Democracy in Latin America

By Mochtar Buchori

JAKARTA (JP): It has been said that democracy is not an all-or-none thing. Between a truly democratic society and an entirely autocratic country, there are various nuances of democracy. Perhaps this is the reason why the word "democracy", like "human rights", has been so much abused.

In Latin America, twenty-two countries ranging from a tiny island-state (Trinidad and Tobago, population 1.27 million) to a big continental nation (Brazil, population 162.66 million) have considered themselves "democratic".

But their practices in implementing democracy vary widely from "truly democratic" states (Costa Rica, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Chile) at one end to "entirely autocratic" or "authoritarian" states at the other (Cuba and Nicaragua).

Larry Diamond, a senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, made an intensive study about democratic practices among governments in Latin America.

Using data compiled by the Freedom House in 1987, 1988 and 1995, he identified eight categories of democracy in Latin America.

Three of these categories are above what he calls "the threshold of democracy", while the other five are below it.

The three categories above this threshold are termed "liberal democracy", "democracy", and "partially illiberal democracy". The five categories below the threshold are "near democracy", "semidemocracy", "semicompetitive authoritarian", "authoritarian", and "state hegemonic closed".

Diamond's categorization system is based on the amount of political rights and civil liberties enjoyed by citizens within each regime. The greater the amount of political rights and civil liberties a regime allows its citizens to enjoy, the higher that society is placed on the ladder of democracy referred to above.

Diamond defines "political rights" as comprising two features, that is "the right of all adults to vote and compete for public office through free and fair elections and alternative political parties"; and "the ability of elected representatives to have a decisive vote and voice".

"Civil liberties" are defined in this study as including three distinct characteristics: first, "freedoms of conscience, religion, expression, information, assembly and organizations"; second, "freedoms from torture and terror"; and third, "due process and equality under the law".

Based upon this concept of democratic freedom, Diamond stipulates three essential requirements that have to be met by any government to pass as a "democratic regime". First, there must be competition among individuals and groups for all effective positions of government at regular intervals (excluding the use of force). Second, there must be political participation in the election of leaders and policies, such that no major adult social group is excluded. And third, there must be civil and political liberties such as freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and freedom to form and join organizations.

No detailed explanation was given concerning the meaning of each of the eight categories mentioned above. A clue concerning the degree of democracy that can be found in each of these categories is provided in the explanation of what semidemocracy means. It is a regime in which "the effective power of elected officials is ... limited", and "political party competition is ... restricted".

Moreover "the freedom and fairness of elections is so compromised, that electoral outcomes, while competitive, still deviate significantly from popular preferences".

And finally, it is a regime where "civil and political liberties are so limited that some political orientations and interests are unable to organize and to express themselves".

In 1994, three Latin American states fell into this category: Colombia, Dominican Republic, and Paraguay.

Another interesting finding of Diamond's study is that the position of most Latin American countries in this spectrum of democracy is not fixed, but move from one category to another.

Depending upon the practices of governance that are actually implemented at two different points in time, a regime can either move up or move down in this democratic scale.

Costa Rica and Trinidad - Tobago, for instance, were rated as "liberal democracies" in 1987. But in 1994, they were scaled one step down to "democracies".

Chile, on the other hand, was rated in 1987 as a country with an "authoritarian" regime, but in 1994 it was "promoted" five scales upward and rated as a "democratic" country. A truly unbelievable achievement.

It should be noted in this instance, that in 1987 Chile was governed by a military junta headed by President Augusto Pinochet Ugarte who seized power in Sept. 11, 1973. In a plebiscite held on Oct. 5, 1988, Pinochet was rejected as a presidential candidate. The following presidential election conducted in December 1989 resulted in Patricio Alwyn Azocar, a lawyer and president of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), being elected as the new president of the country. He took office on March 11, 1990 and immediately consolidated Chile's return to democracy. It was this change of governance that improved Chile's rating.

Other countries with improved ratings in 1994 included Panama (four scales higher), Paraguay (two scales higher), and Nicaragua (one scale higher). Five countries remained in the same position during this period: Cuba (state hegemonic closed), Haiti (authoritarian), Mexico (semicompetitive authoritarian), Ecuador (partially illiberal democracy), and Bolivia (partially illiberal democracy).

Costa Rica and Trinidad - Tobago were not the only states which moved down on this ladder of democracy during the period under study. Eight other countries showed the same symptoms of democratic regression. They were Argentina, Jamaica, Honduras (each moving one scale down); Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia (each moving two scales down); and Dominican Republic and Peru (each moving three scales down).

It can thus be concluded that during the period of 1987 to 1994, the forces that weakened democracy in Latin America were more profound than the forces that strengthened it. The final count in this regard is 17 points down against only 12 points up.

What caused these changes?

Two processes are considered responsible. They are termed "the deepening of democracy", and "the consolidation of democracy".

The deepening of democracy is a process which improves the quality, depth, and authenticity of democracy, while consolidation is a process that makes "democracy become so broadly and profoundly legitimate among citizens that it is unlikely to break down."

Democratic deepening and consolidation of democracy are considered two central imperatives for the promotion of democracy in any country. Apparently these two processes were occurring only in a limited number of instances among these twenty-two countries.

The process of democratic deepening typically heightens conflict. This is because democratic deepening involves, among others, "strengthening the legislative and judicial branches, democratizing political parties and local governments, developing grass-roots civic movements, and punishing corruption and human- rights abuses."

Conflicts created by democratic deepening may be creative for democracy, but it is also destabilizing. Diamond concludes: "There is often a paradoxical, even dialectical relationship, between deepening and consolidation. While some degree and speed of reform will do more to consolidate democracy than to destabilize it, beyond a certain pace and scope the risks to short-term democratic stability will exceed the stabilizing gains for democratic consolidation."

Does this picture of democratic dynamics in Latin America have any meaning for us in Indonesia?

I think so. We in Indonesia have taken for granted that social stability and democratic development are completely compatible. What we do not realize is that excessive emphasis on social stability can weaken democracy.

Social stability does not necessarily entail stability of democracy. If we sincerely wish to have a stable and democratic society, then we must ask ourselves at each instance how to strengthen the one without damaging the other. This is the only way to make our society more civilized.

It is well to remember in this regard what Samuel Johnson (1709-1784) once said, "In civilized society we all depend upon each other, and our happiness is very much owing to the good opinion of mankind."

The writer is an observer of social and cultural affairs.