Crises need not downgrade: IBCA
JAKARTA (JP): The London-based rating agency IBCA said yesterday that systemic banking crises do not of themselves automatically imply sovereign downgrades: much depends on the scale of the problem, the manner in which governments bail out banks and the initial financial strength of the sovereign.
The rating agency said in a statement released here that as far as the long-term foreign currency rating is concerned, if the government were to assume all the external debts of the banking system, this would not amount to any change in the overall sovereign debt burden, but simply a change of obligor.
The following is the main points raised by IBCA in its latest assessment of the banikng sectors in several Asian countries:
Since IBCA looks at the total non-resident debt claims on a country in assessing the sovereign rate, this in itself does not imply a substantial difference in position.
However, systemic banking crises invariably go further than this and often entail blanket provisions for non-performing local currency lending and a recapitalization of banks. Simply printing money to bail out banks may prove highly inflationary and risks triggering large-scale capital flight, as Venezuela discovered to its cost.
Timely infusions of liquidity through proper channels, coupled with a program to exchange non-performing loans for government paper, are likely to prove much more satisfactory. It can also allow the authorities to spread the cost of higher domestic debt service over time, particularly if existing levels of public indebtedness are high. The cost of bailing out Mexico's banks has been variously quoted at 8 percent to 12 percent of GDP but, to date, the government has spent a fraction of this.
In the case of Korea, Bank of Korea was slow to respond to the shock waves passing through the banking system following the collapse of Hanbo at the beginning of the year, preferring to maintain a hands-off approach. That approach has now been supplanted by a package of special loans to the worst affected banks, a state-administered fund to buy back problem loans and assurances to foreign creditors that troubled financial institutions' external liabilities will be honored.
The assurance to foreign creditors is backed by Korea's cautious foreign public debt policy.
Likewise, Korea's long track record of budget surpluses, coupled with gross public indebtedness of less than 10 percent of GDP, put the sovereign in a strong position to support the banking system. Even in IBCA's worst case scenario, the agency believes the public debt/GDP ratio would remain below 20 percent, far short of similarly and more highly rated sovereigns.
The case of Indonesia is different. The conduct of fiscal policy has long been governed by the balanced budget rule which requires the authorities to match current expenditure to current revenue. To the extent that capital expenditure exceeds public saving this must be funded from external borrowing: there is no provision for the government to issue domestic debt and no opportunity for it to monetize deficits. The scope for bailing out the banking system using domestic resources is therefore very limited, necessitating additional foreign borrowing, hence the recent IMF package which has allowed the government to close 16 banks.
Thailand's case is similar to Korea's in the sense that it too has low gross public debt and the freedom to issue larger quantities of domestic public debt. However, the scale of the problem is likely to be greater in Thailand in light of the sharper depreciation of the local currency and the impact that this will have on the baht value of foreign currency debt service.
Nevertheless, the main risk in Thailand remains the lack of political will to take the necessary measures to restore macroeconomic balance and to reform the financial system. On financing, official international support has been substantial.
International bond issues are probably out of the question for the time being, but the sovereign's credit standing is probably still sufficiently good to raise medium- and long-term money from foreign banks, while further regional help could be available. However, public sector borrowing abroad to bail out ailing financial systems without improved financial supervision and regulation would put a severe strain on investor confidence.