Crush Malaysia, whose agenda?

Crush Malaysia, whose agenda?

Dandhy Dwi Laksono, Jakarta

It is almost undeniable that the call for confrontation with
Malaysia launched by president Sukarno from January 1963 to May
1966 was nothing more than an attempt to save the face of a
muddled domestic policy. Moreover, the military strength was
split, particularly after 1965. By creating a common enemy
abroad, Sukarno hoped he could maintain the loyalty of his
generals.

Worse still, the national economy at that time was virtually
on the brink of collapse, which undermined the image of
confrontation with Malaysia as a patriotic political mission.

What is happening today is like history repeating itself. The
general public believes that the issue of the fuel price increase
is behind the Ambalat territorial dispute. This is only party
true.

The viewpoint that there has been a shifting of the issue in
fact refers to the reporting in the mass media of a certain
topic. Though not impossible, it is hard to imagine an unpopular
government launching a guerrilla operation from one editorial
office to another to seek a change in reporting from fuel prices
to Ambalat.

Indeed, only two days after President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
decided to raise fuel prices, newspapers began to change their
front-page headlines and pictures. But this represented "market
demand" rather than political design.

Reducing the Ambalat dispute to a mere shifting of the fuel
price hike theme is basically a departure from a bigger political
perspective. Several issues are worth examining: first, the
connection between Ambalat and the leadership succession within
the Indonesian Military (TNI); second, the defense budget and
military expenditure agenda; and third, the Aceh and Papua
political agenda.

It is common knowledge that the TNI commander's position will
soon be contested by the three chiefs of staff of the military
forces. Gen. Endriartono Sutarto (graduate of the Armed Forces
Academy/Akabri, 1971), now still TNI commander, has had his term
extended twice and has twice offered his resignation. Originally,
in theory then Army chief of staff Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu (Akabri
1973) had the biggest chance of occupying the post, as former
president Megawati Soekarnoputri had wished.

President Yudhoyono, however, was not so keen on appointing
Gen. Ryamizard, widely known for his ultra-nationalist slant.

Meanwhile, it is impossible to name other generals because
pursuant to the law, the office of TNI commander can only be held
by those already holding the position of chief of staff of the
Army, Navy or Air Force.

President Yudhoyono installed in February new chiefs of staff:
Vice Admiral Slamet Soebijanto (Akabri 1973) for the Navy, Vice
Marshal Djoko Suyanto (Akabri 1973) for the Air Force and Lieut.
Gen. Djoko Santoso (Akabri 1975) for the Army.

The President retained Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, 58 as TNI
commander. This move was already seen as his intention to have
one of the new staff chiefs as TNI commander instead of
appointing Gen. Ryamizard, 55, who just retired as Army chief.

Therefore, these factors make it hard to deny the tight
rivalry between the three staff chiefs in spite of the prediction
that President Susilo will carry on the tradition of Army men
serving as military commander. Without the Ambalat dispute, the
Army's chance would be even greater because the Aceh problem
could also be used as a card for bargaining between the military
elite and political authorities.

It is also hard to reject the fact that the offshore location
of Ambalat has enhanced the bargaining position of the Navy and
the Air Force. Furthermore, both the chiefs of staff are two
years senior to Army chief Lieut. Gen. Djoko Santoso, though all
of them have the three-starred rank.

The Army is actually a bit awkward in the face of the Ambalat
conflict, because the area is the domain of the Air Force and
especially the Navy.

In this way, if the Ambalat conflict continues until the time
when the TNI commander has to be replaced, the chances of the
three chiefs of staff of assuming the top military post would be
more or less equal.

The other dimension to the Ambalat issue is an increase in the
defense budget and military expenditure. Gen. Endriartono himself
openly acknowledged this while on board a plane taking him to
East Kalimantan on March 9.

The defense budget rose from Rp 11.53 trillion (US$1.2
billion) in 2003 to Rp 13.2 trillion in 2004. Aceh served as the
main argument for the higher allocation, besides martial law and
civil emergency funds estimated to consume over Rp 5 trillion.

Even before the Ambalat dispute, for the 2005 fiscal year the
ceiling for the defense ministry and the TNI Headquarters was
already pushed up to Rp 22 trillion from the Rp 45 trillion
originally demanded. With the mounting Ambalat tension, a
revision of the defense appropriation is likely.

Then, how much will the defense ministry and TNI request for
2006? The ministry puts it at Rp 56 trillion. This amount is
triple the value of fuel subsidies cut on March 1.

One can bet that if legislators are now asked about the
military budget increase in the context of Ambalat, they will
generally give good news to the ministry and TNI.

Records have indicated that conflict escalation is always
directly proportional to a military budget hike. When the
emergency status was extended in Aceh, the House approved a 15
percent budget increase from 2003 to 2004. It was a moderate rate
in view of the non-state enemy threat like the Free Aceh
Movement.

The Ambalat friction will obviously prompt military budget
lobbyists to break the House resistance as the last bastion of
public funds. It is now evident that the Ambalat (or crush
Malaysia) issue is not only "enjoyed" by pro-fuel-price-hike
protagonists but also involves a broader spectrum of interests.

The writer is a journalist, residing in Jakarta.