Crisis strife opens old wounds
By J. Soedjati Djiwandono
JAKARTA (JP): The present crisis in Cambodia has put it on the brink of another civil war. But this is an understatement. It is, in fact, already in the middle of a civil war, with fighting raging for several days between the forces of first Prime Minister Prince Ranariddh and second Prime Minister Hun Sen, with the death on both sides as yet unknown. The BBC reported Sunday night that Hun Sen no longer recognized the Prince as Prime Minister, while the Prince has branded Hun Sen a traitor.
But the crisis need not be a complete surprise to anyone. With the support of ASEAN and the international community, the country held an election in May 1993 under the auspices of the United Nations, despite the absence of the Khmer Rouge. Reneging on its commitment to the 1991 Paris agreement, the Khmer Rouge boycotted the election.
Indeed, the UN seemed to be more interested in holding the election come what may, than in peacekeeping and peacemaking, the essence of preventive diplomacy which was its supposed role in the country at the time. Thereby a time bomb, as it were, was put in place.
The present crisis in the country is not more than the deterioration of unfinished UN business. This is similar to the nagging presence of Pol Pot and his forces which resulted in the unfinished business of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia.
Prince Ranariddh's FUNCINPEC party won the election by a slim margin. Cambodia has been uniquely governed since then, with the leaders of two parties -- the other was the Cambodia's People Party under Hun Sen -- both acting as prime minister. With the Khmer Rouge's participation in the election, any of the three parties could have been a "balancer", thereby avoiding the awkward situation Cambodia now finds itself in. The Khmer Rouge has taken on that role, although violently, and probably not of its own accord but in competition for its favor from the other two parties.
What can the international community do under these circumstances? U.S. and other diplomats in Phnom Penh have tried to offer mediation, and the Japanese Prime Minister has instructed his foreign ministry to ask ASEAN member states to urge the Cambodian leaders to end their armed conflict.
ASEAN governments may be at a loss. So far not all of them have made a statement, adopted a position, let alone a policy, and at least a coordinated, if not a common one in the framework of ASEAN cooperation. While wishing for a peaceful settlement, Philippines President Fidel Ramos seems to be more interested in the fate of Filipino nationals in Cambodia. Meanwhile, the Philippines Foreign Undersecretary, not without some note of cynical irrelevance, has maintained that the ASEAN decision to admit Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar into ASEAN this year still stands.
ASEAN may be in a position to do more than that. The member nations, particularly Indonesia, played a crucial role in the past which led to the current constellation of power and a strange government arrangement in the country. But in this may lie the need for some kind of a mechanism for crisis management within ASEAN to deal with this kind of contingency in the future.
It is a big challenge. The precise form of such a mechanism and how it will function are likely to be determined primarily by the kind of role commonly played by ASEAN, if at all, in helping overcome the present crisis in Cambodia. But if the right lesson may be learned from past experience, any settlement of the present conflict should involve all the political forces in the country, including the Khmer Rouge.
The writer is a political analyst.