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Democracy in Indonesia seen through the eyes of a scholar

| Source: JP

Democracy in Indonesia seen through the eyes of a scholar

The following article is an excerpt from Prof. Arief Budiman's
inaugural professorial lecture delivered on Oct. 9, 1997 at the
University of Melbourne to mark his chairmanship of the
Indonesian Studies Program at the university. This is the first
of two articles.

MELBOURNE: If a scholar criticizes the government in power,
does it mean that he or she has stopped being a scholar and has
begun playing the role of a political dissident?

Does this also mean that by becoming a dissident, his or her
quality as a scholar has been devalued? What is a dissident
really? Where is the boundary between a scholar and a political
dissident?

Although all of the above issues are important and
interesting, I will limit myself to only discuss the problematic
relation between the state and the scholar who is considered as a
political dissident in the third World countries.

I would argue that in a country like the present Indonesia, it
is very difficult to work as a "neutral" scholar if you try to
work professionally and honestly.

Being accused of as a "dissident" by the government is not
something rare. Needless to say, my experience in Indonesia can
be drawn upon heavily to contextualize this topic.

Does democracy exist in Indonesia? This simple question is
difficult to answer because the problem is quite complex.

Democracy is broadly defined as a socio-political system in
which power is in the hands of the people. It is a situation in
which people are free to express their opinion and there is a
possibility to change the government periodically through general
elections. When these essential things are present, we can safely
say that at least a democratic situation does prevail.

If we elaborate on the factors that facilitate a democratic
situation, we can then understand more deeply the kind of
democracy we are dealing with -- its limits and its related
problems.

When a ruler is politically very strong, it is possible for
him or her to provide a democratic situation referred to as a
"top-down democracy". People can express their views freely in
public and elections are conducted periodically (albeit the
result is always that the same ruling elite gets re-elected).
However, if things do not go in the direction the ruler wants,
this democratic condition could be abruptly stopped. The weak
civil society does not have enough power to counter the will of
this powerful state.

In this sense, a "top-down democracy" is really a quasi-
democracy. In the time of crisis, this kind of democracy can
crumble very easily. Democracy is given as a "loan" to the people
by the powerful state. If the state feels that it is inconvenient
to continue giving this "loan", it can easily be terminated.

I am fully aware that in the West, this kind of democracy is
not considered democracy at all. However, in many developing
countries, a "top-down democracy" is still better than an
outright dictatorship, because in this situation something could
still be done. Otherwise, you come to the simplistic and black-
and-white dichotomy between democratic and authoritarian
political systems.

A second type of democracy that can be identified is a system
in which a democratic situation as described earlier prevails.
However, this situation is the result of a conflict among the
ruling elites. This conflict has made it possible, to a certain
extent, for the people to express their critical opinions because
these opinions may give advantages to one of the factions of the
ruling elites. These critical opinions are somehow protected.

This type of democracy is temporary in nature. It exists only
as long as the conflict is still there. When the conflict is
gone, then the political system will change again. It could turn
more authoritarian or more democratic, depending on the political
dynamics and processes that occurred before the change.

A third type is referred to as "bottom-up democracy", in which
the people have at least equal political power vis-a-vis the
state. This type of democracy is real and genuine because power
rests in the hands of the people. The state cannot do anything
against the will of the people. Thus, the foundation of this
kind of democracy is strong. The state must be very careful in
dealing with its citizens because the latter have the power to
change the government.

What type of democracy exists in Indonesia now? Before we
answer the above question, let us discuss the government policies
in dealing with democracy and economic development.

The present strategy of Indonesian development is called the
"trilogy of development" and consists of economic growth,
political stability and income distribution.

In this trilogy it is clear that the government has put
economic growth as its top priority. To achieve this, it is
stated that political stability is a necessary precondition. This
means that the current New Order government sees that democracy
has to be avoided if it creates political instability.

This is parallel with the statement of the senior leader of
Singapore, Dr. Lee Kwan Yew, who once said that developing
countries did not need democracy, they needed discipline.

While economic development under a politically stable
situation is being conducted, the policy of income distribution
is also implemented.

In terms of economic growth, Indonesia seems to be doing fine.
Since the 1970s, the annual rate of growth of the national
economy has been around 7 percent to 8 percent, with the
inflation rate staying at single digits. It is difficult to deny
that this country has been getting richer.

In terms of income distribution however, we have some
problems. It seems that the present government is not seriously
treating income distribution as a priority. Since the late 1960s,
it has been clear that economic growth is the strategic target of
this New Order government, by sacrificing income distribution if
necessary.

Income distribution efforts have not past the stage of
political rhetoric and is not on the real political and economic
agenda. Now and then, business conglomerates are summoned by the
president and are asked to give some contribution to the poor.
But at the same time, economically strategic land owned by the
poor is constantly being appropriated, and the denial of workers'
rights and wage increases keep on occurring.

Thus, although the poor are becoming somewhat less poor as the
result of successful economic growth, the rich have been getting
much richer. The gap between the rich and the poor has been
dramatically widened.

Also, although the government keeps saying that the number of
people living under the poverty line is decreasing, critical
economists keep on arguing that the criterium used to determine
this poverty line is unrealistically very low -- thus the number
of very poor people is still dramatically very large.

In conclusion, unlike the success of economic growth, in the
case of income distribution, the achievement of the New Order
government has been at least doubtful.

In this kind of society in which there exists a wide gap
between the rich and the poor, the only way to rule is to use an
authoritarian hand. Social riots, triggered by this class
conflict, always threaten the existing social order.

These riots become more difficult to handle because most of
the time they are articulated in religious and racial contexts.
The latest riots that have been happening since last year, in
which Christian churches and Chinese shops were burnt down, are
only the tip of the iceberg. Something much bigger lies
underneath that might erupt suddenly, unexpectedly and more
destructively.

Thus, in the development trilogy, the component that takes
precedence is political stability. Therefore, it is natural that
the military is one of the strongest pillars, together with the
economic technocrats, of the New Order government.

President Soeharto has been so far very skillful in
maintaining the socio-political order. The New Order government
under his leadership has never faced any significant political
challenge.

However, this tight political control, together with the not-
so-successful income distribution policy, has created a serious
problem now.

Unlike Singapore, where the denial of democracy has been
traded off with economic prosperity, Indonesia is closer to the
Philippine model under President Marcos in which the lack of
democracy is coupled with nepotism and corruption among the state
elites.

Again, as mentioned above, the brutality of the riots that
preceded the last general election campaign and the increasing
political tension after the election are all clear signals that
people are not satisfied with the present situation. All these
things may serve as a time bomb that could explode in the future
if the present government does not act fast enough to diffuse it.

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