Danger evident in America's 'justified' plans to attack Iraq
Alexei Bogaturov, Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, RIA Novosti, Moscow
The skies are getting dark over Iraq. Washington is not even trying to hide its plans to initiate another storm in the Persian Gulf 11 years after the operation Desert Storm. It plans to deliver new strikes on Iraq in order to get rid of its leader Saddam Hussein once and for all. The Sept. 11 tragedy gave the White House a nice pretext to destroy inconvenient, i.e. disobedient, to be more precise, regimes. This pretext is Iraq's alleged links to international terrorists headed by Osama bin Laden.
The U.S. military operation in Afghanistan was justified by the fact that the illicit Taliban regime did support the terrorist number one. As to Iraq, there are no reasons to "punish" the country. Washington can hardly submit any substantial proof that official Baghdad did cooperate with terrorists. Moreover, the Iraqi leadership condemned terror acts in New York and Washington right after the Sept. 11 tragedy.
Still, the preparations for an anti-Iraqi offensive are continuing. The other day, the Newsweek magazine reported that Washington had worked out six scenarios of the anti-Iraqi operation -- from a large-scale military campaign to covert operations by American commandos inflaming a riot in Iraq, which will result in a collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime.
However, the magazine analysts did not find any scenario reliable. "The United States can overthrow Saddam Hussein, but both the American and the Iraqi death toll will be terrifying," Newsweek writes. Nevertheless, "the Bush administration is quietly getting ready for war." The present-day Washington administration seems to be absolutely satisfied with the state of war, which was virtually declared on Sept. 11, 2001.
An external threat is a tested way to distract the population's attention from internal problems, primarily, economical ones. The White House is an outstanding success in this regard -- the Americans feel a nation at war craving a revenge for the terror acts, which coincides with the build-up of chauvinist sentiments. Bush understands perfectly well that a "small," but victorious war can change into a substantial political capital reinforcing significantly his political positions.
If so, there is no point for either Bush or his surrounding to stop the anti-terrorist operation. Since the pace of the Afghan campaign is becoming increasingly slow, while the Taliban guerrilla warfare can last forever, it is necessary to chose another target for the attack. Iraq seems to be the most promising in this regard because Washington has spent much time and effort to persuade both American and international society that both Saddam Hussein and Iraq itself are the enemy posing threat not only to the United States, but also to the whole world.
To a certain extent, Hussein should blame himself for such a situation development. He launched an aggression against Kuwait, which the Americans used as a reason to start operation Desert Storm in 1991, and he is still far from being enthusiastic about cooperating with the United Nations Commission monitoring the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and missiles. Nevertheless, such a cooperation is still possible and the world ought to establish it patiently simultaneously easing economic sanctions against Iraq, to subsequently lift them.
But the U.S. is denying the mere idea of lifting the sanctions or maintaining dialogue with Saddam Hussein. It would rather resort to the use of force pursuing its own interests where oil is not the least concern. Does Washington have any grounds to think that the military operation will have results similar to those of the Afghan campaign, i.e. the change of the country's political regime?
Chances are seemingly slim. The Americans will hardly dare to conduct a land operation. At the same time, there is no strong opposition in Iraq, as the Afghan Northern Alliance. Of course, there are people not only in Iraq who would be dissatisfied with any political system, but Washington is highly likely to face many problems in a bid to find a force in Baghdad powerful enough to carry out the long-desired coup d'etat.
However, the Americans are trying hard. For instance, representatives of Iraqi oppositional parties have recently discussed their plans with their American "friends" in Washington. The result remains a secret, but the Iraqi opposition is highly unlikely to have strong positions within Iraq to render Washington some real assistance in its crusade against Hussein.
In case the U.S. resort to the Iraqi Kurds whose opposition with Baghdad has a long history, in the extremely dangerous game the U.S. is beginning, then this can significantly aggravate the situation in the Iraq-bordering countries, primarily, Turkey and Iran where Kurds constitute a considerable part of the population. This means Washington's threats to resort to Kurds is nothing but a bluff.
Even U.S. allies have a generally negative attitude to the possible U.S. aggression against Iraq. Some of them have grounded fears that a new war will have unpredictable consequences for the whole region, others are doubting the success of the operation.
The Mideastern situation is already extremely tense because of the continuing conflict between Israel and Palestine. An anti- Iraqi aggression, which is decisively opposed by all Arab nations, can set a fire that will be extraordinary difficult to extinguish.
Moscow has repeatedly revealed its negative position concerning the military operation against Iraq, which Washington is planning. The Russian leadership generally supports the U.S. anti-terrorist campaign being ready to continue the joint struggle against international terrorism. At the same time, Russia has repeatedly warned America against the use of force against sovereign nations, which also refers to Iraq.
The U.S. ought to treat the country not as "a rogue state," but as a full-fledged UN member, which implies a constructive dialogue with much account not only to the American, but also the Iraqi interests.