Democracy, the military, corruption: The case of the Philippines

Ronald Meinardus, Manila

Ideally, in a democracy the military is subordinate to the political leadership which enjoys a popular mandate through universal elections. In reality, civil-military relations often have a different quality. When I was a political science student the theory of the 'military-industrial complex' was en vogue.

Those were the days of the Vietnam war and it was fashionable not only in leftist circles to identify an almost collusive closeness between U.S. policy makers and the weapons' manufacturers and their lobbies. It is no coincidence that similar theories have once more become popular as the sole superpower has waged new costly wars in different parts of the world.

In the Third World, civil-military relations tend to have a different quality than in the established democracies of the West. In several countries of the Southern hemisphere, the armed forces evolved from guerrilla groups who fought wars of independence and national liberation. In the eyes of the victorious freedom fighters, this legacy entitles them to a privileged role in the political system and society.

The politicization of the military usually poses serious challenges to democratic governance, as this is always based on the primacy of a democratically elected leadership. In this set- up, the soldiers are confined to the barracks, their sole duty being the defense of the country against external aggressors.

In the Philippines, the reality is rather different. With no plausible military threat looming beyond the borders, the armed forces are more or less exclusively absorbed with counter- insurgency operations, fighting a decades-old communist rebellion and also Muslim separatist groups in Mindanao. The strategic focus, thus, is inward-looking and the perception of the enemy local.

While on the surface Philippine democracy may seem stable, civilian rule has been challenged by several military coup attempts after democratic restoration in 1986. The unrest in the ranks is persistent and so is, therefore, the threat of new coups.

Only a few days ago, the leadership of the armed forces revived an internal military spy unit ordering it to go after coup plotters and 'scallywags in uniform' out to topple the government of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

Throughout her presidency, GMA, as she is commonly known in this country, has courted the military who she is indebted to politically. The former vice president rose to power on the back of the armed forces' support who, in a moment of great political uncertainty in early 2001, threw their weight behind Arroyo and joined a popular uprising against President Josef Estrada. Ever since, she has co-opted powerful military leaders into high government positions in what observers see as an effort to protect her administration against coup threats and destabilization efforts.

Partially, this strategy of co-option has been successful. Unlike President Corazon Aquino, who in her six year term endured no less than seven coup attempts, the military so far has only challenged Arroyo once, when in July 2003 a group of soldiers and officers seized an apartment complex in Manila's financial district. After a one-day-stand-off, the coup attempt ended without a shot being fired.

The mutineers accused the government and their superiors of graft and corruption. While the political class rejected the methodology of the mutineers, many showed sympathy for the issues raised by them.

Graft and corruption in the military once more hit the headlines after Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia was accused of accumulating unexplained wealth during his three years stint as financial comptroller of the armed forces. Interestingly, the scandal which broke in August 2004, came to light not as a result of the attentiveness of the Philippine prosecutors but followed an apparently deliberate leak from the U.S. government to local media.

According to political observers, the Garcia case may well pose the biggest test for the Arroyo administration. On the one hand, the President has proclaimed she will fight graft and corruption with all available means, at the same time, though, her vigor to dig deep may be curtailed by concerns of a possible violent military backlash if the investigations become to disturbing for powerful vested interests.

While the details regarding the Garcia case published in the attentive Philippine media are both scandalous and spectacular, many Filipinos believe this is only the tip of the iceberg.

Apart from the economic and also moral dimensions, corruption in the armed forces also has grave military implications.

The allegations of collusion between elements of the military with the enemy are not new. In a recent conference in Manila, Brig. Gen. (ret) Jose Almonte who served as national security adviser to President Fidel Ramos from 1992 to 1998 and is a respected military analyst also beyond the Philippines, spoke of "corruption in logistics units which in effect arms the Abu Sayyaf bandits and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) separatists from the AFP's own armories."

In response to calls for drastic changes in the armed forces, the government is implementing a far reaching "Philippine Defense Reform." A civilian secretary of defense has taken charge and recruited undersecretaries from the business sector to assist in reforming the graft ridden procurement system, the accounting and also auditing systems in the military. Some say change to the better is already visible. At the same time, others say that a truly reformed military may even pose a greater threat to Philippine democracy than the present corrupt institution.

This veiled threat to civilian rule is symptomatic for widespread disenchantment with the political class in the Philippines. It also reflects a way of thinking that has lost respect for a basic rule of democratic governance -- the supremacy of a popularly elected political leadership.

The writer is the Resident Representative of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation in the Philippines and a commentator on Asian affairs. He can be reached at liberal@fnf.org.ph