Crush Malaysia, whose agenda?

Dandhy Dwi Laksono, Jakarta

It is almost undeniable that the call for confrontation with Malaysia launched by president Sukarno from January 1963 to May 1966 was nothing more than an attempt to save the face of a muddled domestic policy. Moreover, the military strength was split, particularly after 1965. By creating a common enemy abroad, Sukarno hoped he could maintain the loyalty of his generals.

Worse still, the national economy at that time was virtually on the brink of collapse, which undermined the image of confrontation with Malaysia as a patriotic political mission.

What is happening today is like history repeating itself. The general public believes that the issue of the fuel price increase is behind the Ambalat territorial dispute. This is only party true.

The viewpoint that there has been a shifting of the issue in fact refers to the reporting in the mass media of a certain topic. Though not impossible, it is hard to imagine an unpopular government launching a guerrilla operation from one editorial office to another to seek a change in reporting from fuel prices to Ambalat.

Indeed, only two days after President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono decided to raise fuel prices, newspapers began to change their front-page headlines and pictures. But this represented "market demand" rather than political design.

Reducing the Ambalat dispute to a mere shifting of the fuel price hike theme is basically a departure from a bigger political perspective. Several issues are worth examining: first, the connection between Ambalat and the leadership succession within the Indonesian Military (TNI); second, the defense budget and military expenditure agenda; and third, the Aceh and Papua political agenda.

It is common knowledge that the TNI commander's position will soon be contested by the three chiefs of staff of the military forces. Gen. Endriartono Sutarto (graduate of the Armed Forces Academy/Akabri, 1971), now still TNI commander, has had his term extended twice and has twice offered his resignation. Originally, in theory then Army chief of staff Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu (Akabri 1973) had the biggest chance of occupying the post, as former president Megawati Soekarnoputri had wished.

President Yudhoyono, however, was not so keen on appointing Gen. Ryamizard, widely known for his ultra-nationalist slant.

Meanwhile, it is impossible to name other generals because pursuant to the law, the office of TNI commander can only be held by those already holding the position of chief of staff of the Army, Navy or Air Force.

President Yudhoyono installed in February new chiefs of staff: Vice Admiral Slamet Soebijanto (Akabri 1973) for the Navy, Vice Marshal Djoko Suyanto (Akabri 1973) for the Air Force and Lieut. Gen. Djoko Santoso (Akabri 1975) for the Army.

The President retained Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, 58 as TNI commander. This move was already seen as his intention to have one of the new staff chiefs as TNI commander instead of appointing Gen. Ryamizard, 55, who just retired as Army chief.

Therefore, these factors make it hard to deny the tight rivalry between the three staff chiefs in spite of the prediction that President Susilo will carry on the tradition of Army men serving as military commander. Without the Ambalat dispute, the Army's chance would be even greater because the Aceh problem could also be used as a card for bargaining between the military elite and political authorities.

It is also hard to reject the fact that the offshore location of Ambalat has enhanced the bargaining position of the Navy and the Air Force. Furthermore, both the chiefs of staff are two years senior to Army chief Lieut. Gen. Djoko Santoso, though all of them have the three-starred rank.

The Army is actually a bit awkward in the face of the Ambalat conflict, because the area is the domain of the Air Force and especially the Navy.

In this way, if the Ambalat conflict continues until the time when the TNI commander has to be replaced, the chances of the three chiefs of staff of assuming the top military post would be more or less equal.

The other dimension to the Ambalat issue is an increase in the defense budget and military expenditure. Gen. Endriartono himself openly acknowledged this while on board a plane taking him to East Kalimantan on March 9.

The defense budget rose from Rp 11.53 trillion (US$1.2 billion) in 2003 to Rp 13.2 trillion in 2004. Aceh served as the main argument for the higher allocation, besides martial law and civil emergency funds estimated to consume over Rp 5 trillion.

Even before the Ambalat dispute, for the 2005 fiscal year the ceiling for the defense ministry and the TNI Headquarters was already pushed up to Rp 22 trillion from the Rp 45 trillion originally demanded. With the mounting Ambalat tension, a revision of the defense appropriation is likely.

Then, how much will the defense ministry and TNI request for 2006? The ministry puts it at Rp 56 trillion. This amount is triple the value of fuel subsidies cut on March 1.

One can bet that if legislators are now asked about the military budget increase in the context of Ambalat, they will generally give good news to the ministry and TNI.

Records have indicated that conflict escalation is always directly proportional to a military budget hike. When the emergency status was extended in Aceh, the House approved a 15 percent budget increase from 2003 to 2004. It was a moderate rate in view of the non-state enemy threat like the Free Aceh Movement.

The Ambalat friction will obviously prompt military budget lobbyists to break the House resistance as the last bastion of public funds. It is now evident that the Ambalat (or crush Malaysia) issue is not only "enjoyed" by pro-fuel-price-hike protagonists but also involves a broader spectrum of interests.

The writer is a journalist, residing in Jakarta.