Democracy, defense and development JP/7/JUWONO

Part 1 of 2

Democracy, defense and development

Juwono Sudarsono Jakarta

From a centralized government backed by the military for more than 32 years under President Soeharto, Indonesia today remains the focus of attention of many policymakers and academicians. The questions posed were: Can civilian-dominated politics take root in Indonesia and become the vanguard of democratic government in a country that has the largest Muslim population in the world? Can a democratic government, facing multiple economic and financial crises, recover sufficiently in the short run to release itself from the vicious circle of political instability, economic stagnation and social conflict?

What is the role of the military in the new political environment? Will the military's repositioning in the new political system enhance both democracy and development? Finally, how efficiently will Indonesians utilize, to the maximum, their endowed natural resources for equitable and sustainable development in an increasingly competitive regional and global environment?

Let us first take up some general points about the first "D": Democratic government. Most social and political scientists would agree that a functioning democracy would require the following underpinnings:

An agreement on fundamentals about state identity (what is it to be Indonesian?) to galvanize and underpin the diversity of 300 ethnic groups across 17,000 islands, unevenly distributed in the densely populated island of Java (65 percent of the population with 15 percent of the land area).

The outer islands where resource-rich provinces (Aceh, Riau, East Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Papua) are largely underpopulated and have less political leverage at the central government level. Our first president, Sukarno, provided the basis for state identity, Pancasila, by which all Indonesians are theoretically bound to believe in, because of the resonance and resilience of these precepts in the body and soul of all Indonesians from Aceh to Papua.

An important aspect of Pancasila is that although Indonesia is the largest Muslim country, it is not an Islamic state. In fact, Islam and democracy are compatible in Indonesia precisely because our version of Islam is enriched through healthy interaction with other faiths.

Our challenge, of course, is to continuously replenish the vitality of that state identity and the notion of "Indonesian- ness" through broader social, economic, judicial and political participation. As the world's fourth most populous country and third largest democracy, we must rise to the challenge that the democracy we have committed ourselves to will be able to deliver the goods to the deprived, the desperate and the despondent.

A "critical mass" is needed from the locally defined middle class, ideally comprising at least 30 to 40 percent of the population, who will define civic government and become the "transmitters" between the very rich and the very poor. While comparisons can be misleading, democracies generally function with agreement on fundamentals only if a committed middle and lower class enjoy access to basic human needs (food, shelter, clothing) and public goods: electricity, roads, harbors, public education, primary health care.

The GDP per capita ideally should be at least $3000-$4000 with monthly household spending ranging between $500 and $1500 a month. They constitute the concerned citizens who fight for growth and equity, for a fairer political and legal system and who vigorously contest unwarranted gains from the economic pie.

Unfortunately, GDP per capita of $1300 and 15-20 percent middle class show that our path towards a functioning democracy remain marked by glitches, the crashing of social and cultural gears across ethnic, provincial and religious lines before it gets better in 10-15 years. Kalimantan, Aceh, Poso, Ambon and Papua in recent years have shown the seriousness of our leadership challenges.

A competent and professional bureaucracy enables government to function properly and truly be a provider of public goods in terms of the delivery of services through taxation and fiscal measures in order to provide utilities(road, harbors, electricity, telecommunications, potable water ) to the larger population.

In this respect, Indonesia's four million-strong bureaucracy still leaves much to be desired. The bulk of our civil service is largely undertrained and lack the capacity to run a functioning administration, which should be able to effectively allocate critical social services.

For a nation of 215 million there are just 5,000 Ph.Ds in all fields ranging from bio-technology to the arts.

The second "D" has to do with the role of the Indonesian Military (TNI). For more than 30 years (1966-1998) it defined the parameters of governance at all levels: national, provincial, district and local. Because the system lacks the fundamentals of democratic government (organized political parties, civic groups, a politically neutral civil service) the TNI became all-pervasive in defining domestic security and external defense.

Its all encompassing national security doctrine sanctified active and retired officers to gain prominent roles in the ruling political party, the bureaucracy, in the legislature, the judiciary, the prosecutors office and the court system. Up until 1999-2000, the police were under the authority of the TNI headquarters. Each service had independent sources of extra- budgetary funding through clusters of foundations, enterprises and cooperatives.

The writer is the Minister of Defense. This is an excerpt of his speech, presented recently at the 13th Senior Course (KSA-XIII) at the National Resilience Institute (Lemhannas).