Democracy in Indonesia seen through the eyes of a scholar

The following article is an excerpt from Prof. Arief Budiman's inaugural professorial lecture delivered on Oct. 9, 1997 at the University of Melbourne to mark his chairmanship of the Indonesian Studies Program at the university. This is the first of two articles.

MELBOURNE: If a scholar criticizes the government in power, does it mean that he or she has stopped being a scholar and has begun playing the role of a political dissident?

Does this also mean that by becoming a dissident, his or her quality as a scholar has been devalued? What is a dissident really? Where is the boundary between a scholar and a political dissident?

Although all of the above issues are important and interesting, I will limit myself to only discuss the problematic relation between the state and the scholar who is considered as a political dissident in the third World countries.

I would argue that in a country like the present Indonesia, it is very difficult to work as a "neutral" scholar if you try to work professionally and honestly.

Being accused of as a "dissident" by the government is not something rare. Needless to say, my experience in Indonesia can be drawn upon heavily to contextualize this topic.

Does democracy exist in Indonesia? This simple question is difficult to answer because the problem is quite complex.

Democracy is broadly defined as a socio-political system in which power is in the hands of the people. It is a situation in which people are free to express their opinion and there is a possibility to change the government periodically through general elections. When these essential things are present, we can safely say that at least a democratic situation does prevail.

If we elaborate on the factors that facilitate a democratic situation, we can then understand more deeply the kind of democracy we are dealing with -- its limits and its related problems.

When a ruler is politically very strong, it is possible for him or her to provide a democratic situation referred to as a "top-down democracy". People can express their views freely in public and elections are conducted periodically (albeit the result is always that the same ruling elite gets re-elected). However, if things do not go in the direction the ruler wants, this democratic condition could be abruptly stopped. The weak civil society does not have enough power to counter the will of this powerful state.

In this sense, a "top-down democracy" is really a quasi- democracy. In the time of crisis, this kind of democracy can crumble very easily. Democracy is given as a "loan" to the people by the powerful state. If the state feels that it is inconvenient to continue giving this "loan", it can easily be terminated.

I am fully aware that in the West, this kind of democracy is not considered democracy at all. However, in many developing countries, a "top-down democracy" is still better than an outright dictatorship, because in this situation something could still be done. Otherwise, you come to the simplistic and black- and-white dichotomy between democratic and authoritarian political systems.

A second type of democracy that can be identified is a system in which a democratic situation as described earlier prevails. However, this situation is the result of a conflict among the ruling elites. This conflict has made it possible, to a certain extent, for the people to express their critical opinions because these opinions may give advantages to one of the factions of the ruling elites. These critical opinions are somehow protected.

This type of democracy is temporary in nature. It exists only as long as the conflict is still there. When the conflict is gone, then the political system will change again. It could turn more authoritarian or more democratic, depending on the political dynamics and processes that occurred before the change.

A third type is referred to as "bottom-up democracy", in which the people have at least equal political power vis-a-vis the state. This type of democracy is real and genuine because power rests in the hands of the people. The state cannot do anything against the will of the people. Thus, the foundation of this kind of democracy is strong. The state must be very careful in dealing with its citizens because the latter have the power to change the government.

What type of democracy exists in Indonesia now? Before we answer the above question, let us discuss the government policies in dealing with democracy and economic development.

The present strategy of Indonesian development is called the "trilogy of development" and consists of economic growth, political stability and income distribution.

In this trilogy it is clear that the government has put economic growth as its top priority. To achieve this, it is stated that political stability is a necessary precondition. This means that the current New Order government sees that democracy has to be avoided if it creates political instability.

This is parallel with the statement of the senior leader of Singapore, Dr. Lee Kwan Yew, who once said that developing countries did not need democracy, they needed discipline.

While economic development under a politically stable situation is being conducted, the policy of income distribution is also implemented.

In terms of economic growth, Indonesia seems to be doing fine. Since the 1970s, the annual rate of growth of the national economy has been around 7 percent to 8 percent, with the inflation rate staying at single digits. It is difficult to deny that this country has been getting richer.

In terms of income distribution however, we have some problems. It seems that the present government is not seriously treating income distribution as a priority. Since the late 1960s, it has been clear that economic growth is the strategic target of this New Order government, by sacrificing income distribution if necessary.

Income distribution efforts have not past the stage of political rhetoric and is not on the real political and economic agenda. Now and then, business conglomerates are summoned by the president and are asked to give some contribution to the poor. But at the same time, economically strategic land owned by the poor is constantly being appropriated, and the denial of workers' rights and wage increases keep on occurring.

Thus, although the poor are becoming somewhat less poor as the result of successful economic growth, the rich have been getting much richer. The gap between the rich and the poor has been dramatically widened.

Also, although the government keeps saying that the number of people living under the poverty line is decreasing, critical economists keep on arguing that the criterium used to determine this poverty line is unrealistically very low -- thus the number of very poor people is still dramatically very large.

In conclusion, unlike the success of economic growth, in the case of income distribution, the achievement of the New Order government has been at least doubtful.

In this kind of society in which there exists a wide gap between the rich and the poor, the only way to rule is to use an authoritarian hand. Social riots, triggered by this class conflict, always threaten the existing social order.

These riots become more difficult to handle because most of the time they are articulated in religious and racial contexts. The latest riots that have been happening since last year, in which Christian churches and Chinese shops were burnt down, are only the tip of the iceberg. Something much bigger lies underneath that might erupt suddenly, unexpectedly and more destructively.

Thus, in the development trilogy, the component that takes precedence is political stability. Therefore, it is natural that the military is one of the strongest pillars, together with the economic technocrats, of the New Order government.

President Soeharto has been so far very skillful in maintaining the socio-political order. The New Order government under his leadership has never faced any significant political challenge.

However, this tight political control, together with the not- so-successful income distribution policy, has created a serious problem now.

Unlike Singapore, where the denial of democracy has been traded off with economic prosperity, Indonesia is closer to the Philippine model under President Marcos in which the lack of democracy is coupled with nepotism and corruption among the state elites.

Again, as mentioned above, the brutality of the riots that preceded the last general election campaign and the increasing political tension after the election are all clear signals that people are not satisfied with the present situation. All these things may serve as a time bomb that could explode in the future if the present government does not act fast enough to diffuse it.