Dangers of a military counterinsurgency operation

Dangers of a military counterinsurgency operation

On May 9, The Jakarta Post held a panel discussion on Aceh
with former Indonesian Military (TNI) general affairs chief Lt.
Gen. (ret) Suaidi Marassabessy, former minister of justice and
human rights Hasballah M. Sa'ad, sociologist Otto Syamsuddin
Ishak -- the latter two of Acehnese descent -- and military
analyst Kusnanto Anggoro from the Centre for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS). After publishing the views of
Suaidi, Hasballah and Otto on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday
respectively, we close the series with the following article by
Kusnanto.

The Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) of Dec. 9, 2002
is practically defunct. Renegotiations between the government and
the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) remains uncertain, while both sides
linger in the shadow of mutual distrust. Thus, military options
are looming, amid an increasingly hawkish stance in both the
House of Representatives (DPR) and the military.

On May 6, President Megawati Soekarnoputri announced an
"integrated operation" in which a restoration of security would
be combined with humanitarian aid, law enforcement and
governance. Yet no details are available on what these three
might entail. It is not at all clear how these would be different
from previous policies.

What is clear is only the first component: Combat-ready
reinforcements have been deployed to Aceh.

Many issues remain to be tackled during the next couple of
days. First, is a political decision under which the President
will legalize the troop deployment in Aceh. A declaration of
martial law would likely meet minor resistance from the DPR.
Whether the decision would invite public outcry and backfire on
the President's political standing, especially in the event of
failure or of prolonged operations in Aceh, is another issue.

What remains unknown are the rules of engagement by which
civilian leaders will devise those requirements that commanders
must do their best to meet. What has been developing in Cabinet
meetings and in the House has simply been discussions of a "legal
umbrella" for the planned military operation.

Necessary as it may be, such a law is not a rule of engagement
by itself, hence the operational accountability of the military
remains problematic. Recent military involvement in Maluku and
Central Sulawesi showed how the military appeared to be an
independent entity from their civilian and/or police
counterparts.

Second, is the question of military strategy and tactics to be
employed in Aceh. There have been demands to ensure that the use
of a military force to "restore security" does not set Aceh off
on another downward spiral producing misery for the civilians,
further obstacles to decent governance and a new generation of
angry rebels.

The cancellation of a consultation meeting between the
government and the DPR, earlier scheduled for May 14, might mean
that the government was under heavy pressure to hold back a
military operation against GAM.

Waiting for a political decision, the military leadership
continuously stress their readiness to quell GAM. It is not clear
whether this drive was a result of an objective assessment of the
situation, or a mere strategic gambit of reentering politics.

What is even becoming more important is whether a military
operation would be relatively successful, of which the political
objectives may well be wide-ranging: Bringing GAM back to the
negotiating table by defeating its military wing without massive
civilian casualties.

Indeed, many in the military leadership have changed somewhat.
They agree that the military operation would be just a small part
of an "integrated" operation, and that all components, including
the local administration, should contribute to peace efforts. In
a rather significant departure from the past, many in the
military agree that the benchmark of a successful military
operation should be a minimum number of casualties.

Whether this will be realized remains to be seen. GAM, which
had effectively disappeared in the early 1980s, managed to
reemerge in the late 1990s as a type of mass-based insurgency.
Military brutality during the 1990s operations had not only
increased Acehnese resentment against Jakarta, but had also
provided GAM with a pool of willing recruits aspiring to wreak
their vengeance upon the military.

Now, the "victims' children of the military operation period"
(anak korban DOM) constitute a significant part of the GAM
membership.

The success of operations against the movements of the
PRRI/Permesta in Sumatra and Sulawesi, the DII/TII in Sumatra and
Java, and the RMS (Maluku) during the 1950s might not apply to
the Acehnese insurgence.

While these rebellions stem, by and large, from grievances
within the military establishment itself, none of them enjoyed
significant support from the populace. Obviously, GAM is not a
half-hearted rebellion. It has managed to amass well over 5,000
members, is well equipped and financed, and has taken over parts
of Aceh's civilian administration.

In dealing with GAM, the military thus faces a more
complicated strategic context. Success will rely heavily on
intelligence gathering and analysis, before tactical counter-
guerrilla operations take place. Success also very much depends
upon tactical flexibility and technical competence. For certain,
a coherent strategy and well-coordinated efforts among the
various services and branches of the military will be badly
needed.

This is not going to be easy; many past operations showed that
soldiers from outside the areas where they were deployed were
more accountable to superiors in Jakarta than to those on the
ground. Unless a unity of command can be ensured, the military
operation is doomed to fail.

More importantly, considerations as to the type of political
decision the President will take must also clearly define the
authorities to which the military commander must be held
accountable.

Meanwhile, soldiers should delve into his thin literature on
unconventional guerrilla warfare; commanders should draw
extensively on personal experience and secondary experience
garnered from colleagues who have been on the field; and
battalions should be encouraged to maintain training programs
even when on duty.

Unfortunately, the thoroughness of training programs, the
willingness to adapt to tactics, and the emphasis upon
flexibility have not all been marked features of the Indonesian
Military. In fact, the learning curve is very low among the
generals. They were so enthusiastic to defend the need for
territorial command in the advent of the recent American
aggression against Iraq, only to fall silent less than three
weeks later.

For all these reasons, the military could not win a campaign
on its own, but must function within a campaign driven by
political concerns, along with a political strategy.

The distinctive innovative feature of many counter-insurgency
or counter-guerrilla operations has been in the political
dimensions of the campaign, in particular, the emphasis upon
winning the hearts and minds of the people.

Such a move would not only substantially cut public support
for GAM, but it would make GAM seriously rethink its persistent
demand for a separate country.

Sure, the TNI have the spirit, reflected in much rhetoric,
including that of defending the Republic's sovereignty and
territorial integrity. Their dealings with internal military
threats may be legalized in a decision on martial law. Yet, the
more serious question is whether they have the credibility, amid
mounting demands for restoring their own denigrated public image.

In any and all circumstances, the civilian and military
leadership should be vigilant. A short-term tactical "success" of
a military operation should not result in the long-term strategic
failure for the President -- and further disgrace for the
military.