Denying harsh realities only makes things worse

Denying harsh realities only makes things worse

By J. Sumardianta

YOGYAKARTA (JP): Indonesia's economic failure is the cost of
bad political decisions amid the neglect of modern democratic
rationalism. But the severity of the crisis leads shell-shocked
people to believe there must be another reason beyond plain
economics.

What is actually striking down this country is the absence of
political reforms. It is a pity, that most of us keep diverting
ourselves from the issue by declaring that the storm will be
over. We are suffering from a collective case of "denial
syndrome".

Only a few dare to admit this crisis is a part of
mismanagement of the political party system, general elections,
House of Representatives and the bureaucracy, which paralyzed all
political controls of anticipating economic catastrophe.

These unhealthy circumstances arose due to the oversimplified
view that takes the entire discourse and political practices of
the New Order as direct duplications of the Pancasila state
ideology and the 1945 Constitution. There is even a firmly held
belief that the New Order is infallible. Consequently, all ideas
to revitalize the political format have been misinterpreted as
efforts to change the hallowed state principles and Constitution.

Let us deal with the following themes concerning the impotent
function of political control in foreseeing the economic debacle:
the impact of the distorted implementation of the politics-
controlling policy, the unchanged substance of the New Order's
general elections, the arrogant and discriminative bureaucracy,
which always takes power as a point of departure, and the House
of Representatives (DPR) and the People's Consultative Assembly
(MPR) dilemma and its implications for the succession process.

There are several important notes on the implementation of the
politics-controlling policy. First, the policy itself does not
have a juridical basis. Law No. 3/1985 authorizes the government
to oversee the deviation of the state ideology, but parties'
internal conflicts have nonideological dimensions. They are
skillfully designed by the hands of power. The overthrow of
Megawati was an instance.

Second, the coverage of the policy is so obscure that it is
subject to the authority's interpretations and self-interest. It
serves not only as entrance for the government to control and
meddle in parties' affairs, but also as a state instrument to
lessen their political opponents. The imprisonment of MARI's and
PUDI's activists was the phenomenal instances.

Third, in practice, it is a discriminative policy. Golkar has
always been given special treatment in the New Order's hegemonic
party system. Golkar has defined itself as an innocent political
instrument when it is a machine for the general elections.

The fact that there are political parties and a group of
functionaries, which nevertheless take part in general elections,
indicate the segregative treatment toward PPP and PDI on one hand
and Golkar on the other. Backed by the bureaucracy and the Armed
Forces, Golkar has promoted its premise "don't change the winning
party" and, as a result, party competitiveness keeps declining.

Fourth, as the government's elements responsible for political
control are from the "green uniforms", they impose a security
approach for the enforcement of the policy. Political development
and enlightenment stumble because political affairs are handled
by imposing a coercive approach.

The distortion has several implications. Political parties
cannot stand independent and their struggle has descended into a
sort of effort to win as many seats in the legislature as
possible. Politicians disregard common sense and ethics and
become opportunistic, while democracy is filled with artificial
affairs rather than anything substantial.

On the basis of factual data from the 1997 general election,
we may argue in the negative on the performance of the New
Order's general elections. The format was systematically
contrived for Golkar's victory; the other parties lingered in the
confined cage of the hegemonic party system. This left them
helpless as showcase participants and they were kept away from
the process of political decision-making.

The committee structure was also dominated by the government's
elements. Moreover, the campaign procedure and vote counting were
obviously not intended for fair and democratic general elections.
The purpose was deflected into gaining a single majority.

Cases such as Kuningisasi -- painting public utilities in
yellow, Golkar's color -- in Central Java, vote recapitulation
before the day of the 1997 general election and vote rigging in
Sampang, Madura, indicate the symptoms of the simplistic point of
view. This primitive process of imposing wills aroused public
resistance. The people's demand for fair general elections
collided with the government's reluctance to correct it, which
eventually reached a climax in riots.

The nature of Golkar has never changed. It is a ruled party
rather than ruling one, as three real political powers control
it: Chief of the Directors Board, the bureaucracy and ABRI. That
is why its political mechanism is served to preserve their power.

The role of the bureaucratic apparatus has shifted from public
servants into absolute interpreters of the political truth. This
neglects the institutional controlling role. The New Order's
bureaucratic mechanism is based more on the distribution of
positions, fortunes and corruption opportunities than
qualifications and achievements. It has become an effective
instrument to strengthen support for the regime. Meanwhile,
sentence imposition is used to confine dissidents and opposing
activists.

We may also question the representativeness and
proportionality of the DPR and MPR. It's not clear who actually
represents the politically and economically helpless people such
as farmers, manual workers or fishermen, those who make up the
majority of the nation's people.

In addition, around 52 percent of DPR members are from Greater
Jakarta, despite the fact that one member is supposed to
represent 400,000 citizens throughout the country. Meanwhile,
only 40 percent of the MPR members are elected through general
elections; the remainder are appointed. Is it true that
sovereignty lies in the hands of the people if 60 percent of the
members are appointed?

The DPR is the so-called illusive and impossible democratic
institution. It is illusive because the members represent the
government more than the people, and impossible because it
conceals oligarchic interests.

The MPR, on the other hand, only gives a little contribution
for the enlightenment of the political life because this
institution lets itself be cooptated by the New Order's
patrimonialism. Domination of government delegates has eased the
meaning of the president's accountability to this institution. As
a result, the president may dictate and hold power over an
indefinite time.

In conclusion, political reforms are necessary. The following
are urgent reform agendas: alteration of the political format,
abolition of the "floating mass" policy, restructuring of the
party system and general election, formation of a clean
bureaucracy, a redefinition of the dual function of ABRI, and
optimization of the controlling function of the DPR-MPR and
limitation of presidential terms.

For the New Order, political reforms do not only serve as a
straight path to return to the Pancasila and 1945 Constitution,
but also as a way to its basic ideal in the order of reformation.
If the New Order is disinclined to reflect and make corrections,
it will be carried away into making more bad decisions in the
future. This will ultimately lead to the New Order going down in
history as a regime with the poorest power control.

The writer is a researcher at the Institute of Study on Human
Interests (ISHI), Yogyakarta.

Window: What is actually striking down this country is the absence
of political reforms. It is a pity, that most of us keep diverting
ourselves from the issue by declaring that the storm will be
over.