Democracy advances rapidly in SE Asian Islamic countries

Democracy advances rapidly in SE Asian Islamic countries

Goenawan Mohamad, Yale Center for the Study of Globalization,
Jakarta

Western media and government often mistake al-Qaeda-inspired
terrorism for Islam's disavowal of democratic order. Osama bin
Laden's anti-American screed seems to reinforce such a mistake.
And yet, a democratic order is in the making precisely where the
largest Muslim societies in the world live -- Malaysia and
Indonesia.

In Malaysia, a multiracial and multi-religious political
grouping, Barisan Nasional, celebrated a landslide victory after
the March election. Faring much worse at the polls, the Pan-
Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), a party advocating the adoption of
Islamic law, or Sharia, was forced to acknowledge defeat.

In Indonesia, the story is not entirely different. The April
2004 election results indicate that while a political party with
an agenda similar to PAS gained more seats in the national
parliament, its influence still remains marginal; once the final
tally is clear, probably only 25 percent of the seats in the
House of Representatives (DPR) won by the Prosperous Justice
Party will be attributed to pro-Sharia voters -- a figure not far
above the 16 percent figure cited in the 1999 parliamentary
election.

Of course, this is by no means a setback for Islam as a social
presence.

In Malaysia, Islam remains the national religion, and it is
still an essential part of most people's identity. Even in a
cosmopolitan city like Kuala Lumpur, Muslims take great care to
observe their religious duties publicly.

Most Muslim women wear the required headscarf, and during the
fasting month of Ramadhan, the police ensure that Muslims refrain
from eating and drinking in public places. Each year, thousands
of people go to Mecca for the hajj. And yet, it does not mean the
faithful will automatically follow the "revivalist" agenda.

The "revivalists", often called in the Western media as the
"fundamentalists", advocate a return to the putative "origin" of
the faith and the establishment of Daru'l-Islam (The Abode of
Peace), a perfect future more or less equal to the Christian idea
of "the city on the hill."

In Malaysia, the "revivalist" ideas have a visible influence
in society as well as in state policies, without making Malaysia
an Islamic state like Iran. In Indonesia, the Muslim version of
"the city on the hill" is more blurred. Despite the fact that
this is the largest Muslim country in the world (about 87 percent
of its 220 million population are registered as Muslims), Islam
has never been declared the national religion.

Resistance to establishing a national religion is deeply
rooted in Indonesia's political history. In 1945, when drafting
the constitution, leaders of Indonesian nationalist movement
overruled any suggestion to prioritize "Islam". The founders of
the new nation decided not to disturb the plurality of faiths and
cultures -- multiple Muslim sects as well as Christians and
Hindus. Still, despite its refusal to adopt Islam as the
country's legal foundation, Indonesia does not want to be known
as a "secular" state.

Indonesia's ambiguity as an Islamic state may be due to three
separate dynamics. One is the trauma of violence. As early as
1946, "Darul Islam", a militia group opposed to the new republic,
advocated the creation of an Indonesian "Islamic state". The
ensuing guerrilla actions between Darul Islam and the government
destroyed much of the West Java rural society. The rebellion was
ultimately squashed after two decades of violence. A similar
armed conflict took place in South Sulawesi from the 1950s until
the 1960s. Consequently, any idea of an "Islamic state" provokes
fear of instability.

The second dynamic relates to Indonesian racial identity. In
Malaysia, to belong to the racial category "Malay", is to be
"Muslim"; in Indonesia, such identity formation does not exist.
Racial categories, introduced by the Dutch at the end of the 19th
century, are not aligned with religious grouping.

The third dynamic is that of plurality. In spite of its
enduring presence, Islam in Indonesia finds itself on the
defensive, no longer the sole guardian of truth and justice.
Despite its prominent visibility in social life, Islam is not as
cohesive as it is in, say, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries.
Since its arrival in Indonesia in the 15th century, Islam has had
to navigate among a plurality of religious interpretations, even
within a single faith.

The plurality of discourse explains the emergence of liberal
interpretations of Islam. One of the earliest and the most
articulate spokespersons of this interpretation is Nurcholish
Madjid. Educated at traditional Islamic boarding school in East
Java, and holding a PhD from the University of Chicago,
Nurcholish has a unique interpretation of Sharia. Sharia,
according to Nurcholish, resembles the word "way", implying
process and thus continuation rather than inertia.

The key notion is "towards" (menuju), and we all are always
on the way towards God, the unreachable, because He is absolute,
and humans are not. For Nurcholish, islam means "a complete
submission to God." Therefore all true religions are "islam", and
even the religion brought by Prophet Mohammed is not a unique,
isolated, or separate entity. When one speaks of the "triumph of
Islam", Nurcholish says, "it should be the triumph of an idea,
regardless who does the good work. The triumph of Islam should be
happiness for all."

To be sure, the "revivalists" will continue to provide a
powerful challenge to such ideas. But at this point, their
political impact remains uncertain, particularly on the issue of
making Islam the legal foundation of Indonesia.

Indonesia's latest amendment to the constitution in the wake
of the 1999 election reaffirmed the 1945 position described above
-- a significant phenomenon, considering the number of political
parties emerging from powerful Muslim communities that won most
Parliamentary seats. Interestingly, most of these Islamic
political parties opted for "pluralism". The National Awakening
Party rejected the idea of adopting Sharia law in the new
constitution. The National Mandate Party, led by the former
chairman of Indonesia's largest reformist Muslim organization,
openly accepts non-Muslims in the party's list of leadership and
legislators.

It is true that since the fall of Soeharto many sub-provincial
administrations have taken advantage of the government push to
decentralize and tried to adopt Sharia law in their territories.
But the general public still appears unwilling to have the
government institute Islam as the national religion.

In 2002, a survey was conducted to determine the extent of
public response to the idea of applying Sharia law in Indonesia.
The majority of the respondents supported it -- and yet refused
to have the government control their religious life. In their
analysis for Journal of Democracy early this year, Saiful Mujani
and R. William Liddle describe the survey's further findings. "A
solid majority (65 percent) takes a neutral stance towards
Islamism," and "only 14 percent of our Muslim respondents may
reasonably be labeled as either strong or moderate Islamists."
The remaining 19 percent is opposed to Islamism.

The al-Qaeda-inspired bombings in Bali and Jakarta helped
foster an image of Indonesia as a country teeming with radical
Islamists. The reality, however, is that the world's largest
Islamic nation hews firmly to a moderate course as it seeks to
build a democratic order.

The writer is a Jakarta-based writer and poet and former
editor of the news magazine Tempo.