Deng Xiaoping: The emperor dies, long live the emperor?

In the first of a series of analyses on China's future without Deng Xiaoping our Asia correspondent Harvey Stockwin examines the fact that the Chinese tradition of a single authoritarian Emperor still persists.

HONGKONG (JP): The death of China's paramount leader Deng Xiaoping at the age of 92 finally brings to an end an era in Chinese politics in which Deng first allied himself with Mao Zedong to put politics in command, and then fought for, and succeeded finally, when in power on his own, in putting far greater focus on China's economic reform and development.

Deng's passing almost, but not quite, marks the close of a chapter in the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) when it has been dominated by an old generation whose views and outlook were formed by the Long March during civil war against the Chinese Nationalists, and the war against Japan.

Immediately, the death of Deng Xiaoping comes as an anti- climax which still appears to be a major event primarily because 86 years after China formally abolished the Emperor system, it still has not rid itself of Emperors.

This unchanging reality, illustrated by the worldwide use of the term "paramount leader" in Deng's obituaries, in turn emphasizes that while Deng changed China for the better more than any other Chinese leader in the 20th century, thereby also changing China's potential position in the world, he failed to reform the perennial pattern of Chinese politics, thereby jeopardizing his own achievements.

The anti-climax results from the fact that Deng's death, unlike the death of the previous Emperor Mao Zedong, comes long after Deng's active political life had drawn to a close. But while Deng was decreasingly active, the paramount leader could never retire.

Deng's slow decline has almost certainly been proceeding for much longer than generally realized. Deng's questionable health was a factor in the tumultuous events within China from April to June 1989, culminating in the Beijing Massacre. A year after that, he had withdrawn from all official positions.

In 1992 he briefly appeared to make a come-back in order to criticize the lack of reformist drive and zeal by those who he had helped place in charge of the Chinese government. Deng has not been seen in public since the Chinese New Year celebrations in 1994 when he visited Shanghai, looking aged and feeble.

The fact that Deng's powers were diminishing was pointedly illustrated when he attended a meeting in July or August 1989 in order to thank Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) officers for suppressing the "counter-revolutionary rebellion" in Tiananmen Square. A fundamental aspect of Deng's power had been his following and contacts within the PLA, yet at this meeting he could be seen being told by a relative who the top officers were that he was meeting.

Yet it has been widely assumed that Deng remained the most powerful man in China long after his powers diminished. The fact that he appeared so rarely in public in the 1990s leant credibility to the belief that he was still in charge. The extent to which he was in charge and the extent to which others acted in his name will probably never be known with any degree of accuracy.

Yet his colleagues and relatives were able to act in his name, and some of Deng's power remained intact, precisely because the communist revolution had not ended the traditional Chinese mind- set which regarded political power as something which accrued and belonged, for life, to an authoritarian leader not to his title.

Neither the term "Emperor" nor "paramount leader" nor "patriarch" appear in the Chinese constitution but nevertheless that is the position which Deng held.

In other words, Deng Xiaoping was still an influential figure even when he was only the vice-president of the Bridge Association of China because he was Deng Xiaoping. Political power was no longer hereditary as in the old days when the Emperor was on the throne. But once Deng had established his supremacy in the late 1970s, after his third and last comeback from attempts by rival CCP leaders to send him into political oblivion, he possessed political power for life, just like the Emperors of old.

It is to Deng's immense credit that in the early 1980s he saw this state of affairs as something in need of necessary reform, and argued strongly for power belonging to positions for fixed terms, and for cadres retiring completely, and not hanging on until they died. Deng had seen how "hanging on" had warped Mao's judgment and sought to end the practice.

But for Deng, though maybe not necessarily for his successors, the practice hung on too. What ought to be happening today is that the expected death has taken place of a great man who has long since retired, and is being remembered accordingly.

Instead what is happening today is that a major political event is also taking place with the death of a great man, whose influence remained long after he had lost the ability to fully exert it. Even though Deng the reformer did not want it this way, since another Chinese Emperor has died, much attention will now be focussed on who strives and maneuvers to try and fill the Emperor's shoes.

The fact that the Emperor system has survived, so far, in substance if not in form, within communist China is of crucial political importance in the days, weeks and months that lie immediately ahead.

If, because Mao's and Deng's respective powers, prestige, and personalities simply cannot be reduplicated in the next generation, it may happen that power within China will increasingly devolve on the office rather than the man. In these circumstances, a relatively orderly succession will be in prospect, provided that factionalism does not get out of control in the run-up to the Fifteenth Party Congress to be held later this year.

But if the tradition of seeking the "paramount leader" still persists, and several personalities now vie for supreme power, then a more tumultuous time is likely. A contest to fill the Emperor's shoes would, in itself, exacerbate the CCP's perennial factional tendencies.

In such circumstances, far from fading away, Deng Xiaoping might well still exert considerable additional influence on the Chinese political scene. Those seeking to become the new paramount leader might either extol Deng's reformist policies and performance on their path to power -- or they might seek to denigrate Deng in an effort to establish a new order.

Whichever turn events took, in any such power contest it would, in essence, be the old order which was being further extended.

Window: Tha fact that the Emperor system has survived, so far, in substance if not in form, within communist China is of crucial political importance in the days, weeks and months that lie immediately ahead.