknowledgement from their peers and supporters
and inducing more terrorism in the future.

Deterrence policies (like the enforcement of Law 11/1963 on
Anti-Subversion during the Old and New Order days, and Law
15/2003 on Anti-Terrorism in the reform era), with its repressive
character, have a tendency to centralize political and economic
decisions, enfeebling democratic life, sapping local governments'
authority, and limiting economic activities to certain areas.

Taking the shortcomings of deterrence into account, we should
adopt another policy to complement it. What we need is some sort
of policy that will lessen the marginal benefits of terrorism,
which are the decreasing benefits of launching additional
terrorist acts -- as the targeted society will adapt to terrorist
acts, so the incremental effects of them tend to subside.

The more centralized political and economic systems, with a
limited number of key actors, are easy prey for terrorism because
when they can paralyze the actors, there will be not enough
parties to substitute for them. So, though deterrence policy is
supposed to reduce the marginal costs of terrorism, it will in
turn make the country more susceptible to terrorism, increasing
the marginal benefits of terrorism.

Ergo, the government should concentrate on policies that can
reduce the marginal benefits of terrorism. What we need then are
policies that really decentralize political and economic powers,
which can be done by truly embracing democracy and improving the
workings of market economy.

In more decentralized systems, when terrorism strikes,
there will be many parties to substitute for the crippled actors
and resume activities, decreasing terrorism's marginal benefits
and thus making it less appealing, as it will have minimal effect
on political and economic stability.

Decentralizing and deterrence policies should be invoked
concurrently. Relying only on deterrence will not stop terrorism;
it merely delays it for a while.

The writer is a researcher at the Indonesian Institute and a
USC Trojan.