Deliver promises to prevent further violence

There is still much suffering in a number of the country's hot spots. The Jakarta Post's Ati Nurbaiti talked to Ichsan Malik who with locals in Maluku founded the BakuBae peace movement. Now he leads the new Path to Peace Institute (Institut Titian Perdamaian) which was launched on Friday, and was among speakers of the International Conference on Conflict in Asia Pacific held here last week by the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) and the Management of Social Transformation-Unesco.

Question: You have been involved in conflict resolution efforts in various areas. What are the lessons that we can learn regarding the strengths and weaknesses of such efforts?

Answer: If we take the (government-sponsored) Malino agreements for the conflicts of Poso in Central Sulawesi and Maluku, a strong factor was public figures in this case, namely Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare Jusuf Kalla and Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.

Another was the media campaign with its extraordinary impact on public awareness (of the preparations and results of the agreements). The third factor of strength has been the gradual returning of the police as law enforcers, whose self confidence was boosted by the Malino agreements (which stressed among others law enforcement among urgent measures).

Unfortunately there have been more weaknesses of such agreements. This has been caused by the vision of a "fire engine"; the government-sponsored efforts came too late, about two years after the conflict in Poso and also in Maluku began.

Other weaknesses have been that the agreements engaged a top- down approach and also an "instant" formula; the Malino II agreement for Maluku replicated exactly the model for Poso (the Malino I agreement) whereas the scale of the conflict in Maluku was far more terrible.

A top-down approach in the case of Poso was reflected by the fact that most of those involved in the agreement were mostly people based in Palu (the capital). The victims were not adequately involved while they know best what is needed.

And how do you see the reoccurrence of violence in Poso?

In Maluku we have had various processes in society such as that involving religious leaders, traditional leaders, the Baku Bae (grassroots peace movement) ... All these contributed to a critical public awareness to the extent that they could no longer be provoked (in the event of any sign of violence or rumor).

In Poso this has yet to happen; we had just began to involve "war lords", politicians and representatives of all 12 higher education institutions across Central Sulawesi (in gatherings). The society there is still vulnerable. But it is important that people did not join the recent violence (attacks of mainly Christian villages, which has left 10 people dead this month). So what would be the most probable cause of the violence?

Some scholars have stressed religion but the most clear factor has been the interests of the local elite. We cannot use our "Jakarta" perspective -- for people there the competition for the position of regent is tantamount to an issue of life and death, But the damaging factor leading to violence is that these elite abuse the issues of ethnicity and religion.

What do you see as the way out for Poso's conflict?

So far the working group (formed following the first eruption of violence in Poso) has not reached anywhere; the development process is also stuck. The Malino agreement contained promises of economic development and that of the infrastructure like Maluku -- although in general things have improved after Malino.

So what must be done is to fulfill those promises -- but there must be no boasting of Malino by Jakarta elites. Second, let people's initiatives continue. For instance, with other groups we are planning a ritual event based on local custom, the timbun tanah ("piling of soil") -- the burying of vengeance. There are local mechanisms (for ending violence).

Development of infrastructure must continue; the intra Sulawesi trade route is very important here.

What about the current approach with the immediate deployment of security forces?

It will work if the police function but the problem is continuing rivalry among police and the Indonesian Military (TNI). The police have indeed become more proactive since Malino. But there are often statements (from various parties including the TNI) that in the case of chaos the police are incapable.

We as civilians continue to encourage the police -- they're the ones who understand the law better.

Apart from economic development and order and security, the Malino agreement also promised immediate legal process for suspected perpetrators of violence. There has been little of that.

For Bakubae the last phase of conflict resolution was to be law enforcement and finally the demand of state responsibility in allowing such violence and loss to happen. But people in Maluku seem to be thankful enough if they could have a home again. Your comment?

The independent investigation team for Maluku failed to come up with results. It must have been the most strangest investigation team ever with each member guarded by so many officers that people were scared and the members failed to get the data they were looking for. So people have come to expect nothing from the state.

But investigations as a phase (to demand state responsibility) must be done so there could be a lesson for the people and for the state, so that the thousands who died did not die in vain. We also need lessons in avoiding similar potential (for violent conflict) in the future.

There must no longer be a "fire engine" approach. And we must not let the phase of investigations and settling the conflicts once and for all to become, say, priority number 700. And the government must not kill local initiatives -- so far authorities from Jakarta always come and pose as saviors in local conflicts.

There will likely always be conflicts among the local elite but we must prevent the possible use of issues like ethnicity and religion, which enable the spread of violence.

And what of the constant rally of nationalism, to uphold the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, such as in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam?

A sense of a "nation" can never be gained through bullets and weapons. It can be done only if the civil society is strong ... Regarding Aceh, the TNI could focus its operations only on hotspots -- but it doesn't need to have operations in the entire province. As it is now, it appears that what the military is aiming for is its "sustainability" in the area.