Decree was Gus Dur's last futile effort
Many analysts believe President Abdurrahman Wahid hastened his downfall when he issued a decree to dissolve the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) on July 23. Sure enough, he was fired by the MPR in a matter of eight hours. What went through his mind that prompted his decision? This article by The Jakarta Post's Fabiola Desy Unidjaja, tries to piece together events of the previous night, based largely on the account of Alwi Shihab, a close confidante and foreign minister in Abdurrahman's Cabinet.
JAKARTA (JP): It was late on Sunday, July 22, the night before the big showdown between President Abdurrahman Wahid and the MPR.
The odds were heavily stacked against Gus Dur. The MPR, constitutionally the highest state institution, had the power to remove the President.
But Gus Dur believed he had one last weapon that could save his presidency: Declare a state of emergency and dissolve the MPR before it began its special session to impeach him.
That night, hundreds of his friends and supporters, mostly scholars and activists from nongovernmental organizations, swarmed Merdeka Palace, the presidential palace that Abdurrahman had turned into a "people's palace".
The majority were there to lend support, whatever decision he made. Some were actively involved in drafting the state of emergency decree.
Inside the meeting room, Gus Dur met with dozens of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) kyai (Muslim clerics). They too were urging him to fight on.
He apologized to them "for not always telling the truth" during his rocky 21-month-long term as president.
"This presidency may have been a mistake," he said in tears to the Muslim preachers.
Outside the palace gates, thousands of soldiers from all three branches of the Indonesian Military (TNI) had assembled since the afternoon in a show of unity and force. The soldiers reaffirmed the message that their leaders had sent to Gus Dur: They were fully united in their refusal to be dragged into his personal power struggle.
Without TNI's support and cooperation, the state of emergency decree would be a worthless document.
Alwi Shihab said Abdurrahman knew defeat was staring him in the face and that nothing that he said or did would stop the MPR from holding the special session.
"He knew then that whatever he did would not save his presidency," Alwi told The Jakarta Post.
"But Gus Dur had to go through with it and issue the decree. He wants to be recorded in history as a fighter who stood up to evil.
"He did not want to be remembered as someone who walked away from acts of injustice," Alwi said.
Alwi was one of several aides who spent the day with Gus Dur at Merdeka Palace, watching the various developments that led to his decision to issue the decree.
Gus Dur practically lost all hope for compromise when he heard MPR Speaker Amien Rais publicly declare that Indonesia would have a new president on Monday, Alwi said.
"The special session had not even started. We were still trying to convince Gus Dur to attend the session, but Amien had decided that Abdurrahman would be replaced, no matter what."
Amien's statement came after he and leaders of most of the major political parties met with then vice president Megawati Soekarnoputri.
Alwi said Gus Dur at that time still entertained the possibility of striking a political compromise. The state of emergency decree was still not on the cards at that point.
At about 10 p.m., Abdurrahman had dinner with Alwi, Attorney General Marsilam Simanjuntak, Minister of Manpower and Transmigration Al Hilal Hamdi, Minister of Technology A.S. Hikam, Cabinet Secretary Marzuki Darusman, presidential spokesman Yahya C. Staquf and National Awakening Party (PKB) secretary general Muhaimin Iskandar.
He asked each of the ministers to present their view of the planned state of emergency decree. The ministers asked that they be given one hour to come up with recommendations.
"If he was certain of doing it (declaring a state of emergency), he would not have asked for our opinion," Alwi said.
During that hour, Gus Dur took a nap.
Alwi said he also received a request from U.S. deputy secretary of defense in Washington D.C. Paul Wolfowitz to speak to him on the phone.
Wolfowitz, who served as U.S. ambassador to Jakarta in the late 1980s, asked why Gus Dur refused to compromise with the Assembly, why he threatened a state of emergency.
In his response, Alwi said a compromise was still on the table and that if the United States could convince Megawati to accept a 10-point proposal on the delegation of authority from the President to the vice president before midnight, there would not be any need to declare a state of emergency.
After napping, Gus Dur met NU kyai and Megawati's younger sister Rachmawati Soekarnoputri, who encouraged him to issue the decree.
"I also told Abdurrahman about the conversation I had with Wolfowitz. He did not say anything about it," Alwi said.
Abdurrahman later met with Coordinating Minister for Political, Social and Security Affairs Agum Gumelar, TNI Chief Adm. Widodo A.S. and then acting national police chief. Gen. Chaeruddin Ismail.
"The officials refused to support the state of emergency plan. They also rejected Gus Dur's decision to appoint Lt. Gen. Johny Lumintang as deputy TNI chief," Alwi said.
This clearly angered Gus Dur a few hours earlier, Widodo had agreed to Johny's appointment.
"You're all cowards. You're letting an unconstitutional process take place. I will declare a state of emergency," Abdurrahman said, as quoted by Alwi.
Both Agum and Widodo immediately left the palace.
"Then I received another call from Wolfowitz who seemed to believe that it was all over (for Gus Dur)," Alwi said.
Gus Dur was ready to make the declaration by midnight, but his ministers urged him to consult first with his constitutional law advisor, Harun Al Rasyid.
The decree was drafted largely by activists who had assembled at the palace. Harun made some revisions with regard to the legal and constitutional points before giving the nod.
Shortly after 1 a.m. on Monday, July 23, Abdurrahman announced his decision to suspend the MPR, the House of Representatives and Golkar Party and to hold a general election within one year.
The rest, as they say, was history.