Demography speaks of conflict

Demography speaks of conflict

By Sri Pamoedjo Rahardjo

JAKARTA (JP): The social tensions which ushered in the end of
the New Order has reached the crossroads of either retaining
Pancasila democracy or adopting a Western-style democracy, and
the common people are caught in the cross fire of the current
friction. Finding faults and public protests are now daily
events. The economy remains stagnant. Plus, the current friction
is fraught with political overtones. However, such conflicts can
be avoided if both sides understand the demography of conflict.

Conflict in a family or in a society is a daily event. The
current conflicts in Indonesia, however, are often analyzed using
economic and political variables. Another way of viewing the
current societal conflict in Indonesia is as intergenerational
friction. The entire Indonesian population can be observed as a
human development cycle, that is, from birth to infancy,
childhood, adolescence, adulthood, aging and eventually death.
Growth itself is accompanied by changes in attitude, perception
and behavior. Having reached a population of 200 million in 1997,
the momentum of change and intergenerational differences are
affecting a large number of people. It is imperative that we
understand the dynamics operating between these population
groups.

The present population structure of Indonesia is a result of
the demographic behaviors of previous generations. The layered
mosaic of Indonesia's population suggests differences in the
needs and demands of each generation. Failure to recognize these
differences may result in an oversimplification of the current
conflict as merely politically and economically motivated. An
analysis of the upcoming and future population mosaic can help
anticipate and identify differences in intergenerational values
that in turn dictate the needs and demands of each group.
Ignoring these differences will create unresolved conflicts that
may not be easily detected, but can be manipulated and taken
advantage of by special interest groups.

In the past, the New Order government has proudly claimed the
successes of population and family planning programs. The
indicator of the programs successes was the reported decline of
the population growth and the total fertility rate. Population
growth is the difference between the birthrate and death rate,
while the total fertility rate is the average number of children
per woman of reproductive age. If the average number of children
was 3.3 in 1990, this meant that a woman of reproductive age had
an average of 3.3 children who were born in 1990 or earlier.

The below table shows the population structure of Indonesia by
total fertility rates from 1920 to 1998, together with other
descriptive variables. Before independence, the country
experienced high birth rates and high death rates. The main
causes in the decline in the average number of children were poor
economic conditions, frequent epidemics and generally poor
environmental health. Many demographers believe that in the
1940s, birth rates were even lower than death rates.

As the social and political situation improved, the
demographic indicators tended to increase. The arrival of the
baby boomers compelled the government to introduce family
planning programs in the late 1960s. Only then did demographic
indicators begin to decline. With the current shift in the
programs focus, e.g., from family planning to family welfare,
attention to management of the size of families seems to have
been affected. Combined with the increasing cost of
contraceptives, the specter of a rapid increase in the number of
births is again not far off.

Population humps exert pressures on available resources and
continuously create another cycle of peaks in the population
structure. All other factors constant, these peaks will disappear
from the population structure only after all generations affected
by the humps have gone through their life cycle. When the
structure is carefully observed, the population humps in the past
have created overlapping masses in the population mosaic.

This overlap suggest conflicting priorities in meeting
demands, which must be done in order to minimize friction within
society. Unless we become aware of these different priorities, an
appropriate public response cannot be designed effectively and in
a timely manner. Similarly, unless the political leaders
understand the differing views, needs and demands of
intergenerational groups, they will not be able to talk about
acceptable solutions which are in line with public feelings. What
do the figures suggest?

First, the structure of generations suggests attitudinal
changes. The cycle of human behavior starts from infancy. With
parental nurturing, the infant's personality is formed. As the
infant grows to childhood, the child begins to associate and
relate with people outside the family.

As the child grows to adolescence, the young person becomes
sensitive to the needs of the family, relatives, peers and others
in his or her social circle. Generally, as the person grows into
adulthood, socialization with other subcultures will accumulate
into wisdom and biases in his or her personality. As the person
ages, the personality development could regress to lower self-
esteem, loss of power and declining income, even though the
person is perhaps richer in wisdom.

