Dealing calmly with China better for Asia-Pacific future
By Tomatsu Asami
TOKYO: Those concerned are still trying to determine how to diagram the overall structure. But most are converging on the awareness that coping with "the problem" is the main issue. Of late, my own belief in this has been reinforced.
What I mean by "those concerned" are the people considering the situation in the Asia-Pacific region in the post-Cold War era. The "problem" is the set of possibilities related to China.
There are many issues involving China. Its national defense budget has shown double-digit growth for seven years in a row as it rapidly expands its military.
Furthermore, China has claimed territorial rights to the Spratly Islands. It objected strongly to Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui's recent visit to the United States. It recently resumed nuclear weapons testing.
The problem I wish to discuss is not unease over these developments, but rather a secret "anticipation" that fears regarding them may someday prove merited.
One example can be found in the redefinition of the Japan- United States security system. Work on this began in earnest after the prime minister's advisory panel on defense issues compiled a proposal on redefining bilateral security arrangements last August and the U.S. Defense Department issued its response in February through an East Asia strategic report.
The biggest reason for starting the work quickly was that the end of the Cold War deprived Japan and the United States of a common enemy -- the former Soviet Union -- that had sustained their alliance.
However, the work is not proving easy because the United States is said to harbor deep suspicions about Japan's outlook on defense in the future.
At the root of U.S. misgivings is a big gap in Japanese and U.S. perceptions of strategic realities in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States maintains that Russia is no longer a threat and that Japan and the United States should jointly prepare to offset various factors that could lead to instability, such as regional conflicts.
According to Defense Agency sources, however, Japan still cannot free itself from the idea that it faces a threat from the north -- Russia.
Therefore, we can easily understand the reasoning that all quarrels between the two nations would be resolved if they flatly declared China to pose a common threat.
The theater missile defense (TMD) system is another good example. The United States strongly hopes Japan will accept the TMD, but Japan cannot readily respond due to such reasons as the absence of a definite enemy that would fire missiles at it.
However, "the difficulty involving TMD would be resolved if China continued its arms buildup at the current pace," said Taku Yamazaki, former director general of the Defense Agency.
Friction between the United States and Asian countries over the East Asia Economic Caucus advocated by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad could also vanish like mist if China became a threat.
Undoubtedly, the main reason is that circumstances have not yet come to the point where China does pose a threat. That China's military buildup has become conspicuous is persuasive, and it would be a serious matter if China continued along its present course for another 10 years.
There is a common theory that China's present situation merely involves "potential" problems and that it would be hasty to say it poses an immediate threat to others.
It must be noted that it would not be a good idea to exclude powerful China just when efforts are under way to establish a new world order following the Cold War.
In addition, other countries cannot readily become hostile to China in light of the competition for ascendancy over China's enormous and seemingly unlimited potential market.
Certainly, it would not be wise to incite China unnecessarily now. The chairman's statement issued at the Group of Seven summit in Halifax said, "We welcome China's growing participation in international and regional fora dealing with political and security issues."
But efforts to avoid stirring up China could aggravate the environment surrounding that country, especially when there is a tendency to exercise more caution than necessary.
Some observers now expect China to become a genuine threat and think such a cautious approach could spawn misunderstandings, such as that caution is advocated for reasons of strategy aimed at China's markets.
Of course, the situation is complicated by the drastic changes in China and difficulty in understanding that country's true intentions. In explaining such matters as China's rapid arms buildup and Lee's visit to the United States, one turns to ideas of hegemony and Chinese philosophy. However, this is not completely satisfactory.
Regarding difficulties in identifying China's true intentions, the Far Eastern Economic Review pointed out in its April 13 issue, "Our guess is that China does not itself know exactly what it wants to do."
If that is true, China may become more suspicious and cautious in the midst of the complicated environment created by our overattentiveness and excessive caution. China could reinforce its precautions toward the outside world and confine itself in a shell.
A senior U.S. government official was quoted as saying in a lecture in Washington recently that, for the time being, it would be best for the United States to cooperate with Japan and other U.S. allies to keep China in "comprehensive engagement". It would be difficult, he said, for the United States to do so, if it chose to be hostile to that nation right from the outset.
I believe that dealing with China in a calm manner is important for the future of the Asia-Pacific region.
Tomatsu Asami is a Yomiuri Shimbun staff writer.