Crisis strife opens old wounds
Crisis strife opens old wounds
By J. Soedjati Djiwandono
JAKARTA (JP): The present crisis in Cambodia has put it on the
brink of another civil war. But this is an understatement. It is,
in fact, already in the middle of a civil war, with fighting
raging for several days between the forces of first Prime
Minister Prince Ranariddh and second Prime Minister Hun Sen, with
the death on both sides as yet unknown. The BBC reported Sunday
night that Hun Sen no longer recognized the Prince as Prime
Minister, while the Prince has branded Hun Sen a traitor.
But the crisis need not be a complete surprise to anyone. With
the support of ASEAN and the international community, the country
held an election in May 1993 under the auspices of the United
Nations, despite the absence of the Khmer Rouge. Reneging on its
commitment to the 1991 Paris agreement, the Khmer Rouge boycotted
the election.
Indeed, the UN seemed to be more interested in holding the
election come what may, than in peacekeeping and peacemaking, the
essence of preventive diplomacy which was its supposed role in
the country at the time. Thereby a time bomb, as it were, was put
in place.
The present crisis in the country is not more than the
deterioration of unfinished UN business. This is similar to the
nagging presence of Pol Pot and his forces which resulted in the
unfinished business of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia.
Prince Ranariddh's FUNCINPEC party won the election by a slim
margin. Cambodia has been uniquely governed since then, with the
leaders of two parties -- the other was the Cambodia's People
Party under Hun Sen -- both acting as prime minister. With the
Khmer Rouge's participation in the election, any of the three
parties could have been a "balancer", thereby avoiding the
awkward situation Cambodia now finds itself in. The Khmer Rouge
has taken on that role, although violently, and probably not of
its own accord but in competition for its favor from the other
two parties.
What can the international community do under these
circumstances? U.S. and other diplomats in Phnom Penh have tried
to offer mediation, and the Japanese Prime Minister has
instructed his foreign ministry to ask ASEAN member states to
urge the Cambodian leaders to end their armed conflict.
ASEAN governments may be at a loss. So far not all of them
have made a statement, adopted a position, let alone a policy,
and at least a coordinated, if not a common one in the framework
of ASEAN cooperation. While wishing for a peaceful settlement,
Philippines President Fidel Ramos seems to be more interested in
the fate of Filipino nationals in Cambodia. Meanwhile, the
Philippines Foreign Undersecretary, not without some note of
cynical irrelevance, has maintained that the ASEAN decision to
admit Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar into ASEAN this year still
stands.
ASEAN may be in a position to do more than that. The member
nations, particularly Indonesia, played a crucial role in the
past which led to the current constellation of power and a
strange government arrangement in the country. But in this may
lie the need for some kind of a mechanism for crisis management
within ASEAN to deal with this kind of contingency in the future.
It is a big challenge. The precise form of such a mechanism
and how it will function are likely to be determined primarily by
the kind of role commonly played by ASEAN, if at all, in helping
overcome the present crisis in Cambodia. But if the right lesson
may be learned from past experience, any settlement of the
present conflict should involve all the political forces in the
country, including the Khmer Rouge.
The writer is a political analyst.