Denying harsh realities only makes things worse

By J. Sumardianta

YOGYAKARTA (JP): Indonesia's economic failure is the cost of bad political decisions amid the neglect of modern democratic rationalism. But the severity of the crisis leads shell-shocked people to believe there must be another reason beyond plain economics.

What is actually striking down this country is the absence of political reforms. It is a pity, that most of us keep diverting ourselves from the issue by declaring that the storm will be over. We are suffering from a collective case of "denial syndrome".

Only a few dare to admit this crisis is a part of mismanagement of the political party system, general elections, House of Representatives and the bureaucracy, which paralyzed all political controls of anticipating economic catastrophe.

These unhealthy circumstances arose due to the oversimplified view that takes the entire discourse and political practices of the New Order as direct duplications of the Pancasila state ideology and the 1945 Constitution. There is even a firmly held belief that the New Order is infallible. Consequently, all ideas to revitalize the political format have been misinterpreted as efforts to change the hallowed state principles and Constitution.

Let us deal with the following themes concerning the impotent function of political control in foreseeing the economic debacle: the impact of the distorted implementation of the politics- controlling policy, the unchanged substance of the New Order's general elections, the arrogant and discriminative bureaucracy, which always takes power as a point of departure, and the House of Representatives (DPR) and the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) dilemma and its implications for the succession process.

There are several important notes on the implementation of the politics-controlling policy. First, the policy itself does not have a juridical basis. Law No. 3/1985 authorizes the government to oversee the deviation of the state ideology, but parties' internal conflicts have nonideological dimensions. They are skillfully designed by the hands of power. The overthrow of Megawati was an instance.

Second, the coverage of the policy is so obscure that it is subject to the authority's interpretations and self-interest. It serves not only as entrance for the government to control and meddle in parties' affairs, but also as a state instrument to lessen their political opponents. The imprisonment of MARI's and PUDI's activists was the phenomenal instances.

Third, in practice, it is a discriminative policy. Golkar has always been given special treatment in the New Order's hegemonic party system. Golkar has defined itself as an innocent political instrument when it is a machine for the general elections.

The fact that there are political parties and a group of functionaries, which nevertheless take part in general elections, indicate the segregative treatment toward PPP and PDI on one hand and Golkar on the other. Backed by the bureaucracy and the Armed Forces, Golkar has promoted its premise "don't change the winning party" and, as a result, party competitiveness keeps declining.

Fourth, as the government's elements responsible for political control are from the "green uniforms", they impose a security approach for the enforcement of the policy. Political development and enlightenment stumble because political affairs are handled by imposing a coercive approach.

The distortion has several implications. Political parties cannot stand independent and their struggle has descended into a sort of effort to win as many seats in the legislature as possible. Politicians disregard common sense and ethics and become opportunistic, while democracy is filled with artificial affairs rather than anything substantial.

On the basis of factual data from the 1997 general election, we may argue in the negative on the performance of the New Order's general elections. The format was systematically contrived for Golkar's victory; the other parties lingered in the confined cage of the hegemonic party system. This left them helpless as showcase participants and they were kept away from the process of political decision-making.

The committee structure was also dominated by the government's elements. Moreover, the campaign procedure and vote counting were obviously not intended for fair and democratic general elections. The purpose was deflected into gaining a single majority.

Cases such as Kuningisasi -- painting public utilities in yellow, Golkar's color -- in Central Java, vote recapitulation before the day of the 1997 general election and vote rigging in Sampang, Madura, indicate the symptoms of the simplistic point of view. This primitive process of imposing wills aroused public resistance. The people's demand for fair general elections collided with the government's reluctance to correct it, which eventually reached a climax in riots.

The nature of Golkar has never changed. It is a ruled party rather than ruling one, as three real political powers control it: Chief of the Directors Board, the bureaucracy and ABRI. That is why its political mechanism is served to preserve their power.

The role of the bureaucratic apparatus has shifted from public servants into absolute interpreters of the political truth. This neglects the institutional controlling role. The New Order's bureaucratic mechanism is based more on the distribution of positions, fortunes and corruption opportunities than qualifications and achievements. It has become an effective instrument to strengthen support for the regime. Meanwhile, sentence imposition is used to confine dissidents and opposing activists.

We may also question the representativeness and proportionality of the DPR and MPR. It's not clear who actually represents the politically and economically helpless people such as farmers, manual workers or fishermen, those who make up the majority of the nation's people.

In addition, around 52 percent of DPR members are from Greater Jakarta, despite the fact that one member is supposed to represent 400,000 citizens throughout the country. Meanwhile, only 40 percent of the MPR members are elected through general elections; the remainder are appointed. Is it true that sovereignty lies in the hands of the people if 60 percent of the members are appointed?

The DPR is the so-called illusive and impossible democratic institution. It is illusive because the members represent the government more than the people, and impossible because it conceals oligarchic interests.

The MPR, on the other hand, only gives a little contribution for the enlightenment of the political life because this institution lets itself be cooptated by the New Order's patrimonialism. Domination of government delegates has eased the meaning of the president's accountability to this institution. As a result, the president may dictate and hold power over an indefinite time.

In conclusion, political reforms are necessary. The following are urgent reform agendas: alteration of the political format, abolition of the "floating mass" policy, restructuring of the party system and general election, formation of a clean bureaucracy, a redefinition of the dual function of ABRI, and optimization of the controlling function of the DPR-MPR and limitation of presidential terms.

For the New Order, political reforms do not only serve as a straight path to return to the Pancasila and 1945 Constitution, but also as a way to its basic ideal in the order of reformation. If the New Order is disinclined to reflect and make corrections, it will be carried away into making more bad decisions in the future. This will ultimately lead to the New Order going down in history as a regime with the poorest power control.

The writer is a researcher at the Institute of Study on Human Interests (ISHI), Yogyakarta.

Window: What is actually striking down this country is the absence of political reforms. It is a pity, that most of us keep diverting ourselves from the issue by declaring that the storm will be over.