Secondly, physiological changes with their accompanying
psychological changes could create intergenerational friction in
society. Generational subgroups obviously differ in their way of
thinking and acting in a way that is almost akin to parent-youth
conflicts. Unless these differences are well understood, the
intergenerational conflicts can be manipulated as political
issues by some groups.

In other words, the natural phenomenon of parent-youth
conflict can become mass hysteria if leaders do not have the
wisdom to manage this apparently predictable cycle of conflict.
Mass hysteria can become out of control if the leadership is not
equipped with an understanding of the human development cycle.

What lessons can be derived from the human growth cycle? The
figures above reveal overlapping generations with contrasting
functions, needs and demands in society. The generation born
before the 1990s overlaps with the generation born before the
1940s, the generation born before the 1980s overlaps with the
generation born before the 1950s, etc.

Members of the 1920 and 1930 generations have a longer
lifespan due to improved economic status and health technologies.
Their existence in society generally demands geriatric services
and facilities. A critical mass of the aged in our society
comprise the current elite who survived the depression in the
1930s and World War II.

Their backgrounds taught them to be tough in meeting
challenges and prudent in their spending. They have also
developed strong family bonds. As youths, they helped to lay down
the foundations of the nation. In return, they expect the ensuing
generations to emulate them, to be tough, loyal, prudent and to
maintain their extended kinships. Rejection of the older views is
seen as the rejection and refusal of the younger generation to
preserve moral values.

The adult members of society (the 1940 and 1950 generations)
reveal a different demand function. Their childhood was marked by
an extensive period of poverty and difficulty. This exposure bred
a more acquisitive but relatively prudent generation. Almost
similar to the previous generation, they are frugal and
hardworking.

The elite of this generation, however, have varied views on
the increased social mobility which opens opportunities to all
people of various family and ethnic backgrounds. The hard lives
of their youths make them long for stability in society.
Consequently, they now demand a strong government to maintain
stability. As they are preparing to enter old age, security is a
priority. The majority of them wish to maintain the status quo
and preserve the prosperity enjoyed in the last decade.

The young adult members of society (the 1960 and 1970
generations) grew up in better living conditions, as the country
experienced an economic boom in the 1980s and early 1990s. This
has caused this generation to become less sensitive to the
environment at large.

Speaking generally, they think of themselves as the center of
achievement. They are less open to extended kinship. They are
ambitious and focused on their own career development. They are
also not willing to lose what they possess. They want to maintain
the comforts they enjoyed when they were growing up. Success in
their careers and increasing incomes have caused this generation
to become more cosmopolitan.

The elite of this generation have developed their own
subculture of yuppies and big spenders. The current prolonged
crisis could develop a bitterness toward this subculture.
Demographically, their number is large and they are capable of
forming a critical mass that would have to be reckoned with.
Failure to recognize their needs can imperil future leaders.

The young members of society (the 1980 generation) were
nurtured during the peak of economic prosperity. The exposure of
their parents to a highly competitive job market compels a demand
for better schools, higher education, global exposure and better
job opportunities within and outside the country.

As youths, they are full of idealism, highly active and
motivated, but easily influenced by their peers. Prolonged
exposure to the current difficulties can steer them back to
ultraconservatism when they become adults. In contrast, the
youngest members of society (the 1990 generation) are still
limited to demands for health and nutrition, as well as basic
education and recreation.

However, the current decline in their parents' income, crude
public debates, untoward public behavior and shortages in basic
commodities expose them to bad adult role model examples in
public and private life, and could make them less respectful
toward authority figures. The current difficulties can also cause
them to be more prudent and conservative. In extreme cases,
members of this generation have been forced into the streets in
order to survive.

In conclusion, the current conflict can be seen as the
phenomenon of the human personality development cycle. What
should be understood by all concerned generations, is that
intergenerational conflict can happen because a variety of
historical, social, economic and political backgrounds form
behavioral differences.

Conflict can be minimized if these generations are aware that
the young will become old, and the old were once young. If they
understand the cycle, friction can be prevented from turning
into a full-blown conflict that could result in the breaking of
family ties and national unity. Are we all willing to pay such a
high price in the name of change?

The writer is a social and economic observer and a former
regional development bank officer.