Dangers of a military counterinsurgency operation

On May 9, The Jakarta Post held a panel discussion on Aceh with former Indonesian Military (TNI) general affairs chief Lt. Gen. (ret) Suaidi Marassabessy, former minister of justice and human rights Hasballah M. Sa'ad, sociologist Otto Syamsuddin Ishak -- the latter two of Acehnese descent -- and military analyst Kusnanto Anggoro from the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). After publishing the views of Suaidi, Hasballah and Otto on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday respectively, we close the series with the following article by Kusnanto.

The Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) of Dec. 9, 2002 is practically defunct. Renegotiations between the government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) remains uncertain, while both sides linger in the shadow of mutual distrust. Thus, military options are looming, amid an increasingly hawkish stance in both the House of Representatives (DPR) and the military.

On May 6, President Megawati Soekarnoputri announced an "integrated operation" in which a restoration of security would be combined with humanitarian aid, law enforcement and governance. Yet no details are available on what these three might entail. It is not at all clear how these would be different from previous policies.

What is clear is only the first component: Combat-ready reinforcements have been deployed to Aceh.

Many issues remain to be tackled during the next couple of days. First, is a political decision under which the President will legalize the troop deployment in Aceh. A declaration of martial law would likely meet minor resistance from the DPR. Whether the decision would invite public outcry and backfire on the President's political standing, especially in the event of failure or of prolonged operations in Aceh, is another issue.

What remains unknown are the rules of engagement by which civilian leaders will devise those requirements that commanders must do their best to meet. What has been developing in Cabinet meetings and in the House has simply been discussions of a "legal umbrella" for the planned military operation.

Necessary as it may be, such a law is not a rule of engagement by itself, hence the operational accountability of the military remains problematic. Recent military involvement in Maluku and Central Sulawesi showed how the military appeared to be an independent entity from their civilian and/or police counterparts.

Second, is the question of military strategy and tactics to be employed in Aceh. There have been demands to ensure that the use of a military force to "restore security" does not set Aceh off on another downward spiral producing misery for the civilians, further obstacles to decent governance and a new generation of angry rebels.

The cancellation of a consultation meeting between the government and the DPR, earlier scheduled for May 14, might mean that the government was under heavy pressure to hold back a military operation against GAM.

Waiting for a political decision, the military leadership continuously stress their readiness to quell GAM. It is not clear whether this drive was a result of an objective assessment of the situation, or a mere strategic gambit of reentering politics.

What is even becoming more important is whether a military operation would be relatively successful, of which the political objectives may well be wide-ranging: Bringing GAM back to the negotiating table by defeating its military wing without massive civilian casualties.

Indeed, many in the military leadership have changed somewhat. They agree that the military operation would be just a small part of an "integrated" operation, and that all components, including the local administration, should contribute to peace efforts. In a rather significant departure from the past, many in the military agree that the benchmark of a successful military operation should be a minimum number of casualties.

Whether this will be realized remains to be seen. GAM, which had effectively disappeared in the early 1980s, managed to reemerge in the late 1990s as a type of mass-based insurgency. Military brutality during the 1990s operations had not only increased Acehnese resentment against Jakarta, but had also provided GAM with a pool of willing recruits aspiring to wreak their vengeance upon the military.

Now, the "victims' children of the military operation period" (anak korban DOM) constitute a significant part of the GAM membership.

The success of operations against the movements of the PRRI/Permesta in Sumatra and Sulawesi, the DII/TII in Sumatra and Java, and the RMS (Maluku) during the 1950s might not apply to the Acehnese insurgence.

While these rebellions stem, by and large, from grievances within the military establishment itself, none of them enjoyed significant support from the populace. Obviously, GAM is not a half-hearted rebellion. It has managed to amass well over 5,000 members, is well equipped and financed, and has taken over parts of Aceh's civilian administration.

In dealing with GAM, the military thus faces a more complicated strategic context. Success will rely heavily on intelligence gathering and analysis, before tactical counter- guerrilla operations take place. Success also very much depends upon tactical flexibility and technical competence. For certain, a coherent strategy and well-coordinated efforts among the various services and branches of the military will be badly needed.

This is not going to be easy; many past operations showed that soldiers from outside the areas where they were deployed were more accountable to superiors in Jakarta than to those on the ground. Unless a unity of command can be ensured, the military operation is doomed to fail.

More importantly, considerations as to the type of political decision the President will take must also clearly define the authorities to which the military commander must be held accountable.

Meanwhile, soldiers should delve into his thin literature on unconventional guerrilla warfare; commanders should draw extensively on personal experience and secondary experience garnered from colleagues who have been on the field; and battalions should be encouraged to maintain training programs even when on duty.

Unfortunately, the thoroughness of training programs, the willingness to adapt to tactics, and the emphasis upon flexibility have not all been marked features of the Indonesian Military. In fact, the learning curve is very low among the generals. They were so enthusiastic to defend the need for territorial command in the advent of the recent American aggression against Iraq, only to fall silent less than three weeks later.

For all these reasons, the military could not win a campaign on its own, but must function within a campaign driven by political concerns, along with a political strategy.

The distinctive innovative feature of many counter-insurgency or counter-guerrilla operations has been in the political dimensions of the campaign, in particular, the emphasis upon winning the hearts and minds of the people.

Such a move would not only substantially cut public support for GAM, but it would make GAM seriously rethink its persistent demand for a separate country.

Sure, the TNI have the spirit, reflected in much rhetoric, including that of defending the Republic's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Their dealings with internal military threats may be legalized in a decision on martial law. Yet, the more serious question is whether they have the credibility, amid mounting demands for restoring their own denigrated public image.

In any and all circumstances, the civilian and military leadership should be vigilant. A short-term tactical "success" of a military operation should not result in the long-term strategic failure for the President -- and further disgrace for the military.