Crime of Suzuki-Togo line in Japan's diplomacy

Ken-ichi Miyata, Managing Editor, The Asahi Shimbun, Tokyo

Japan's diplomacy toward Russia is now in a state of absolute paralysis. Key executives of the Russia service at the Foreign Ministry have either been ousted from their posts or received disciplinary warnings. Their crime? They did nothing to stop Muneo Suzuki, the Lower House member who was forced out of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), from lording it over the ministry.

The core of Japan's Russia strategy was to get Moscow to sign a peace treaty and return the disputed Northern Territories to Japanese sovereignty.

Kazuhiko Togo, dismissed as ambassador to the Netherlands, played a central role in the formulation of that strategy over the past decade.

With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the territorial issue appeared to finally emerge from the deep freeze to which it had been relegated and seemed to be in the process of thawing.

The newly emerged Russia needed assistance from the economic superpower of the Far East, Japan. With erstwhile enemy NATO looking to expand eastward, it was no surprise that Russia looked politically toward Asia and the Pacific, especially Japan.

Ryutaro Hashimoto was the prime minister who responded to those overtures. While presenting then-President Boris Yeltsin with a generous economic assistance package, Hashimoto boldly proposed that he would not seek a specific date for the return of the Northern Territories as long as Moscow confirmed sovereignty of the four islands belonged to Japan. According to Hashimoto, his proposal was very close to being accepted. But in the end Russia rejected the idea.

Japan waited too long before taking the initiative. The early 1990s was a period of great euphoria-brought on by the end of the Cold War. West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl achieved the reunification of Germany and the United States implemented large assistance programs to Russia for the dismantling of its nuclear arsenal. If Japan had made a move at that time, the results might have been different.

Hashimoto upped the ante with Russia around 1997 when the initial enthusiasm that arose within the United States and Europe had cooled and expectations held by Russia had abated like a fever and turned to disappointment. Moscow began taking a harder line from that period onward.

Against this negative international background, Suzuki and Togo went against the flow and tried to change things themselves. Their proposal for a two-step process of first returning two islands to Japanese control followed by the return of the other two islands involved a good deal of inventiveness. The signals Japan sent seemed to hint Japan was willing to compromise with the return of just two islands while on the surface it looked like Tokyo was seeking the return of all four. The ploy was intended to win Russian agreement. Japan, however, never had any intention of giving up on any of the four islands. Russia, meantime, was not prepared to consider returning all the islands. It did not take long for Japan to reveal its true colors.

Why did Suzuki and Togo undertake such an impossible strategy? There was probably a policy motive of wanting to achieve some form of progress in long-stagnant negotiations with Russia. There is also no mistaking that personal ambition and plans to raise their own standing within the LDP and the Foreign Ministry also played a part in spurring the two to seek a result that no one else had ever been able to do.

Later revelations surrounding Suzuki showed that his past actions were also closely linked to more vested interests closer to home.

Then-Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori agreed to and supported the difficult scenario drawn out by Suzuki in the hope that success would help bolster the popularity of his Cabinet. Suzuki belonged to the LDP faction led by Hashimoto, which was the largest and one of the most influential in the party at that time. Since the support of the Hashimoto faction was vital to the survival of the Mori Cabinet, Mori probably felt obligated to go along with any plan-especially since it was being earnestly promoted by an important member of that faction.

The backing of Suzuki and Mori, both central figures in the government, led to the emergence of Togo and his subordinates.

A distorted relationship developed between Suzuki and his advance guard in the Foreign Ministry in the form of Togo and other leading members of the Russian school. While that relationship allowed Suzuki to dominate the ministry, it collapsed in the most miserable way with the recent scandal involving Suzuki.

There are now almost no high-ranking Foreign Ministry officials who dare mention the word Russia since it has become an overly dangerous theme within the context of current domestic politics.

In the fluid world order in the wake of Sept. 11, the issue of rebuilding mutual relations between the United States, Europe and Russia is of vital importance. The current paralysis in relations between Japan and Russia could likely lead to a major setback in Japan's overall diplomacy. That is the point on which both Suzuki and Togo should bear the most responsibility.