Demography speaks of conflict
By Sri Pamoedjo Rahardjo
JAKARTA (JP): The social tensions which ushered in the end of the New Order has reached the crossroads of either retaining Pancasila democracy or adopting a Western-style democracy, and the common people are caught in the cross fire of the current friction. Finding faults and public protests are now daily events. The economy remains stagnant. Plus, the current friction is fraught with political overtones. However, such conflicts can be avoided if both sides understand the demography of conflict.
Conflict in a family or in a society is a daily event. The current conflicts in Indonesia, however, are often analyzed using economic and political variables. Another way of viewing the current societal conflict in Indonesia is as intergenerational friction. The entire Indonesian population can be observed as a human development cycle, that is, from birth to infancy, childhood, adolescence, adulthood, aging and eventually death. Growth itself is accompanied by changes in attitude, perception and behavior. Having reached a population of 200 million in 1997, the momentum of change and intergenerational differences are affecting a large number of people. It is imperative that we understand the dynamics operating between these population groups.
The present population structure of Indonesia is a result of the demographic behaviors of previous generations. The layered mosaic of Indonesia's population suggests differences in the needs and demands of each generation. Failure to recognize these differences may result in an oversimplification of the current conflict as merely politically and economically motivated. An analysis of the upcoming and future population mosaic can help anticipate and identify differences in intergenerational values that in turn dictate the needs and demands of each group. Ignoring these differences will create unresolved conflicts that may not be easily detected, but can be manipulated and taken advantage of by special interest groups.
In the past, the New Order government has proudly claimed the successes of population and family planning programs. The indicator of the programs successes was the reported decline of the population growth and the total fertility rate. Population growth is the difference between the birthrate and death rate, while the total fertility rate is the average number of children per woman of reproductive age. If the average number of children was 3.3 in 1990, this meant that a woman of reproductive age had an average of 3.3 children who were born in 1990 or earlier.
The below table shows the population structure of Indonesia by total fertility rates from 1920 to 1998, together with other descriptive variables. Before independence, the country experienced high birth rates and high death rates. The main causes in the decline in the average number of children were poor economic conditions, frequent epidemics and generally poor environmental health. Many demographers believe that in the 1940s, birth rates were even lower than death rates.
As the social and political situation improved, the demographic indicators tended to increase. The arrival of the baby boomers compelled the government to introduce family planning programs in the late 1960s. Only then did demographic indicators begin to decline. With the current shift in the programs focus, e.g., from family planning to family welfare, attention to management of the size of families seems to have been affected. Combined with the increasing cost of contraceptives, the specter of a rapid increase in the number of births is again not far off.
Population humps exert pressures on available resources and continuously create another cycle of peaks in the population structure. All other factors constant, these peaks will disappear from the population structure only after all generations affected by the humps have gone through their life cycle. When the structure is carefully observed, the population humps in the past have created overlapping masses in the population mosaic.
This overlap suggest conflicting priorities in meeting demands, which must be done in order to minimize friction within society. Unless we become aware of these different priorities, an appropriate public response cannot be designed effectively and in a timely manner. Similarly, unless the political leaders understand the differing views, needs and demands of intergenerational groups, they will not be able to talk about acceptable solutions which are in line with public feelings. What do the figures suggest?
First, the structure of generations suggests attitudinal changes. The cycle of human behavior starts from infancy. With parental nurturing, the infant's personality is formed. As the infant grows to childhood, the child begins to associate and relate with people outside the family.
As the child grows to adolescence, the young person becomes sensitive to the needs of the family, relatives, peers and others in his or her social circle. Generally, as the person grows into adulthood, socialization with other subcultures will accumulate into wisdom and biases in his or her personality. As the person ages, the personality development could regress to lower self- esteem, loss of power and declining income, even though the person is perhaps richer in wisdom.
