Democracy, defense and development

Democracy, defense and development
JP/7/JUWONO

Part 1 of 2

Democracy, defense and development

Juwono Sudarsono
Jakarta

From a centralized government backed by the military for more
than 32 years under President Soeharto, Indonesia today remains
the focus of attention of many policymakers and academicians. The
questions posed were: Can civilian-dominated politics take root
in Indonesia and become the vanguard of democratic government in
a country that has the largest Muslim population in the world?
Can a democratic government, facing multiple economic and
financial crises, recover sufficiently in the short run to
release itself from the vicious circle of political instability,
economic stagnation and social conflict?

What is the role of the military in the new political
environment? Will the military's repositioning in the new
political system enhance both democracy and development? Finally,
how efficiently will Indonesians utilize, to the maximum, their
endowed natural resources for equitable and sustainable
development in an increasingly competitive regional and global
environment?

Let us first take up some general points about the first "D":
Democratic government. Most social and political scientists would
agree that a functioning democracy would require the following
underpinnings:

An agreement on fundamentals about state identity (what is it
to be Indonesian?) to galvanize and underpin the diversity of 300
ethnic groups across 17,000 islands, unevenly distributed in the
densely populated island of Java (65 percent of the population
with 15 percent of the land area).

The outer islands where resource-rich provinces (Aceh, Riau,
East Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Papua) are largely underpopulated
and have less political leverage at the central government level.
Our first president, Sukarno, provided the basis for state
identity, Pancasila, by which all Indonesians are theoretically
bound to believe in, because of the resonance and resilience of
these precepts in the body and soul of all Indonesians from Aceh
to Papua.

An important aspect of Pancasila is that although Indonesia is
the largest Muslim country, it is not an Islamic state. In fact,
Islam and democracy are compatible in Indonesia precisely because
our version of Islam is enriched through healthy interaction with
other faiths.

Our challenge, of course, is to continuously replenish the
vitality of that state identity and the notion of "Indonesian-
ness" through broader social, economic, judicial and political
participation. As the world's fourth most populous country and
third largest democracy, we must rise to the challenge that the
democracy we have committed ourselves to will be able to deliver
the goods to the deprived, the desperate and the despondent.

A "critical mass" is needed from the locally defined middle
class, ideally comprising at least 30 to 40 percent of the
population, who will define civic government and become the
"transmitters" between the very rich and the very poor. While
comparisons can be misleading, democracies generally function
with agreement on fundamentals only if a committed middle and
lower class enjoy access to basic human needs (food, shelter,
clothing) and public goods: electricity, roads, harbors, public
education, primary health care.

The GDP per capita ideally should be at least $3000-$4000 with
monthly household spending ranging between $500 and $1500 a
month. They constitute the concerned citizens who fight for
growth and equity, for a fairer political and legal system and
who vigorously contest unwarranted gains from the economic pie.

Unfortunately, GDP per capita of $1300 and 15-20 percent
middle class show that our path towards a functioning democracy
remain marked by glitches, the crashing of social and cultural
gears across ethnic, provincial and religious lines before it
gets better in 10-15 years. Kalimantan, Aceh, Poso, Ambon and
Papua in recent years have shown the seriousness of our
leadership challenges.

A competent and professional bureaucracy enables government to
function properly and truly be a provider of public goods in
terms of the delivery of services through taxation and fiscal
measures in order to provide utilities(road, harbors,
electricity, telecommunications, potable water ) to the larger
population.

In this respect, Indonesia's four million-strong bureaucracy
still leaves much to be desired. The bulk of our civil service is
largely undertrained and lack the capacity to run a functioning
administration, which should be able to effectively allocate
critical social services.

For a nation of 215 million there are just 5,000 Ph.Ds in all
fields ranging from bio-technology to the arts.

The second "D" has to do with the role of the Indonesian
Military (TNI). For more than 30 years (1966-1998) it defined the
parameters of governance at all levels: national, provincial,
district and local. Because the system lacks the fundamentals of
democratic government (organized political parties, civic groups,
a politically neutral civil service) the TNI became all-pervasive
in defining domestic security and external defense.

Its all encompassing national security doctrine sanctified
active and retired officers to gain prominent roles in the ruling
political party, the bureaucracy, in the legislature, the
judiciary, the prosecutors office and the court system. Up until
1999-2000, the police were under the authority of the TNI
headquarters. Each service had independent sources of extra-
budgetary funding through clusters of foundations, enterprises
and cooperatives.

The writer is the Minister of Defense.
This is an excerpt of his speech, presented recently at the 13th
Senior Course (KSA-XIII) at the National Resilience Institute
(Lemhannas).