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Cult of personalily haunts Megawati's 'democratic' congress

| Source: JP

Cult of personalily haunts Megawati's 'democratic' congress

By Marcus Mietzner

DENPASAR (JP): Megawati Soekarnoputri's recent Indonesian
Democratic Party (PDI) congress in Bali has established her
organization as the major nationalist force in Indonesia's
political landscape.

Riding on a wave of public sympathy, Megawati's party branches
reelected her as their chairwoman without a single delegate
opposing her nomination. Equipped with a monopoly on the
formulation of PDI policies, she succeeded to maximize the
party's prospects for the upcoming general elections by forging
an alliance with other nationalist organizations.

However, behind the facade of internal harmony several
problems emerged during the congress that in the long term might
endanger the faction's solidity.

The most serious problem Megawati's PDI faction faces has to
do with the very reason for its extraordinary success. Megawati's
dominance of the organization attracts the mass support that
probably will carry it into the next government, but it weakens
the party as far as its institutional development is concerned.

The congress endowed Megawati with unprecedented authority
without installing a mechanism of control. The close
identification of the PDI faction with its chairwoman mirrors the
structural weakness of the party vis-a-vis Megawati's
overwhelming popularity.

Seen from a short-term perspective, this structural weakness
will do the party no harm. In the long term, however, the party
might become a pure electoral machine to secure Megawati's
success at the ballot box.

While this arrangement might work well as long as Megawati
leads the party, it will leave the organization empty-handed and
programmatically hollowed out as soon as she leaves the political
stage.

The congress failed to address this problem. It even rejected
the idea of installing a deputy chairman who would succeed the
popular daughter of the country's first president should she
herself become the chief executive.

The weak institutional basis of the party creates not only
problems for PDI's internal decision-making process, but it also
affects Megawati's public image.

The congress was held in an atmosphere in which it was
impossible to criticize the chairwoman. While much of the public
adoration of Megawati is genuine, the party deliberately promotes
the personal cult created around her.

In a country that only recently agreed that idolatry of an
individual leader was one of the problems leading to its economic
and political breakdown, this phenomenon should be the source of
some concern.

At the congress, there were indications that the absence of
criticism of her leadership had increased Megawati's
sensitiveness. Confronted with rumors about friction within the
party and attempts of bribery allegedly involving her husband,
she made a dramatic appearance during which she reportedly
threatened to step down if the party was not ready to unite.

One of her advisers confirmed that she usually applied such a
threat when she was confronted with heated debate within the
party. Her threats, however, do not create an incentive for
debate within her PDI camp, and it will remain to be seen how she
can cope with public criticism should she win the race for the
presidency.

Another result of the concentration on Megawati's personality
is the sidelining of programmatical content. While she has earned
admiration for her fight against the government's obvious
intervention in PDI's internal affairs, especially after her
government-orchestrated ouster in 1996, she has been less
explicit when elaborating on her programs to solve the country's
economic and political problems.

Her opening speech at the congress was clearly composed in
order to give her the visionary profile that she has lacked so
far. But apart from a proposal to replace the country's leading
judges in order to reform the judiciary, and a general invitation
to foreign investors, she offered few concrete solutions.

Although her programmatical weakness is surely an expression
of the collective confusion about which way Indonesia should go
politically and economically, Megawati's silence on concrete
issues seems to be more than that.

As she pointed out in her speech, her capital is the trust
that people put in her, and nothing else. This trust is not based
on the confidence in her intellectual capacity, but in her moral
integrity. She therefore refuses to make any statement that could
alienate her supporters or potential coalition partners.

The experience of Amien Rais, whose attempts to formulate a
concrete party platform have alienated many voters simply because
of its explicit nature, might have convinced Megawati that
holding her tongue is the best strategy.

In terms of tactics, Megawati provided evidence at the
congress that she has the potential to be a master player in the
political arena. The inclusion of Hasyim Wahid, the younger
brother of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) leader Abdurrahman Wahid (better
known as Gus Dur), in the party's leadership board has formalized
the close relations between Megawati's PDI and the People's
Awakening Party (PKB), the party established by NU.

NU is Indonesia's largest Moslem organization.

Megawati sees the alliance between traditionalist Islam and
nationalist forces as crucial in order to win the general
election. Aware that she cannot win a single majority, she is
taking steps to secure coalition partners as early as possible.
She attended a public prayer on the eve of PKB's establishment,
and Hasyim's joining of PDI underlines the commitment of both
Megawati and Gus Dur to go ahead with their alliance, despite
criticism from NU's religious leaders in the regions and PDI
activists sympathetic to Amien Rais.

Besides securing Gus Dur's support, Megawati managed to
recruit figures from other major nationalist organizations
including Meilono Suwondo, the younger brother of former Golkar
leader Siswono Yudohusodo, in the party board. Siswono is a
prominent member of a nationalist association of civilian figures
and retired officers.

The movement had been founded after nationalist elements
within Golkar failed to place former minister of defense Edi
Sudradjat as Golkar chairman in July. Edi was seen attending the
PDI congress' opening ceremony. Sitting beside him was Kemal
Idris, the leader of another nationalist organization, the
National Front.

Having arranged political marriages with elements of
traditionalist Islam and civilian nationalists, she also
attempted to forge an even more sensitive alliance by appointing
retired Maj. Gen. Theo Syafei as one of her deputies. In doing
so, she tried to win support from prominent representatives of
the Armed Forces (ABRI). Whether she will succeed with this
effort is still an open question. There are three factors
creating uncertainty concerning a possible cooperation between
PDI and the Armed Forces.

First, Theo Syafei is not representative of the Armed Forces.
Even before his retirement, he was known as an extraordinarily
outspoken general. In 1997, he was recalled from the House of
Representatives by the Armed Forces headquarters for declaring
that boycotting the election was a public right. His relations
with the military leadership have been tense ever since.

Second, the current top brass' stance toward Megawati is
unclear. Although the military finally issued a permit for her
congress and Commander-in-Chief Gen. Wiranto reportedly was
impressed with Megawati's rejection of a federal system, ABRI's
political orientation in the post-Soeharto era has yet to be
defined.

It is quite possible that ABRI might opt to continue its
support for Golkar in order to defend its institutional
interests.

Third, Megawati's PDI congress -- in its one and only show of
party sovereignty -- passed a resolution calling for the
abolition of the military's dual function. Despite intensive
lobbying by Megawati's advisers for a more moderate formulation,
the congress' participants insisted on the move. The delegates
were furious when they realized that the agreement reached in a
special commission had been manipulated by party officials. Only
after its political statement was changed for a third time in
order for it to include the dual function language, did the
party's delegates agree. However, the extensive powers given to
Megawati allow her to change this commitment at any time.

Although the chances for a cooperation with ABRI seem slim,
Megawati has succeeded in forging an impressive alliance. The
chances that she will be able to build up a workable coalition in
the next House are high. However, her problems might start at the
very moment she takes over the national leadership. She would
have to guard against the dangers arising from her own personal
cult and would have to prevent her party from becoming a mere
personality oriented public relations agency.

In addition, she has to accept the possibility of public
criticism should her concept of leadership fail. The congress in
Bali has done little to prepare her for this eventuality.

The writer, a PhD scholar at the Australian National
University's Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, is
currently a visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies.

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