Secondly, physiological changes with their accompanying psychological changes could create intergenerational friction in society. Generational subgroups obviously differ in their way of thinking and acting in a way that is almost akin to parent-youth conflicts. Unless these differences are well understood, the intergenerational conflicts can be manipulated as political issues by some groups.
In other words, the natural phenomenon of parent-youth conflict can become mass hysteria if leaders do not have the wisdom to manage this apparently predictable cycle of conflict. Mass hysteria can become out of control if the leadership is not equipped with an understanding of the human development cycle.
What lessons can be derived from the human growth cycle? The figures above reveal overlapping generations with contrasting functions, needs and demands in society. The generation born before the 1990s overlaps with the generation born before the 1940s, the generation born before the 1980s overlaps with the generation born before the 1950s, etc.
Members of the 1920 and 1930 generations have a longer lifespan due to improved economic status and health technologies. Their existence in society generally demands geriatric services and facilities. A critical mass of the aged in our society comprise the current elite who survived the depression in the 1930s and World War II.
Their backgrounds taught them to be tough in meeting challenges and prudent in their spending. They have also developed strong family bonds. As youths, they helped to lay down the foundations of the nation. In return, they expect the ensuing generations to emulate them, to be tough, loyal, prudent and to maintain their extended kinships. Rejection of the older views is seen as the rejection and refusal of the younger generation to preserve moral values.
The adult members of society (the 1940 and 1950 generations) reveal a different demand function. Their childhood was marked by an extensive period of poverty and difficulty. This exposure bred a more acquisitive but relatively prudent generation. Almost similar to the previous generation, they are frugal and hardworking.
The elite of this generation, however, have varied views on the increased social mobility which opens opportunities to all people of various family and ethnic backgrounds. The hard lives of their youths make them long for stability in society. Consequently, they now demand a strong government to maintain stability. As they are preparing to enter old age, security is a priority. The majority of them wish to maintain the status quo and preserve the prosperity enjoyed in the last decade.
The young adult members of society (the 1960 and 1970 generations) grew up in better living conditions, as the country experienced an economic boom in the 1980s and early 1990s. This has caused this generation to become less sensitive to the environment at large.
Speaking generally, they think of themselves as the center of achievement. They are less open to extended kinship. They are ambitious and focused on their own career development. They are also not willing to lose what they possess. They want to maintain the comforts they enjoyed when they were growing up. Success in their careers and increasing incomes have caused this generation to become more cosmopolitan.
The elite of this generation have developed their own subculture of yuppies and big spenders. The current prolonged crisis could develop a bitterness toward this subculture. Demographically, their number is large and they are capable of forming a critical mass that would have to be reckoned with. Failure to recognize their needs can imperil future leaders.
The young members of society (the 1980 generation) were nurtured during the peak of economic prosperity. The exposure of their parents to a highly competitive job market compels a demand for better schools, higher education, global exposure and better job opportunities within and outside the country.
As youths, they are full of idealism, highly active and motivated, but easily influenced by their peers. Prolonged exposure to the current difficulties can steer them back to ultraconservatism when they become adults. In contrast, the youngest members of society (the 1990 generation) are still limited to demands for health and nutrition, as well as basic education and recreation.
However, the current decline in their parents' income, crude public debates, untoward public behavior and shortages in basic commodities expose them to bad adult role model examples in public and private life, and could make them less respectful toward authority figures. The current difficulties can also cause them to be more prudent and conservative. In extreme cases, members of this generation have been forced into the streets in order to survive.
In conclusion, the current conflict can be seen as the phenomenon of the human personality development cycle. What should be understood by all concerned generations, is that intergenerational conflict can happen because a variety of historical, social, economic and political backgrounds form behavioral differences.
Conflict can be minimized if these generations are aware that the young will become old, and the old were once young. If they understand the cycle, friction can be prevented from turning into a full-blown conflict that could result in the breaking of family ties and national unity. Are we all willing to pay such a high price in the name of change?
The writer is a social and economic observer and a former regional development bank officer.